



THE RT. HON. HENRY ROBERT STEWART
LORD VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH

After the original picture by T. Lawrence, R.A.

VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH

BY

ARTHUR HASSALL, M.A.


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MAKERS OF NATIONAL HISTORY

It is intended in this series to commemorate important men whose share in the making of national history seems to need a more complete record than it has yet received. In some cases the character, the achievements, or the life, have been neglected till modern times ; in most cases new evidence has recently become available ; in all cases a new estimate according to the historical standards of to-day seems to be called for. The aim of the series is to illustrate the importance of individual contributions to national development, in action and in thought. The foreign relations of the country are illustrated, the ecclesiastical position, the evolution of party, the meaning and influence of causes which never succeeded. No narrow limits are assigned. It is hoped to throw light upon English history at many different periods, and perhaps to extend the view to peoples other than our own. It will be attempted to show the value in national life of the many different interests that have employed the service of man.

The authors of the lives are writers who have a special knowledge of the periods to which the subjects of their memoirs belonged.

W. H. HUTTON.

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

IN his memoirs, Greville sums up the characteristics of Castlereagh in a masterly fashion. "Londonderry's talents were great, though he owed his authority more to his character than his abilities. His appearance was dignified and imposing; he was affable and agreeable in society. His great feature was cool and determined courage. As a speaker, he was prolix, monotonous, and never eloquent; but full of good sense and argument. He was considered one of the best managers of the House of Commons that ever sat in it."

This description of Castlereagh, written by a no means friendly critic, is, if we except the remarks about his abilities, though somewhat terse, an accurate summary of his chief characteristics.

But the attention of historians and essayists has been almost exclusively directed towards the short period of Castlereagh's life subsequent to the year 1815. With the exception of the brilliant essay by the late Marquess of Salisbury, now supplemented by the memoir published by the Marchioness of Londonderry, no attempt has hitherto been made to estimate the value of Castlereagh's services at the time of the fall of Napoleon.

While the careers of most, if not all, of England's statesmen during the last three centuries have been fully described, no adequate estimate of Castlereagh's life and work has yet been given to the world.

In consequence, the ignorance of that statesman's career still remains as deep as ever. What is worse, the growth of misconception with regard to the character and value of his life-work has steadily increased, and he is judged entirely upon the policy which the Cabinet adopted between 1815 and 1822.

Castlereagh's career previous to the War of Liberation thus remains to most Englishmen a closed book, and it is not recognised that from 1798 he was occupying an important position in the councils of Great Britain, and was gaining invaluable political experience as Secretary for Ireland, as President of the Board of Control, as War Secretary, and as Foreign Secretary. By the time that the crisis of 1813 arrived, and Europe had become one vast camp, Castlereagh had acquired an unrivalled knowledge of political affairs, and was fully equipped for dealing in a masterly fashion with the momentous and complicated questions which were connected with the fall of Napoleon and with the reorganisation of Europe.

Castlereagh's administrative genius first found full play and ample recognition during the rebellion of 1798, and the subsequent struggles which centred round the question of the Union of Great Britain and Ireland. During that exciting and trying period Cornwallis found him a valuable coadjutor, and speaks in warm praise of his "talents, temper and judgment." Castlereagh clearly appreciated the necessity of granting the Roman Catholic Claims, and the justice of doing so. Till his death he always advocated the concession of the rights of full citizenship to the Roman Catholics. During his period of office under Addington, and afterwards under Pitt,

he stamped his own individuality upon several of the measures of each ministry.

As President of the Board of Control under Addington, he steadily supported the policy of the Marquess Wellesley, whose administration forms an epoch in the relations of Great Britain with India, and during Pitt's second ministry he first inaugurated that policy of making a diversion in Northern Germany in order to hamper Napoleon's efforts in Central Europe.

As President of the Board of Control, as Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, and as one of Pitt's chief advisers, Castlereagh had shown that, though inferior to Canning in debate, he possessed all those qualities which are summed up in the word statesmanship. It is believed that a sort of rivalry between Castlereagh and Canning began while they were outwardly united in opposing the Ministry of all the Talents. At any rate, with the accession of the Portland ministry to office in 1807, the impatience felt by the mercurial Canning at having to work with a colleague whose methods were so different from his own soon showed itself. Canning's strength lay in debate, while he was inferior to Castlereagh in administrative powers. Castlereagh was his superior as a parliamentary tactician, and trusted to patronage and the manipulation of boroughs to secure a parliamentary majority. Canning, on the other hand, while aiming at the leadership of the Tories in the House of Commons, despised those laborious tactics which were then necessary in order to obtain for the ministers regular support in Parliament. The Walcheren Expedition and its unpopularity seemed to presage the fall of Castlereagh and the

triumph of Canning. But the latter's injudicious conduct resulted in a duel with Castlereagh and the retirement of both ministers from office. To Canning the events of the year 1809 constituted little less than an overwhelming disaster. His political career received a serious check from which it never recovered. Owing to his impatience he missed the opportunity of taking a leading share in the conduct of the affairs of Great Britain at one of the most momentous crises in her history, and from 1809 to 1822 had practically no influence in British politics. To Castlereagh, however, the events of 1809 merely constituted a temporary check in his career. In March, 1812, he succeeded Lord Wellesley as Secretary for Foreign Affairs,—a post well suited to his tastes and abilities,—while on the death of Perceval, in May of the same year, he became leader of the House of Commons, the duties of which he performed till his death.

In spite of his laboured and awkward style of oratory, he soon established his influence in the House of Commons, guided the foreign policy of the Government, and defended the home administration of Lord Sidmouth.

In bringing about the fall of Napoleon, Castlereagh deserves unstinted praise. It was he who first recognised the military abilities of Wellington, and it was he who constantly supported the plan of keeping a large army in the Peninsula. When few but himself believed in the policy of the Peninsular War, Castlereagh supported Wellington in every possible way. In 1812 he showed similar foresight in advocating and supporting the European resistance to Napoleon in Germany. His diplomatic

success in effecting in 1813 a junction between the Austrian troops and those of Russia and Prussia, and in thus rendering the plans of Napoleon futile and the victory of the Allies at Leipzig possible, justify us in regarding Castlereagh as the chief of the factors which contributed to the fall of Napoleon.

Castlereagh's triumph in 1814, followed by a still greater triumph in 1815, after the victory of Waterloo, crowned the successful efforts of a masterly foreign policy. No minister since the days of the elder Pitt and the Seven Years' War had been in a position similar to that occupied by Castlereagh. Byron might write his "Ode to Napoleon," and speak of "the thieves (the Allies) being in Paris," but the House of Commons, composed as it was of men of every shade of public opinion, recognised the immense debt which Great Britain, and indeed Europe, owed to the perseverance, courage, and statesmanship of the reserved and impassive British minister.

The ignorance which is shown of Castlereagh's career by writers of the History of Great Britain is due partly to the influence of the Whigs, who could not forgive the Tories for keeping them out of office for so many years, partly to Castlereagh's own personal characteristics. He never courted the mob, he never sought popularity; he ever, as in Dublin in 1821, shrank from the applause of the multitude.

Castlereagh's claims to the gratitude of all the nations who opposed Napoleon is undoubted. But to the inhabitants of Great Britain his clear-sightedness and resolution were especially valuable. For he not only supported the War in the Peninsula, but by his diplomacy kept together that great European

Coalition which brought to an end the domination of France, Moreover, after 1815, undeterred by the venomous and shortsighted attacks of his political opponents, he guided Great Britain through the inevitable period of reaction which after a great war is always accompanied by distress and suffering. Under the excitement of the struggle against Napoleon the British had borne with equanimity many hardships, but once the struggle was over and the bill had to be paid, the existing ministers became the objects of hostility and attack. It required no little courage to advocate what was termed "coercive and reactionary legislation." Nevertheless the necessity for such legislation was undoubted, and Castlereagh was as resolute in protecting the nation from anarchy at home as he had been in defending it against Napoleon's projects. Moreover, the idea so popular with Whig writers that Castlereagh after 1815 was "the champion of absolutism in the Councils of Europe," has been entirely dispelled.

"Few statesmen of George III's reign," it has recently been said, "have left a purer reputation or rendered a greater service to this country." This estimate of the position held by Castlereagh is much in advance of the views held half a century ago. Contemporary opinion is often shortsighted, and the impression left on one's mind after reading many of the memoirs of the time is that few Englishmen during the first fifteen years of the last century realised the magnitude of the crisis through which they were passing. Consequently they entirely failed to estimate at its proper value the immense services rendered to Great Britain and to Europe by Castlereagh. The time has now come for a calm and

dispassionate estimate of the value of Castlereagh's services, and it would seem that he ought to be placed in the same category as the Elder Pitt, though it must always be remembered that Castlereagh guided Great Britain through a period far more critical than was that of the Seven Years' War.

It is impossible until the numerous letters and despatches bearing on Castlereagh's official career have been given to the world to do more than indicate the attitude which that statesman took with regard to the events of his day. The Correspondence relative to the Convention of Cintra which appeared in *The Times* of Sept. 21st, 1908, gives some indication of the wealth of material which will be available for a future biography of Castlereagh.

To my friends the Rev. W. H. Hutton, B.D., Editor of the Series, and to the Rev. A. H. Beaven, I am under deep obligations. Both have made valuable suggestions, while the latter has revised the proof sheets, and has given me the benefit of his very wide and accurate knowledge of English History.

A. H.

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VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH

CASTLEREAGH

CHAPTER I

CASTLEREAGH'S EARLY LIFE

1769-1797

ROBERT STEWART, Viscount Castlereagh (by courtesy) in 1796, and on the death of his father in 1821 second Marquis of Londonderry, was born on June 18th, 1769. The same year marks the birth of the Great Napoleon, and of his conqueror Arthur Wellesley. Castlereagh belonged to an ancient Scottish family which in the middle of the twelfth century gave Scotland her first Lord Stewart. To the same family belonged the Stewart kings, and in 1603 one of these kings, James I, gave lands in Ireland to his Stewart relatives. Of these John Stewart received in 1610 an estate in Donegal known as Stewart's Court or Ballylawn, and in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries his family acquired distinction. In 1690 Colonel William Stewart, great-grandson of John Stewart, fought bravely for the Protestant cause, and against James II. His son, Alexander Stewart, who lived from 1700 to 1781, moved the family residence from Donegal to Co. Down, and his residence of Mount Pleasant, now Mount Stewart, remained from henceforth the principal seat of his immediate

Castle-
reagh's
Ancestry.

descendants. This Alexander Stewart married in 1737 Mary Cowan, his cousin, and heiress of an East Indian merchant; his son, Robert Stewart, who consistently supported Pitt and the Tories, was created Baron of Londonderry in 1789, Viscount Castlereagh in 1795, Earl of Londonderry in 1796, and Marquis of Londonderry in 1816. The latter's famous son, Robert Stewart, was the only surviving child of his first marriage with Lady Sarah Seymour, daughter of that Marquess of Hertford who in 1766 was lord-lieutenant of Ireland. By his second marriage with Lady Frances Pratt, eldest daughter of Lord Chancellor Camden, the colleague and friend of the elder Pitt, he had several children, of whom Charles Stewart, the soldier and diplomatist, is the best known. By his first marriage the elder Robert Stewart was brought into close connexion with many of the great Whig families, while by his second marriage he became brother-in-law of Lord Camden, Viceroy of Ireland, a relationship which proved of incalculable value to young Castlereagh.

Mount
Stewart.

In her life of Castlereagh, Lady Londonderry has written a beautiful description of the home of the young statesman. "His home was on the shores "of Strangford Lough, one of the most beautiful "indentations of the Irish coast, bordered on the "south-west by the picturesque Mourne Mountains. "It is studded with islands, alive with myriads of "seabirds, and haunted by the liquid whistle of "the curlew. Mount Stewart itself is a large demesne "consisting of low hills, crowned with woods of "beech, Scotch and silver fir. The house lies with

"Only a strip of sea-scented beach

"between it and the water, yet buried in a grove

"of dark green ilex trees, which show the shining
 "silvery sheen of their under-leaves when ruffled
 "by the slightest breeze."¹

Young Castlereagh had from an early age considerable promise and an alert mind. William Steel Dickson, a Presbyterian minister, has left a description of him in the year 1782, when he took part in a review of the Volunteers at Belfast. "In
 "a sham fight the day after the review, Robert
 "Stewart, now Viscount Castlereagh, then only in
 "his thirteenth year, commanded the light infantry
 "of the Ards Independents. His company
 "consisted mostly of boys a few years older than
 "himself." Then he describes the conduct of the
 young leader. "The manner in which he conducted
 "his boyish band through the variegated and long-
 "protracted engagement displayed such genius of
 "spirit and judgment, as excited admiration,
 "extorted applause, and laid the foundation of
 "that popularity which he afterwards obtained." From that time high expectations were raised with regard to the future career of Robert Stewart throughout the country. "From that day many
 "began to look forward to and to speak of him as
 "their future representative. 'If such be the
 "'boy, what may we not expect from the man?'
 "was to be heard in almost every company; and
 "I own that my expectations were as extravagant,
 "and my attachment as enthusiastic as that of
 "any man living."

**His Early
 Life.**

The promise which was shown by Castlereagh at an early age led Lord Londonderry to form the

**At College
 and on the
 Continent.**

¹ Lady Londonderry: Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh, p. 4.

highest hopes for his future, and determined him to plunge his son as soon as possible into political life. After a year's residence at St. John's College, Cambridge, where he showed considerable ability, Castlereagh was sent at the age of eighteen to the Continent. He visited Paris, Genoa, Rome, and Vienna, and returned home with some knowledge of political affairs on the Continent. Some of his remarks with regard to the position in France at the close of 1791 are worth reproducing.

**Views on
the French
Revolution.**

On November 11th, 1791, he had written his views with regard to the character of the Legislative Assembly which had begun its sittings a month earlier. "From what I have said you will not rank me among the admirers of the French Revolution as the noblest work of human integrity and human wisdom. . . . I feel as strongly as any man that an essential change was necessary for the happiness and for the dignity of a great people long in a state of degradation. . . . If I could do it without seeming to approve the principles professed by their leaders, principles which I shall ever condemn as tumultuous pedantry, tending directly to unsettle government, and ineffectual in its creation, I should on all occasions worship and applaud the feeling which led the way to this unparalleled change." No phrase has ever yet been used which describes the Girondist position and principles more accurately than that of "tumultuous pedantry."

**In the Irish
Parliament.**

At the time of his return to Ireland, Castlereagh had already shown that he possessed qualities which admirably fitted him for his future duties. His personal courage was undoubted, his love of work

was unbounded, his powers of observation had been proved, and he soon developed an aptitude for politics which enabled him to occupy the prominent place among the leading statesmen of the day.

He had just reached the age of twenty-one when in 1790 he was returned member of the Irish Parliament for his own County of Down. The seat, which had to be won from the Hillsborough interest, proved a costly one. The election expenses reached the enormous sum of £60,000, and the contest entailed heavy sacrifices on the part of Castlereagh's father. The money saved by his grandfather and father for the completion of Mount Stewart was all spent, and a number of family pictures had to be sold.

Castlereagh was now launched on his political career. At first he joined the Opposition in the Irish House of Commons, but when through the development of the French Revolution and the intrigues of Wolfe Tone the land was threatened with anarchy, he threw all his influence upon the side of order. In 1794 he married Lady Emily Hobart, daughter of the Earl of Buckinghamshire, a most beautiful woman who was keenly interested in politics. Their correspondence shows the deep affection which throughout their lives Castlereagh and his wife bore to each other, and as far as possible they were inseparable.

Among his early formed friendships, that with Arthur Wellesley is the most interesting, and Sir Jonah Barrington relates how in 1793 he was introduced by the Speaker to Mr. Wellesley and Mr. Stewart, about whom he says, no one could predict "that one would become the most celebrated of his

“era, and the other one of the most mischievous
 “statesmen and unfortunate ministers that has ever
 “appeared in modern Europe.” He then remarks,
 with perhaps a grain of truth, that it was “to the
 “personal intimacy and reciprocal friendship of these
 “two individuals they mutually owed the extent of
 “their respective elevation and celebrity; Sir Arthur
 “Wellesley would never have had the chief command
 “in Spain but for the ministerial manœuvring and
 “aid of Lord Castlereagh, and Lord Castlereagh never
 “could have stood his ground as a minister but for
 “Lord Wellington’s successes.”

**Personal
 Appearance.**

It is quite evident from the opinions of contemporaries and from the portraits by Sir Thomas Lawrence, that Castlereagh was one of the handsomest men of his day. His portraits depict a man “with
 “beautiful features and calm, clear gaze,” and
 endowed with a clear intellect, the highest talents,
 a strong will, a cool brain, and great self control.
 His boldness and absolute fearlessness roused the
 admiration even of his opponents. With his somewhat cold temperament, and unflinching determination, he was admirably fitted to cope with opposition whether in Ireland or England. While adamant in furthering the cause which he had at heart, he was always generous to opponents. In the midst of popular clamour he always remained calm and imperturbable. Whether engaged in saving Ireland from its incapable legislature, or in defending Great Britain from the French, or in suppressing popular disorder at home, Castlereagh always showed the same foresight, calmness and intrepidity. This was the man who now began his political career during the stormy period of the French Revolution, and in ■

land which was honeycombed with sedition and madly excited by political passions.

From 1793, when the British Government granted the franchise to the Roman Catholics, Castlereagh like Clare saw that union was inevitable. Till then he had recommended "Concession to the Dissenters and resistance to the Catholics." He did not regard the alliance between the northern Presbyterians and the Catholics as likely to continue, and he felt sure that if once concessions were made to the former body their pretended enthusiasm for Catholic emancipation would soon evaporate. To the Irish Protestants the maintenance of the existing Constitution in Church and State was absolutely essential, and the idea of sharing the Government of the country with Catholics was abhorrent to those who, like Charlemont, belonged to the ruling class. The share taken by a large number of Catholics in promoting the Rebellion of 1798, which had for its object the independence of Ireland, completely and finally alienated the loyal Protestants from any sympathy with the Catholics, and rendered the Union inevitable.

Ireland
after 1793.

The development of the French Revolution, too, contributed to throw Castlereagh upon the side of the Tories, and led him to support the English Government. On the outbreak of war between Great Britain and France in February, 1793, he became Colonel of the Londonderry Militia, and his military duties necessitated frequent absences from Parliament. In December, 1796, when the danger from Hoche's expedition was a real one, Castlereagh was with his regiment at Bantry Bay. Had it not been for the tempestuous state of the weather, the

Danger of
French
Invasion.

expedition would certainly have landed, and Castlereagh would have seen some real warfare. As it was, the anticipations of the Irish rebels as represented by the lines :—

The French are in the Bay,
Said the Shan van Voght.
The French are in the Bay,
Said the Shan van Voght.
The French are in the Bay,
They'll be here without delay,
What will the foemen say ?
Said the Shan van Voght.
Etc., etc.

were doomed to disappointment, and adverse winds saved Ireland from invasion.

Writing at this critical juncture from Cork, he says, " I am just arrived to find the wind has saved " us the trouble of driving the French away. There " is not a ship left in Bantry Bay ; it is said some " have foundered, and others have been taken, but " all I can collect in the confusion of Gen. Stuart's " orderly room—all his aides being complete fools— " is that they are all gone, and that there is a prospect " that they may fall into the hands of the English " fleet."

The year 1796 was indeed an anxious one for the loyal inhabitants of the North of Ireland. Disloyalty was rampant, and the French victories had raised the spirits of the seditious, who were anxiously expecting a French invasion. The militia were regarded with suspicion by the authorities, and during the autumn and winter large bodies of loyal yeomanry were enrolled. In Ulster, however, disaffection and sedition remained for a time unchecked. On November 4th, 1796, Castlereagh wrote to Pelham, the Chief Secretary, describing the seriousness of the

conspiracy in Ulster, and bringing forward the question "Whether it is wise to anticipate (the disloyal people) or to wait for their attack in the gross —for in the detail we are at present suffering from it. The policy entirely depends upon the contingency of their receiving foreign assistance."

However, owing to Castlereagh's personal influence, tact, and ability, a sudden and satisfactory change was effected in the attitude of the tenants on his father's estate. There the terrorism had been so effective that in 1796, "Scarcely one of Lord Londonderry's tenants would dare to speak to him, if they met him on the road, or would show him the slightest mark of respect." At the end of the year, however, a sudden change had taken place, and some 1,700 men on the estate came forward to take the oath of allegiance. This change in the attitude of the tenantry has always been ascribed to the tact and personal influence of Castlereagh, who all through his life exercised a great influence upon those with whom he was in close contact.

From this period Castlereagh's rise in the world of politics was rapid. Besides sitting for Co. Down in the Irish Parliament, he was also member for Tregony in the English Parliament from 1794 to May 1796, when he was elected for Orford in Suffolk, a pocket borough which was the property of his relative, Lord Hertford. Meanwhile events of importance were taking place in Ireland.

[The extracts from Castlereagh's letters are taken from the sketch of the "Life of Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh," by the Marchioness of Londonderry.]

Change in
Attitude
of Northern
Irish.

CHAPTER II

THE REBELLION OF 1798

Castlereagh
Chief
Secretary,
1798-1801.

THE arrival in March, 1795, of Lord Camden (the successor to Fitzwilliam) as Lord Lieutenant, with Pelham as his Secretary, implied that in the future the Catholics and Reformers must expect no remedial measures. Camden's influence obtained for his brother-in-law promotion to a viscounty in October, 1795, and to the earldom of Londonderry in August, 1796. In the latter month he made Robert Stewart (his sister's step-son), now Viscount Castlereagh, Keeper of the Privy Seal. In May, 1798, Pelham returned to England, and owing to illness practically gave up his office. From the date of his departure Castlereagh performed the duties which should have fallen to Pelham as Chief Secretary, and on the latter's resignation in November, 1798, he definitely became Chief Secretary, and held that office till 1801. Castlereagh had now an opportunity of showing that his father's confidence in him had not been misplaced. At the age of twenty-seven he was called upon to face a crisis infinitely more dangerous and difficult to deal with than that which Pitt had encountered in 1784.

Condition
of Ireland.

England was in the throes of a war with France ; Ireland was honeycombed with disloyalty and disaffection. The grant of legislative independence to Ireland in 1782 had by no means tranquillized the island, where after the outbreak of the French

Revolution sedition was rampant. The Presbyterians and Dissenters in the north of Ireland were republican by tradition ; the Catholics, downtrodden by the Protestant Church and Parliament, were equally discontented. In 1791 Wolfe Tone, a young Irish lawyer, had founded *The Society of the United Irishmen*, and advocated a close alliance between the republican Presbyterians and the Catholics. To please both sections, Tone at first contented himself with formally supporting Parliamentary Reform and Catholic emancipation. But his estimate of the situation in the north of Ireland was faulty, and the political developments which took place there proved fatal to his plans. The Volunteer movement, which had originated in the necessity for self-defence, had become in the view of the British Government dangerous to the peace of Ireland, and was accordingly suppressed before 1793. The French Revolution had aroused considerable attention in Ireland, and in the northern parts of the Island had been received with violent enthusiasm. Paine's "Rights of Man" became very popular in Belfast, and Wolfe Tone for a time hoped that the northern Irish would prove his most valuable allies in his crusade against the English connexion. For a time it seemed that, having secured parliamentary reform, the Ulster Presbyterians would join with the Catholics in founding an independent Irish Republic.

Both the English Government and Wolfe Tone, however, gauged the situation inaccurately. A large majority of the inhabitants of Ulster were loyal to George III and the English connexion. The Protestant Revolution of 1688 was far more

Policy of
Wolfe
Tone.

a reality to them than was the French Revolution of 1789, and the memory of William III dearer to them than the French watchwords of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. In 1790 Castlereagh had joined with the other members of the northern Whig Club in drinking to "The Sovereignty of the People," and the Conquerors of the Bastille. But in doing so he simply reflected the views of English Whigs such as Fox, who felt no opposition to the idea of monarchy, and never anticipated the overthrow and death of Louis XVI, and the supremacy of Robespierre. In fact as early as 1791 it was beginning to be quite apparent that the "Kid Glove Radicalism of the Whig Club" had little in common with the views which were later openly held by the United Irish Society. In that year Wolfe Tone, who made strenuous efforts to invent a system which would keep together "the Whigs and Nationalists, Protestants and Catholics, in a common hostility to English rule," found himself faced by the unconquerable opposition of the Protestants to any attempt to place the Catholics on a political equality with them. Tone himself, like Tyrconnel in the reign of James II, desired by "fair and open war to procure the separation of the two countries." As the success of such a policy implied the absolute supremacy of the Catholics, who formed the majority in Ireland, the United Irishmen of Belfast refused to accept his proposition that "no reform of Parliament, which did not include the Roman Catholics would suffice," and he then realised that a very large majority of the Irish Protestants, though apparently anxious for reform, desired "rather a monopoly than an extension of liberty."

Against this rock of religious sectarianism the waves of Tone's eloquence beat in vain. The admission of the Catholics to the franchise was as early as 1791 distinctly and avowedly repugnant to the feelings of a large number of the members of the United Irishmen.

That this is so is at once apparent from a study of Irish history after 1793. The Acts of 1792 and 1793 conceded the elective franchise to the Catholics and repealed the laws excluding Catholics from juries. It was evident to all men of foresight or political experience that these concessions would inevitably lead to a demand for further privileges, "including admission to Parliament and eligibility for the great offices of the State." The enfranchisement of the Roman Catholics led almost immediately to a violent division of opinion among the hitherto ostensibly united opposition to the English Government. The Catholic aristocracy indeed declared themselves satisfied with the concessions of 1793, and it was left to the lower orders of the Catholic population to yield to the urgent demands of the "little knot of revolutionary politicians," and in 1798 to rise in rebellion. All moderate men among the Protestants realised that the victory of United Irish principles would leave the Protestant party in a minority in Ireland. It only required the organization of the Catholics under the title of "Defenders," and the threats of French invasion to lead the Protestants of the north to declare their loyalty to the Crown and their opposition to all ideas of treason. Under the impulse of strong patriotic and Protestant feelings, Ulster abandoned its flirtation with revolutionary ideas, and the Orange

The Acts
of 1792
and 1793.

movement which originated in 1795 became the centre of the opposition to the United Irishmen.

Thus in the years 1792 and 1793 Pitt had adopted a policy which has been much criticised. In order to break up the alliance which then existed between the Catholics and the Northern Presbyterians he had carried measures for the relief of the former. All educational disabilities were removed, the legal profession with the exception of the highest posts was thrown open to the Catholics, and a Relief Act was brought forward which admitted Catholics to the grand juries, the magistracy, and to the franchise.

**The Effect
of the Act
of 1793 :
Castle-
reagh's
opinion.**

The Act of 1793 convinced Castlereagh, as it did Clare, that Union was inevitable. During his travels he had spent some months in France, and in November, 1791, had seen the Legislative Assembly at work. The principles of the Girondists, who formed the most considerable body in that Assembly, he describes in a letter as "tumultuous pedantry," and in the same letter makes some very sensible remarks about the condition of Ireland. There, he says, the situation is precarious. "I am inclined "to think," he continues, "that it will not remain "long as it is. The government of it I do not like, "but I prefer it to a revolution. There is great "room and necessity for amendment, and our "connexion would not be weakened by it. The "people begin to grow very impatient, the abuses "are considerable, and their weight nothing. The "Catholics are calling for emancipation. I dread "a collision between them and the dissatisfied "Protestants." In 1793 he writes a still more striking letter in which he points out that if the

elective franchise be given to the Catholics, Ireland will in a few years be governed by them. Under these circumstances the Protestant Church could not remain "the establishment of a State of which "the Protestants do not comprise an eighth part." Then he points out that the Acts of 1792 and 1793 will merely be used by the Catholics as stepping stones towards further reforms. "Nothing short "of co-equal rights will satisfy them; and these "you cannot yield if you wish to preserve your "Church and State. Therefore, though the "Catholics may have equal rights, they cannot have "equal enjoyments. Depend upon it they will "struggle as much for the practical enjoyment "as they do now for the theoretical privileges of "the Constitution." He then forcibly condemns the policy of 1793. "You have made an unwise "alliance with that body (the Catholics); give them "anything rather than the franchise, for it forces "everything else." Pitt and his ministry, however, thought otherwise, and from that moment Castlereagh like Clare saw that a Union between England and Ireland was inevitable and absolutely necessary.

In 1794 the appointment of Lord Fitzwilliam in succession to the Earl of Westmorland as Viceroy, had led the Catholics in Ireland to expect further concessions, including their admission to Parliament. When in the autumn of 1794 a conference of ministers—which included Pitt, Portland, Spencer, Grenville, Windham and Fitzwilliam—was held, it was settled that Fitzwilliam should go as Lord Lieutenant, "but on the explicit understanding "that there should be no new system of men or "measures in Ireland; that he should, if possible,

Recall of
Fitz-
william,
1795.

“prevent any agitation on the Irish question ;
“that in any case, on that or any other important
“measure, he should transmit all the information
“he could collect, with his opinion, to the Cabinet ;
“and that he should do nothing to commit the
“Government to such matters without fresh
“instructions.” Nevertheless, Pitt seemed at this meeting to be strongly impressed with the strength of the claims of the Catholics to be relieved from all remaining disqualifications, and undoubtedly Fitzwilliam understood that “if the Catholics should
“appear determined to stir up the business, and
“to bring it before Parliament [he] was to give it
“a handsome support on the part of the Government.”

Though Fitzwilliam had no direct mandate from the British Government to make concessions to the Irish Catholics, his arrival early in 1795 was regarded as the first step towards Catholic emancipation. It has been said that had the Catholics been given adequate reforms, and had the most glaring of the abuses connected with the ecclesiastical and agrarian systems been removed, the *raison d'être* of much of the political agitation would have been removed, and the hopes of the republican agitators destroyed. This view, however, entirely ignores the position which would have been occupied by the Protestant (and in 1795 dominant) minority had Catholic emancipation been granted. Fitzwilliam's arrival in Ireland, however, was regarded by the excitable Catholic population as implying the adoption by the British Government of a policy of conciliation and emancipation.

He arrived in Ireland on January 4th, 1795 ; on the 8th he wrote to Portland assuring him that he

would do his best to put a stop to the Catholic agitation. On the 15th, however, he wrote stating his opinion that, "not to grant cheerfully all that the Catholics wish, will not only be exceedingly impolitic, but perhaps dangerous." In the same despatch he urged Portland to discuss without delay the whole matter with Pitt. No reply was sent to Fitzwilliam till February 15th, when Portland wrote advising him not to countenance the immediate adoption of a measure for Catholic emancipation. In the meantime the Irish Parliament had met, and Fitzwilliam had expressed his determination to support a bill for the immediate grant of Catholic emancipation, to be followed by a Reform Bill. Fitzwilliam's determination caused the greatest alarm among the government officials in Ireland, no less than among the Members of the Cabinet, and on February 19th, 1795, he was hastily recalled.

The recall of Fitzwilliam forms a landmark in Irish history. It implied that the doubts expressed by Castlereagh and Clare as to the wisdom of the Act of 1793 were fully justified. Fitzwilliam openly proposed to dismiss from their posts all who opposed Catholic emancipation. He obviously intended to develop the policy of concession implied in the Act of 1793, and his arrival in Ireland "had encouraged extravagant expectations in the popular mind." With a rashness which is unique in the history of the representatives of a Government, Fitzwilliam deliberately and openly disregarded the arrangements which had been "definitely sanctioned and prescribed by the Cabinet," and committed acts and indicated the adoption of a policy which were entirely counter to the directions which he had received from Pitt.

Fitzwilliam's recall a Landmark in Irish history.

Fitzgibbon (Lord Clare), the Irish Chancellor, who was hated by the popular party in Ireland, saw his influence seriously threatened and his position being undermined. As a strong opponent of the Catholic claims, and as Pitt's "most trusted adviser on Irish affairs," he at once informed the Cabinet of Fitzwilliam's intentions, and caused George III to be told that the admission of Catholics into Parliament would be a breach of his Coronation Oath. In that "narrow and obstinate but scrupulous" mind, this belief was now irrevocably imbedded." Pitt declared that Beresford's dismissal¹ was in direct opposition to the Cabinet understanding, and as Fitzwilliam's conduct was not even defended by his closest friends in the Cabinet, he was on February 19th, 1795, suddenly recalled.

Rebellion
and
anarchy
inevitable.

Lord Camden was appointed Viceroy, and his appointment was understood to imply a restoration of the system of government which had existed under Lord Westmorland. Pitt had now determined not to pursue the policy to which the Act of 1793 and the appointment of Fitzwilliam had apparently committed him. Riots took place in Dublin, all hope of satisfying the extreme Catholics was at an end, and the Catholic population became the tools of the revolutionary Society of United Irishmen. One result of this action on the part of the Catholics was to throw the majority of the northern Protestants, whether Churchmen or Presbyterians, on the side of the Government. In 1795 the Orange Society was formed in Ulster, and henceforward was the

¹ John Beresford, who was dismissed from his post by Fitzwilliam, was a leader of the Protestant Ascendancy party, and was virtually King of Ireland.

centre of the opposition to Defenderism, as the Catholic organisation was called. On September 21st, 1795, the Battle of the Diamond (so-called from the name of the hamlet where it took place) was fought between the contending parties, resulting in a victory for the Protestants. Henceforward till the Union, Ireland was the scene of anarchy, which in 1798 developed into a definite rebellion on the part of the Catholics and the United Irishmen.

The increasing anarchy in Ireland seemed to arouse at times a certain amount of attention in England. One of Maria Josepha Holroyd's friends wrote, in July, 1795, and told her that she had lately heard from the Rev. G. Coxe, who found on his arrival in the neighbourhood of Kelly that the "Defenders" had again become very daring; "burning houses, laming cattle, and roasting people alive (!) : harassing the military, who are day and "night out."

Such indications of the condition of Ireland as are given in the above letter were valuable, in that they brought home to residents in England the misery which was caused to dwellers in Ireland by the anarchic conditions which prevailed in many parts of the island.

Castlereagh had now attained to a position of considerable importance in Ireland. In the Irish House of Commons he had ably defended Ireland's trade, and in April, 1798, his talents and patriotism were recognised by the bestowal upon him of the Freedom of the City of Dublin. On the gold box which was presented with it is inscribed the fact that the Freedom of the City was conferred upon Castlereagh in testimony of the high esteem which

Castlereagh
and the
Rebellion
of 1798.

was entertained for his wisdom, talents, and patriotism. Those qualities were already required by the young statesman, for the famous rebellion of 1798 was on the verge of breaking out. That rebellion, while tending towards the dismemberment of the Empire, was also directed against "the persons and property of the well affected, and against the Courts of Justice." But the main object of the leaders of the rebellion was "A republican form of government, and separation from England, and not Catholic emancipation or the establishment of the Catholic religion." Wolfe Tone's correspondence leaves no doubt on this matter. "To subvert the tyranny of our execrable government, to break the connexion with England, the never-failing source of our political evils, and to assert the independence of my country, these were my objects." These words, written by Tone, express with great candour the aims which he and his fellow conspirators hoped to achieve. "No fact can be more established than that the Society of United Irishmen from the first moment of its institution has been with respect to its leading members a band of systematic traitors." And it is apparent that the most vigorous measures on the part of the Government were necessary and justifiable.

Castlereagh was largely responsible for the administration during the rebellion, and urged that its suppression should be carried out by a proper military force, and not entrusted to local Orange Volunteers. "I consider," he wrote to Pitt, "it peculiarly advantageous that we shall owe our security so entirely to the interposition of Great Britain. I have always been apprehensive of

"that false confidence which might arise from an impression that security had been obtained by our own exertions. Nothing would tend to make the public mind impracticable with a view to that future settlement without which we can never hope for any permanent tranquillity." There is no doubt that Castlereagh was right, and that English soldiers alone should have been used. As it was, the Yeomanry who were mainly though not entirely Protestant, and who numbered some 37,000, saved Ireland. Their employment, however, only strengthened the traditional hatred between the Catholics and Protestants.

During the troubled period of the rebellion, Castlereagh received admirable assistance from his secretary, Alexander Knox. This remarkable man, who was three years older than Castlereagh, had studied Irish politics in a most thorough manner. At first, in agreement with Grattan, he had been "a sincere and zealous advocate for a limited parliamentary reform." But like all men of statesmanlike views, he had viewed the methods and policy of the United Irishmen with disfavour, and opposed all concessions to such a revolutionary organisation. In 1795, his "Essays on the Political Circumstances of Ireland" showed a remarkably accurate acquaintance with the "true inwardness of the United Irish movement, long before the danger had been substantiated by the Reports of the Secret Parliamentary Committees, of the most instructive of which, that of the Irish House of Commons in 1798, Knox was himself to be the author."¹

**Alexander
Knox and
the United
Irishmen.**

¹ Falkiner, "Studies in Irish History," p. 61.

**Suppression
of the
rebellion.**

The year 1798 proved the turning point in the history of the rebellious movements in Ireland. The United Irishmen were in close correspondence with the London Corresponding Society, and treasonable designs, some even involving the murder of the king, were discussed. In February the Irish Revolutionary Committee resolved to agree to no terms which did not provide for the total separation of Ireland from Great Britain. To this resolution the Irish Government replied by arresting on March 14th the whole Executive Committee, fourteen in number, with the exception of Lord Edward Fitzgerald, a younger son of the Duke of Leinster, and nephew of the Duke of Richmond. On May 19th, however, he was arrested in Dublin after a violent struggle, and died on June 4th. The prospects of the rebels were practically ruined by the death of their able leader. The rebellion had broken out on May 23rd, 1798, and the excesses of the rebels so alarmed the English Government that, yielding to Castlereagh's repeated demands, reinforcements were sent from England. With these troops General Lake attacked the rebel forces on Vinegar Hill, on June 21st. The rebels had 14,000 men and 13 guns, while Lake had only 10,000. The royal troops, however, soon proved their superiority, and aided by the militia won a decisive victory.

On June 22nd Castlereagh wrote to General Lake pointing out that while the leaders were just objects of punishment, the mass of the rebels "were mere instruments in the hands of the more wicked." He recognized that among the rebels there was an irreconcilable minority which was thoroughly disloyal and which considered that it was perfectly justifiable

to invite a French invasion. In a memoir signed by A. O'Connor, Thomas Emmet, and W. J. Macnevin, it was stated that "the people (under certain conditions) had a right to resist, and were free to seek for allies wherever they were to be found. The English revolutionists of 1688 had called in the assistance of a foreign republic to overthrow their oppressors."

Castlereagh, into whose hands the above memoir had fallen, became quite convinced in 1798 that the only way to make Ireland a loyal member of the Empire was to effect a Legislative Union. And henceforward all his efforts were directed to that end. On June 11th, Cornwallis had succeeded Camden as Viceroy, and at once concurred with Castlereagh in ordering the adoption of merciful measures to the vanquished. The appointment of Cornwallis as successor of Camden was undoubtedly a wise measure. The latter had been practically pledged to resist concessions to the Roman Catholics, and was connected in men's minds with the recall of Fitzwilliam. Cornwallis, whose name is usually associated with the disaster at Yorktown, had shown considerable capacity during the period of his Governor-Generalship in India. He was well fitted for the difficult task of ruling Ireland at this critical time. Honest, straightforward, patriotic, Cornwallis was an admirable example of that devotion to duty which characterized the most distinguished Englishmen of that day. The task before him was a most difficult one, for it was nothing less than to carry a Legislative Union between England and Ireland.

On his arrival in Ireland, he at once endeavoured

**The Views
of Castle-
reagh and
Cornwallis.**

to remove the religious element from the struggle, and to substitute the word Jacobinism for Catholicism as the foundation of the rebellion.

In his correspondence, Cornwallis spoke in the highest terms of the services which Castlereagh had performed during this anxious period. Both men were in favour of acting liberally towards the insurgents, but their views were not fully endorsed by the English Government, which, however, appreciated Castlereagh's generous views with regard to the difficult question of Catholic emancipation, and recognised that he and Cornwallis were admirably adapted for furthering the scheme for a union of England and Ireland.

From the moment of his arrival, Cornwallis insisted that the rebellion was Jacobin, and neither religious nor national. While he gave no mercy to those who held Jacobin opinions, he attempted to conciliate the Catholics by publishing an amnesty for all who would lay down their arms. In the words of Castlereagh, it was the earnest wish of both himself and Cornwallis that "the amnesty should "have all the grace possible, and be pushed as far "as compatible with the public safety." Owing, however, to the intervention of the English Government, the exceptions insisted upon were very numerous, and the amnesty consequently did not have the full effect designed by its authors.

By many the amnesty was regarded as a sign of weakness, and anarchy reigned over many parts of Ireland. The suppression of the roving bands of rebels took some months, and was enlivened by the landing of a French force in Killala Bay in

The French
expedition
to Ireland,
1798.
The
Castlebar
Races,
1798.

August. Under General Humbert 800 Frenchmen aided by 1,000 armed Irish peasants, put to flight some 2,000 disaffected militia in a battle known as the Castlebar Races. But Lord Cornwallis with some reliable troops, acting in conjunction with Admiral Warren, who destroyed the French squadron which was bringing reinforcements, forced the invaders to surrender on September 8th. The disaffected militia were no longer employed, and their place was taken by English and Scottish regiments. The failure of the French invasion lessened the confidence of the rebellious Irish in their power to resist the Government, and Castlereagh considered it "peculiarly advantageous that we" shall owe our security so entirely to the interposition "of Great Britain."

The rebellion was over, but Ireland had suffered much from the devastation caused by the years of strife. Moreover, the danger of renewed French invasions still remained. It was evident that the whole system of the Government of Ireland must, without any delay, be entirely remodelled. The only satisfactory safeguard against a continuance of anarchy, and against a renewal of French attempts lay, in the opinion of Pitt and Castlereagh, in a close union between England and Ireland.

[The quotations from Castlereagh's letters and speeches are taken from Alison's "Life of Castlereagh."]

Union with
England
necessary.

CHAPTER III

THE UNION

The
necessity
of the
Union.

THE events of the late rebellion in Ireland, and the continued threats of a French invasion tended to strengthen Castlereagh's conviction that a Union was necessary. The strife of parties in Ireland was so deep-rooted and bitter, that in his opinion unless the whole system of government was changed, and the island ruled on imperial principles, there was no chance of Ireland remaining a possession of Great Britain. Pelham had definitely resigned his post of Chief Secretary in November, 1798, as he was strongly opposed to any concessions to the Roman Catholics, and it was left to Castlereagh, his successor, and to Cornwallis, the successor of Camden, to carry out the Union of Ireland with England. Both men had already declared their views. The Union of England and Ireland together with Catholic emancipation would in their opinion bring peace to Ireland, which would in future be a source of strength and not an element of weakness to England. On this subject Cornwallis had already written strongly to Pitt, and stated that, "if it is in contemplation ever
"to extend the privileges of the Union to the Roman
"Catholics, the present appears to be the only
"opportunity which the British ministry can have
"of obtaining any credit from the boon which must
"otherwise in a short time be extorted from them."¹

¹ This happened in 1829.

In spite of the pressing exigencies of the war with France, Pitt's attention was absorbed in the Irish problem, and he fully agreed with the views of Castlereagh and Cornwallis. The resignation of Pelham had enabled him to appoint Castlereagh as Chief Secretary, and that in spite of the rule hitherto observed, that the Chief Secretary should not be an Irishman. At first Pitt had been reluctant to break the rule, but as early as August, 1798, he had been so impressed by the ability and impartiality shown by Castlereagh during the rebellion, that he had decided to nominate Castlereagh as Pelham's successor as soon as the latter should have resigned. Castlereagh's definite appointment as Chief Secretary gave the greatest satisfaction to Cornwallis, who in a letter to the Duke of Portland spoke in the highest terms of Castlereagh's intimate knowledge of the characters and connexions of the principal personages in Ireland. "He is," declared Cornwallis, "so very unlike an Irishman" that, "although I admit the propriety of the general rule, I think he has a just claim to an exception in his favour."

Castle-
reagh
Chief
Secretary.

Castlereagh had indeed shown a remarkable aptitude for his difficult post, and Pitt was fully capable of estimating at their real value the judgment, talents and tact that the young Irishman had already shown during the trying period of the rebellion.

No man was better fitted to carry the Union in the Irish House of Commons, of which he was now *ex officio* the leader. The difficulties before him and Cornwallis were immense. Both men recognised that under the existing system justice to the Catholics was impossible, and that there was no hope of

The Views
of Castle-
reagh and
Cornwallis.

securing the admission of the Catholics to the Irish Parliament. It was also equally apparent to them that the admission of the Catholics, who were in a large majority in the country, to the Irish Parliament would be immediately followed by the permanent predominance of Catholicism in Ireland, and by the confiscation of the property of the Protestants. Any attempt, therefore, to admit Catholic representatives into the Irish Parliament would be at once followed by a civil war of extermination. The Catholic rebels were still openly bent on the extermination of the Orangemen, while the Protestants never ceased attacking the Government for its leniency towards the Catholic rebels.

The
necessity
of the
Union.

In spite of much that has been said to the contrary, it seems certain that, although the idea and expediency of a legislative union had been at times considered by Pitt and other statesmen, there existed before the rebellion in 1798 no definite project for bringing about such a measure. And even as late as June 20th, 1798, the date of the landing of Lord Cornwallis in Ireland, there was no intention on the part of the English Cabinet to effect a union. Shortly, however, after his arrival in Ireland, the idea was definitely broached, and Castlereagh received a letter from Lord Camden in which it was stated that "the King and every one of his ministers are inclined to an Union, and it will certainly be taken into consideration here." Castlereagh had long been in favour of the union, and when in the autumn of 1798 he and Cornwallis consulted several leading Irish politicians, they were much gratified to find that "the difficulties and disadvantages of the present system" were pretty

generally recognised, though opinions as to the best remedy widely differed.

Pitt had already made up his mind that union was absolutely necessary. The rebellion had shown that in a great struggle such as Great Britain was then carrying on with the French Revolution, the constitution which had been granted to Ireland in 1782 was a source of danger to the Empire, and that it was imperative that a legislative union between Ireland and Great Britain must be effected without delay. Without such a Union Ireland had no chance of securing tranquillity. The rebellion had left the Protestants and Catholics arrayed against one another, and though the latter had in 1793 obtained the suffrage, it was impossible to grant them emancipation, seeing that they far outnumbered the Protestants. Pitt therefore resolved to bring about a legislative union between Ireland and Great Britain, but after October, 1798, owing it is said to the arguments advanced by Lord Clare, who visited him at Holwood, he seems to have recognised that emancipation must follow and not be coupled with his scheme of a union.

That Pitt, Cornwallis and Castlereagh were justified in insisting upon the union there can be little doubt. The "Grattan Constitution" had practically been a failure; the treasonable intercourse of Wolfe Tone and Fitzgerald with the French had revealed a constant and immense danger to England, the outbreak of the rebellion of 1798, and rendered it impossible to prolong the period of legislative independence. Had Pitt carried his original scheme with regard to Irish commerce, and had it been rendered impossible for the two legislatures to adopt

Its Justifications.

divergent lines of policy on important, nay vital constitutional questions, the development of Irish history after 1782 might have taken a course widely different from that which ended in treasonable negotiations with France and the rebellion of 1798. But Pitt, Cornwallis and Castlereagh all intended that a measure of Catholic emancipation, *i.e.*, the final removal of Catholic disabilities, should accompany or immediately follow the union.

Agitation
in Ireland.

In October, 1798, the leading Dublin newspaper had sounded the alarm, and from that time till the union was effected, Ireland was rent by dissensions. Had it not been for the rebellion of 1798 the English Government could not have hoped to find any support in Ireland for their proposal. But the alarms and disturbances which preceded the rebellion, together with the discredit into which the Irish Parliament had fallen, shook the confidence of many in the existing system of government, and rendered them ready to consider the question of union. A large number of the Protestants in Ireland now realised that at any moment their lives might be at the mercy of the Catholic population, and that the presence of a strong English force was necessary for their protection. The Catholics on their part resented the triumph of the insulting Orange faction, and owing to their exclusion from Parliament saw no chance of relief so long as the present governmental system existed. Castlereagh relied to a great extent upon the realisation of the Irish Protestants that they owed their safety to English aid. But, unfortunately, that aid had not arrived till the crisis was over, and the Protestants, attributing the late anarchy to the concession, by England's

influence, of the suffrage to the Catholics, maintained that their ascendancy was absolutely necessary for the welfare of the country. Grattan and his followers were united in resisting the idea that union was the only cure for Ireland's evils. Given parliamentary reform, Catholic emancipation, and the commutation of tithes, they were convinced that the condition of Ireland would rapidly improve. But Castlereagh never showed any liking for Grattan's desire to see Catholics in the Irish Parliament. Like Pitt, he recognised that their admission would be a most dangerous experiment, and would at once provoke a civil war. One of the chief reasons for his advocacy of the Union was that it would lead to the emancipation of the Catholics, and at the same time would remove all danger of their political preponderance in Ireland.

Thus while it may be said that a large majority of the Protestants were opposed to any measure which might threaten their ascendancy, the Catholics were on the whole not opposed to the idea of a union, so long as they had "reason to expect that Union " would be followed by emancipation, a provision " for the clergy, which would entail a royal power " of veto over episcopal appointments, and the " commutation of tithe."

In November, 1798, Castlereagh wrote that "there " appears no indisposition on the part of the leading " Catholics—on the contrary I believe they will " consider any transference of power from their " opponents as a boon." Persistent efforts were being made at this time by Castlereagh to influence not only the borough owners but also public opinion generally. The chief provincial newspapers were

The
situation
at the end
of 1798.

bought, and every possible attention was paid to the press. Payments were made to the Catholic priests and to Presbyterian ministers with a view of securing their support.

The opinions, too, of many Protestants seemed to justify Castlereagh's hope that even in Ulster support would be obtained for a union between Great Britain and Ireland. The prospect of free trade with England and tithe legislation as results of the Union induced many manufacturers and others in Ulster to favour the project, and moreover not a few of the northern republicans who realised the dangers arising from the possible supremacy of the Roman Catholics agreed with the views already expressed by Wolfe Tone, that failing separation, a union with England was desirable. A union appeared to several of these northern republicans as unlikely to damage Ireland politically, but certain to benefit her commercially.

In November, 1798, Cooke, the Irish Under-Secretary, drew up and issued a pamphlet giving the official statement of the case and advocating the intending union. Though published anonymously, its importance was at once recognized, and it had an immense circulation. At the opening of 1799 it would seem that on the whole the attitude of Ulster was encouraging. "The measure," wrote Castlereagh, "as yet had made no sensation in the "north." There was always the hope, which was apparently well-founded, that the Belfast merchants would recognise that a union would immensely benefit the trade of Belfast. Before the end of 1798 Castlereagh had written in a still more favourable tone: "The general disposition of the north is

“favourable to the measure, particularly the linen trade.”

But though certain classes of manufacturers and merchants might be favourable to the project of union, and though the Catholics might be won over, the decision of the matter lay with the Irish Parliament. For carrying the measure through Parliament, it was necessary to win over the borough interest. Cornwallis was convinced that if the borough owners realised that the Government was in earnest they would support the union. Further, in the autumn of 1799 Castlereagh had visited London, and had been assured that the Cabinet was favourable to the principle of Catholic relief, though it was not thought expedient that any direct assurance should be given to the Catholics.

On January 22nd, 1799, the Irish Parliament met, and though the Union was not expressly mentioned, the question was practically raised by the King's Speech, which recommended “some permanent adjustment, which may extend the advantages enjoyed by our sister kingdom to every part of this island.” For some weeks previously the Castle authorities had undoubtedly attempted by means of corruption to win votes, and after a debate which lasted more than twenty hours the Government carried the address by one vote. However, when the report of the address was discussed, the opposition to the Union carried by a majority of five a motion to omit the clause relating to the Union.

Meeting of
the Irish
Parliament,
Jan., 1799.

The defeat of the Government was the signal for wild rejoicings in Dublin, which was illuminated.

The defeat
of the
Govern-
ment.

Castlereagh, in explaining the defeat which the administration had received, acknowledged that the opposition was mainly composed of country gentlemen. These, it must be remembered, represented public opinion, while many of those who voted with the Government held offices under the Crown.

Pitt's
resolution.

It was only the firm conviction of Pitt and the English Government that the precarious position of the British Isles then threatened by French attacks made a union absolutely necessary, that justified their perseverance in a measure so distasteful to the real representatives of the Irish people.

Pitt himself never flinched from his resolution to effect the Union, and on January 31st, after the arrival of the result of the debate in the Irish House of Commons, he made a powerful speech in its favour. The distribution of 10,000 copies of this speech in Ireland would, it was hoped, have some effect upon the trend of public opinion, and at the same time Castlereagh began to make arrangements for granting pecuniary compensation to the boroughs. The very violent attitude of Dublin to the idea of Union only convinced Castlereagh of the necessity of pressing on the measure. "The language and conduct, both within and without doors," he wrote, "has been such on a late occasion as to satisfy every thinking man that if the two countries are not speedily incorporated, they will ere long be committed against each other." And though the independent members in the Irish House of Commons, headed by Foster, the Speaker, and aided by his brilliant speeches, might make a brave show, the fact remained that the late rebellion had rekindled the bitter animosities that divided the Protestants from the Catholics, and that

there was continual danger of another civil war so long as the Established Church was "opposed to the religion " of the great majority of the country," and so long as " the land remained in the hands of a small " Protestant minority."

It must be remembered, too, that a large proportion of the Catholics in 1799 were in favour of the Union, as were the linen merchants and the greater part of the inhabitants of Londonderry. Moreover, anarchy continued to reign in Mayo and Galway, and it is said that in that part of Ireland property to the amount of £100,000 was destroyed in two months. " Hordes of armed ruffians " traversed the country every night houghing " the cattle of gentlemen and farmers, and murdering " all who dared to oppose them." Juries were intimidated, and dared not convict, and few men had the courage to prosecute. Robbery and murder was, however, by no means confined to Connaught ; the neighbourhood of Dublin itself was equally insecure ; and the whole of the south was disaffected and ready to welcome a French invasion. A Coercion Act became absolutely necessary, and the realisation of its necessity convinced many that the Union alone would restore tranquillity to Ireland. Before 1799 had proceeded far, the condition of Ireland more than justified Pitt and Castlereagh in pushing on the Union. The bad harvest of 1799 aggravated the general misery, while the tendency to rebellion and the desire for a French invasion seemed steadily to increase.

Justifica-
tion of
Pitt's
attitude.

The means by which the minority in the Irish Parliament in favour of the Union was converted into a majority are well known. While the soul

Castle-
reagh's
Measures
to effect
the Union.

of Cornwallis revolted against the corruption by which alone success could be attained, Castlereagh "pursued his course with a quiet, businesslike "composure." His task was, in his own words, "to buy out and secure to the Crown for ever, "the fee simple of Irish corruption which had so "long enfeebled the powers of government and "endangered the connexion." To men of that day there was nothing especially repellent in the means taken to carry the Union. Mr. Lecky points out that "the heads of the Catholic Church, and "nearly all the heads of the Established Church in "Ireland approved of what he was doing," and he further notes that Wilberforce showed no disapprobation at the manner in which the Union was carried. Castlereagh himself, in a letter to Alexander Knox, his private Secretary, declares that the measures which he and others had to take were pursued honestly in the interests of Ireland. The method adopted for securing a majority in the Irish Parliament for the Union was bribery of the borough-owners. 236 members sat for 118 boroughs, a large number of which would be disfranchised by a union. The compensation of the owners was perfectly justifiable, and moreover was essential for the success of Pitt's policy. Eventually the price of each borough was fixed at £15,000, and eighty-four were disfranchised. Bribery, however, played a considerable part in the history of the Union. During 1800 numerous vacancies occurred in the Irish House of Commons, and many of these were filled up by Government nominees. Moreover, a certain number of peerages were conferred, and a large number of places and pensions were given away in order

to strengthen the Unionist party in the Irish Parliament.

Mr. Hunt, in his history of England from 1760 to 1801, has put the whole matter in a very concise form. "Pitt," he writes, "did not corrupt the Irish Parliament; it was corrupt already; he merely continued the immemorial methods of dealing with it on a larger scale than before. Nobles and gentry chose to sell themselves, and in order to rid Ireland of a source of trouble and danger, and Great Britain of a cause of weakness, he paid them their price."¹

His Justification.

Castlereagh held the same opinion, and looked upon the whole matter from a business point of view. The borough owners had their price, and it was Castlereagh's business to pay it. He was convinced that only by a process of wholesale corruption could the Union be carried, and that by "one supreme, shameless, wholesale effort he could put an end to it for ever." The carrying of the Union thus meant the end of a system maintained for many years by corruption, and dependent upon the ascendancy of a narrow-minded Protestant minority whose supremacy was detested by the mass of the Irish people.

The last session of the Irish Parliament was opened on January 15th, 1800, and on February 17th a resolution in favour of a legislative union between Great Britain and Ireland was carried by a majority of 46. During the previous four weeks the debate on the question of Union raised by an amendment to the address by Sir Lawrence Parsons,

The last session of the Irish Parliament, 1800.

¹ Hunt: "History of England from 1760 to 1801," p. 449. (Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1907.)

pledging the House to maintain an Independent Parliament in Ireland, had produced speeches of unusual merit. On January 15th the debate lasted for eighteen hours, and was remarkable for the fierce tone of the speeches. Castlereagh showed coolness and courage in the face of the storm, and opened the debate by declaring that the project of Union "was now approved by a great majority of the people." The Opposition emphatically denied the truth of this statement, and received support from the Ulster Orangemen, who were now opponents of the Union, and from all classes in Dublin which derived much benefit from the presence of Parliament. After the debate had continued for fifteen hours, Grattan, who was suffering from the effects of severe illness, appeared and made a memorable speech in favour of the continued existence of the Irish Parliament.

Speeches of
Castlereagh,
Foster, and
Plunket.

In spite of his eloquence, the amendment was rejected on the morning of January 16th by 138 votes to 96. On February 5th Castlereagh moved in an able speech the formal introduction of the Union. He pointed out that the Scottish Union had encountered opposition similar to that with which the project of an Irish Union was now meeting, and he declared that lighter taxation would be a result of the Union. Without promising Catholic emancipation, he contented himself with saying that "strength and confidence would produce liberality," and that "an arrangement, both for the Catholic and Dissenting clergy, had been long in the contemplation of his Majesty's Government." The speech was a long, elaborate, and weighty defence of the policy of the Government, and on

February 6th (the debate having lasted from four o'clock on the 5th till one o'clock on the following afternoon), when the division was taken, the opposition could only muster 115 votes to their opponents' 158. Even now all cause for anxiety had not disappeared. Some supporters of the Union refused to vote for it till the nation had been consulted, and Lord Cornwallis wrote on January 31st that "the clamour against the Union is increasing rapidly. . . . The Roman Catholics are joining the standard of opposition, to which they have been much impelled by the imprudent speeches and the abuse cast on them by our friends." On February 17th, when the Union passed into Committee, Foster, the Speaker, made a remarkable speech against the Union, but neither his arguments nor the continual opposition of Plunket to the measure were of any avail. Plunket had been for many years the foremost champion of the Catholic cause; he was an equally strong opponent of the Union. In January, 1799, his speech it was said decided the question against the Government, and throughout the debates upon the Union the "invective of his speeches, and particularly of his attacks upon Castlereagh rises to an extraordinary pitch of passionate vehemence." During the stormy controversies of the Union, the question of the defence of Ireland against French invasions did not occupy, as it should have done, the chief place. And yet it seems clear that until the Union was accomplished Ireland was constantly in danger of being subdued by a French expedition.

On March 28th, 1800, the Union was carried in both Houses, and the Irish Parliament adjourned **The Union.**

to give time for the British Parliament to consider and pass the resolutions. Cornwallis remained very anxious. "The word Union," he wrote, "will not cure the evils of this wretched country. It is a necessary preliminary, but a great deal more must be done." In May the British Parliament had agreed to the resolutions, which were sent back to Ireland, where on May 26th the Bill was read for a second time. In June the Union was finally effected, and the Bill received the royal assent on August 1st. The question of Catholic emancipation remained unsettled. Pitt, Dundas and Cornwallis had wished to make Catholic emancipation part of the Union, and when that was found to be impracticable, it was generally understood that on the first opportunity the ministry would introduce the measure of Catholic emancipation in Parliament. Pitt was honestly determined to do justice to the Catholics, and regarded Catholic emancipation as more important even than the Union. The Union was, in his view, merely a necessary preliminary to Catholic emancipation, and with this view Cornwallis and Castlereagh fully concurred.

On August 2nd, 1800, the Irish Parliament was prorogued. It never sat again. Castlereagh, whose skill as a parliamentary leader was now fully acknowledged, only regarded the Union as a preliminary measure. He seems to have been convinced that the Union would do little by itself, and that the admission of Catholics to Parliament and to public offices was absolutely necessary. He was in London in the autumn of 1800, and pressed the question of emancipation upon the Cabinet. By means of Catholic emancipation and the other

measures which have been alluded to, he was convinced that the Irish Catholics would become attached to the English connexion, and that the spirit of disaffection would disappear. With these views Pitt fully concurred. But they had not reckoned upon the King.

[The quotations from Castlereagh's speeches are taken from Alison's "Lives of Castlereagh and Sir C. Stewart."]

CHAPTER IV

THE FALL OF PITT'S MINISTRY

1801

The
question of
the Irish
peerages.

No sooner was the Union carried than Castlereagh met with unexpected difficulties with regard to certain promises which he had made relative to the grant of sixteen peerages. In consultation with Pitt both he and Cornwallis had been given to understand that sixteen peerages would be granted to certain influential supporters of the Union. After the passing of the Union Bill Cornwallis sent to Portland a list of the sixteen peerages which he had promised, but to his astonishment he received a letter on June 13th from the minister declining to submit more than half the names to George III. Both Castlereagh and Cornwallis at once decided to resign. In a letter to Lord Camden, written on June 18th, 1800, Castlereagh spoke in a most decided fashion :—" If the Irish Government is not enabled to keep faith with the various individuals who have acted upon a principle of confidence in their honour, it is morally impossible that either Lord Cornwallis or I can remain in our present situation ; . . . it will remain a breach of faith, as injurious to the character of Government as to our own, having given an assurance, which we were not enabled to fulfil."

Castlereagh
and
Catholic
emancipa-
tion.

In two subsequent letters on June 21st and June 25th to Mr. Cooke, Under-Secretary for Ireland, Castlereagh speaks in almost stronger terms of the necessity of carrying out the promised arrangements.

The idea of breaking faith on the first possible occasion with those who had served the Government so well, seems to indicate that the British ministry had never realized the nature of the struggle in which Castlereagh had been engaged for two years. It seems incredible that the Government should have been willing to run the risk of alienating the leading Irish supporters of the Union at a time so critical in the history of Great Britain. How far Portland's attitude was due to the opposition of the King to the creation of the peerages is not known. At any rate, and fortunately for Portland, the conduct of Castlereagh and Cornwallis had the desired effect.

That it required the threatened resignations of Cornwallis and Castlereagh to induce the British Government to carry out what amounted to solemn promises is a sufficient proof of the general ignorance that prevailed in England, and even among Cabinet ministers, of the political situation in Ireland. That the services of Castlereagh were fully appreciated is, however, seen from a letter of the Duke of Portland, written on June 27th, 1800. Castlereagh had every right to ask that a British peerage should be conferred on his father, Lord Londonderry. But so many peerages had to be created in 1800 that both Castlereagh and Londonderry agreed not to press their claims. The gratification felt by the Government in this act of abnegation is shown in a letter written on June 27th, 1800, by Portland to Cornwallis, in which he authorizes the latter to assure Londonderry and Castlereagh that the King will confer the British peerage on Lord Londonderry, or any of his descendants, whenever he or any of the latter should express a desire to possess it.

Recognition of Castlereagh's Services.

The
question of
Catholic
emancipa-
tion.

It would have been well for Ireland, and, indeed, for the British Empire, had the King been as acquiescent with regard to the Catholic claims as he was with regard to the question of the Irish peerages. Though no distinct pledge had been given, it was generally recognised by both Cornwallis and Castlereagh, and, indeed, by the leading Roman Catholics, that Catholic emancipation would immediately follow the Union. The necessity and justice of such a measure had been recognised by all far-seeing statesmen. Canning, in a speech in the House of Commons, had given as one important reason for the Union, that when once the Irish Parliament should be united with that of Great Britain it will become possible "to concede to the Catholics what may remain to be conceded, without the appearance of intimidation." To the Protestants, one attractive feature of the Union was that it freed them from all danger of a Catholic domination, while to the Catholics the prospects of emancipation induced them to favour the suppression of the Irish Parliament. Such were the views of Canning, of Pitt, and indeed of every responsible statesman at that time. That the Union did not bring peace and prosperity to Ireland, and that the changes following that Union have not been as beneficial as were anticipated, was due to a variety of causes. But the chief cause undoubtedly was that the promised emancipation of the Catholics did not immediately follow the Union. In October, 1800, Lord Cornwallis, in a letter to General Ross, indicates a fear on his part that the English Cabinet was in danger of making a fatal blunder. "I cannot help," he wrote, "enter-
taining considerable apprehensions that our Cabinet
will not have the firmness to adopt such measures

"as will render the Union an efficient advantage to the Empire. Those things which, if now liberally granted, might make the Irish a loyal people, will be of little avail when they are extorted on a future day." These words, the importance of which cannot be overestimated, indicate the well-considered opinions of all who had studied the situation. To Pitt, Castlereagh had submitted in the autumn of 1800 a memoir containing all the unanswerable arguments on behalf of the immediate emancipation of the Catholics, and on December 17th, 1800, he went over to England in order to interview the Government. He found on his arrival that the King, who had lately become aware of the views of Pitt, was resolutely set against Catholic emancipation, which he regarded as a breach of his coronation oath.

In a long and statesmanlike letter, Castlereagh, on January 1st, 1801, stated his views, which were, indeed, shared by Pitt. In that letter he declared that only by holding out hopes of emancipation had he been able to secure the support or neutrality of the Catholics during the long and bitter struggle for the Union.

Pitt's
attitude
towards the
Emancipa-
tion
question.

In consequence of the assurances of the Cabinet he and Cornwallis had not hesitated to call forth the Catholics in favour of the Union.

But neither he nor Cornwallis had reckoned on the extraordinary conduct of Pitt, who apparently had not taken the King into his confidence on the subject, nor on the equally extraordinary shortsightedness of many members of the Cabinet, nor on their ignorance of the state of Ireland and the immense, nay vital, importance of the question. Nor could Castlereagh

have reckoned on the existence of any opposition in the Cabinet to emancipation, for in the autumn of 1799, when he came over to consult Pitt and his colleagues with regard to the best means of carrying the Union, the Cabinet were unanimous in favour of the principle of Catholic relief. Further, he was then authorized by the ministers to assure Cornwallis that "he need not anticipate any difficulty in dealing with "the Catholics, so far as the Cabinet were concerned ; "and that he was fully warranted in soliciting from "the Catholics every support for the Union which "they could afford." The fears of Cornwallis and Castlereagh were, indeed, justified. At the time of Fitzwilliam's recall the King had closely questioned the Chancellor with regard to Catholic emancipation, and had asked whether, in his opinion, he (the King) could consistently with his coronation oath consent to a law freeing the Catholics and the Dissenters from the disabilities and restrictions they were under. This, and other questions of a like nature, showed that as early as 1795 George was already considering what his attitude should be towards Catholic emancipation ; and it was at that time that, alluding to Dundas, he said to the Chancellor that "he had "among his ministers some most valuable men, "but he did not like the mixture of Scotch "metaphysics."

George
III's fatal
intervention.

Nothing more seems to have passed between the King and any of his ministers till October, 1800, when a letter from Lord Clare was shown George by Lord Westmorland.

In that letter Clare stated that the question of Catholic emancipation was again to be raised, whereupon the King became much agitated, and

gradually made up his mind to refuse his consent to any measure giving the Catholics the right to sit in Parliament.

Clare's information proved correct, for the Cabinet in September had considered a paper sent by Lord Castlereagh, containing three questions for discussion : (1) A provision for the Catholic clergy, and if granted a provision for the Dissenting clergy also ; (2) The admission of Catholics to Parliament ; (3) Some arrangement about tithes. Though Castlereagh, who was present at the consultations of the Cabinet in September, could declare that no actual engagement had been made with the Catholics, there is no doubt that the leading Catholics had been encouraged to expect that emancipation would shortly follow the Union.

In his "Diaries and Correspondence"¹ Mr. Rose declares that the Cabinet in the autumn of 1800 were divided on the subject, the members favourable to emancipation being Pitt, Grenville, Dundas, Windham and Spencer ; while opposed to it were the Chancellor, Portland, Westmorland, Liverpool and Chatham. Nevertheless, in spite of the ominous attitude of the King and of Lord Loughborough (the Chancellor), Pitt continued to reassure Castlereagh. As late as January 22nd, 1801, Cornwallis wrote to Castlereagh, "All your last letters have administered real comfort to me. We shall now turn that great measure of the Union to real profit, at the same time that we are adopting the only means of resisting the hostility of almost all Europe."

But neither Castlereagh nor Pitt seems to have

¹ Rose : "Diaries and Correspondence," vol. I, p. 287 *seq.*

realised the strength of the views held by the King on the Catholic question. From some hitherto unexplained reason Pitt had never explained to him what had passed between the Cabinet and Castlereagh. The King, however, had gathered from other sources that several members of the Cabinet were favourable to emancipation, he had become very alarmed, and was naturally indignant at the way in which he had been treated.

Pitt, consequently, found himself in a very awkward position. He had approved of the "engagements" *tacitly* undertaken by Cornwallis and Castlereagh, and at the same time he felt unable to carry Catholic emancipation against the strong opposition of George III. On February 5th, 1801, Pitt resigned, and with him Grenville, Spencer, Camden, Dundas and Windham left the Cabinet.

Explana-
tion of
Pitt's
Conduct.

Pitt had never realised the strength of the objections felt by the King to Catholic emancipation. He had, too, entirely ignored the possibility of intrigues on the part of any member of his party. He, therefore, took no steps in the autumn of 1800 to acquaint the King with his own views and those of Cornwallis and Castlereagh with regard to the Catholic question. In the early autumn of that year he summoned a Cabinet Council to discuss the matter. Before it met on September 30th Loughborough, who had been staying at Weymouth, showed the King Pitt's letter, and at the Cabinet meeting declared his own opposition to the admission of the Catholics to Parliament. His declaration came like a thunderbolt to his colleagues. Up to that moment Pitt had apparently no idea that there would be any serious opposition to his proposal, but he soon realised that

some of his colleagues—Hawkesbury, Chatham, Westmorland, and Portland—did not agree with his views on the subject.

Even after the Cabinet meeting, which was adjourned, he continued to be quite unconscious of the strength of the opposition which was rapidly growing to any measure of Catholic relief. At the time of Fitzwilliam's recall the King had made up his mind that the admission of Catholics to Parliament would be contrary to his coronation oath, and his views had been reinforced by the written opinions of the Primate of Ireland and of the Archbishop of Canterbury. Knowing the difference of opinion in the Cabinet, and, most unwisely, not thinking it necessary to take the King into his confidence, Pitt determined to carry the measure, and in January, 1801, assured Castlereagh of the fact.

On January 28th George made to Dundas the following remark at a levée :—"What is it this young Lord (Castlereagh) has brought over which they are going to throw at my head? The most Jacobinical thing I ever heard of"! On January 29th he said Addington had asked him to prevent Pitt "from ever speaking on a subject on which he could scarcely keep his temper." On February 5th Pitt's resignation was accepted.

Pitt's
resignation!

There is no doubt that in not telling the King early in 1800 that he contemplated bringing in a measure of Catholic emancipation, Pitt made a grievous blunder. Unintentionally, no doubt, he deceived both Cornwallis and Castlereagh. Both these men never doubted that Pitt would carry the measure, and, in consequence, were led to adopt measures and to make statements which placed them later in a

false position. It is not at all certain that under any circumstances would he have been able to persuade the King of the necessity of the measure, but at any rate he would not have excited among the Catholics hopes which could not be fulfilled, and the non-fulfilment of which became one of the chief causes of the future unrest in Ireland.

The seriousness of the crisis caused by Pitt's resignation will be at once recognised when it is remembered that Great Britain was in the throes of war and threatened by the Northern Coalition. That Pitt intended to grant Catholic emancipation is undoubted. He continued to hope that after a short period the King's opinions would change, and that the ministers would be able to make the necessary concession to the Catholics. That this was Pitt's hope seems to be proved from a letter of Castlereagh to Cornwallis four days after Pitt's resignation. In that letter he says that it is Pitt's wish that "Cornwallis, without bringing forward the King's name, should make the Catholics feel that an obstacle which the King's ministers could not surmount, precluded them from bringing forward the measure whilst in office; . . . and that they retired from the King's service, considering this line of conduct as most likely to contribute to the ultimate success of the measure." He went on to say that "in the meantime Mr. Pitt would do his utmost to establish their cause in the public favour, and thus prepare the way for its ultimate success." Pitt would have done an immeasurable service to Ireland and to the Empire if he had insisted on giving the Catholics emancipation. But, unfortunately for the future relations between England and Ireland, he refused

to press the question. "The Catholics," wrote Castlereagh to Cornwallis, "must distinctly understand "that Pitt would not concur in a hopeless "attempt at this moment to force it" (Catholic emancipation).

He concludes his letter by a striking expression of opinion :—"From what has already passed, the "prospect of a change of sentiment on the part of the "King seems too hopeless to be held out, in fairness "to the Catholics, as any solid ground of hope ; and "his death is that solution of the difficulty which all "parties must equally deprecate."

The King's illness in February prevented the resignations of the ministers from taking effect ; and it was not till March that Addington succeeded Pitt as Prime Minister, and that Charles Abbot, afterwards Lord Colchester, was appointed Chief Secretary in place of Castlereagh, while it was not till May that Lord Hardwicke became Lord-Lieutenant.

For some weeks during the spring of 1801 Castlereagh was seriously ill. The anxiety caused by the late events, following upon his labours during the preceding years, resulted in a fever. From the middle of April till the middle of May his condition excited the most serious apprehensions of his friends. His recovery was followed by an increased intimacy with Pitt, who recognised in the young Irish nobleman a man who possessed great administrative powers, an imperturbable courage, and talents of the highest order.

Castlereagh
and Pitt.

CHAPTER V

CASTLEREAGH AND THE ADDINGTON MINISTRY

The
formation
of the
Addington
Ministry,
1801.

FROM March, 1801, to July, 1802, Castlereagh remained out of office. During that period the Addington ministry was formed, and the war with Napoleon was brought to a close by the Treaty of Amiens. In the new Cabinet, Portland, Westmorland and Chatham retained their seats, and Hawkesbury was promoted to a place in that body. Of the remaining members, Hobart and Pelham had both been Irish Secretaries under Pitt, and Eldon had been his Attorney-General. The new blood was supplied by St. Vincent, Lewisham and Charles Yorke. Loughborough, whose treacherous conduct to his colleagues over the Catholic emancipation deserves the highest condemnation, was excluded from the ministry, but received the solace of an earldom.

Castlereagh
advocates
Catholic
emancipa-
tion.

Until July, 1802, when he succeeded Lewisham as President of the Board of Control, Castlereagh wrote several able and instructive papers on Ireland for the benefit of the ministry. He was resolved, as far as in him lay, to redress the most flagrant grievances, for he recognised that unless such a policy was adopted Ireland would continue to be discontented, and would remain an admirable field for foreign intrigue. A French invasion was quite within the bounds of possibility, and Castlereagh realised that unless the chief grievances of the Irish nation were redressed Ireland could easily become a very serious danger to the British Empire. He was

well aware of the disappointment felt by the Catholics at their exclusion from the British Parliament, and in view of a possible French invasion it was all the more necessary to remove their grievance. On the Catholic question he submitted to the government a very able memoir. In it he pointed out that the British Catholics now numbered three millions, and were daily growing in wealth and influence. It is, he declared, quite impossible to keep such an important body in their present position. Such a policy would leave the Catholics in a perpetual state of irritation and, moreover, would be a policy entirely indefensible and unjustifiable. As long as the Catholics and Dissenters remain unemancipated they were open to an alliance with Jacobinism. As things are, he declared, with prophetic insight, the "difficulty of governing the country will rapidly increase, as every year adds materially to the relative importance of the Dissenting interests." He then showed the impossibility of governing Ireland upon a garrison principle, and urged that the Union itself would do little towards the establishment of an orderly government unless followed up by emancipation and other necessary measures.

Of these he mentioned as especially important the adjustment of tithes. At that time tithes were collected in kind by the Protestant incumbents from the Catholic parishioners. Such a system was obviously a continual source of discontent, irritation and contention. From his residence in Ireland Castlereagh was well aware of the constant disputes "often ending in blood" caused by the collection of the Protestant tithes, and though the amounts themselves were often very small, the existence of

The tithe
question.

the tithe system tended each year to increase the animosity felt by the Catholics towards the Protestant clergy. In 1631 the tithe question in Scotland had been settled satisfactorily, by the amount due being laid as a direct burden upon the landlord. Castlereagh now proposed to introduce a similar system, with improvements rendered advisable by experience. Had Castlereagh's suggestions been carried out, a satisfactory solution would have been found for a most difficult question.

His
endowment
plan.

He further recommended that the salaries of the Roman Catholic clergy should be paid by the State, and that the payments should be made in proportion to their rank. An Archbishop would receive £750 a year, and the parochial clergy would each receive on an average about £40 a year. By this means the priest would not be dependent on his congregation, and the close alliance existing between the priests and their flocks would be weakened. Castlereagh's views on this question show a toleration and broad-mindedness not shared by the majority of English politicians, who allowed their religious intolerance to blind them to the advisability of a wise act of policy.

The
defence of
Ireland.

Castlereagh thus showed a most intelligent appreciation of the needs of Ireland. He recognised fully that unless the Catholic claims were satisfied and the Catholic grievances redressed, not only would the work of the Union be rendered useless, but that the majority of the Irish population would remain in a condition of constant unrest and irritation. He fully appreciated, too, the fact that this unrest and irritation would develop rapidly into disloyalty, if not into civil war. England being engaged in a life and death struggle with France, it was all the more

necessary to render Ireland peaceful and contented. Otherwise she would become, owing to her geographical position, a constant and serious danger to England. To provide for the protection of Ireland from foreign invasions, Castlereagh wrote a very remarkable memoir on the defence of Ireland. He began by stating that "It is a common observation among historians that a powerful invasion of an insular State is generally successful; and if a judgment may be formed from the history of England the observation is by no means unfounded."

The Addington ministry, though in office for a short period, witnessed many stirring events. On April 1st, 1801, Nelson won the battle of the Baltic, and Denmark was forced to submit. The death of the Tsar Paul, who was the "life and soul of the northern confederacy," on March 23rd, and the accession of Alexander, brought about a change in the policy of Russia, which, together with the overthrow of the Danes, led to the establishment of peace in the north of Europe. Meanwhile, on March 21st, the French army in Egypt was defeated at the battle of Alexandria, and in September the evacuation of Egypt by the French took place. On March 27th, 1802, peace with France was concluded by the Treaty of Amiens. The terms of the Treaty were not very favourable to Great Britain, but Castlereagh, like Pitt, was of opinion that the pacification was only a truce, during which Great Britain could make preparations for the outbreak of hostilities. In a secret memoir to the Cabinet he pointed out that Great Britain should, at the first sign of French encroachment, take a decided line, and "adopt a vigilant system of conduct"; and he urged that in

**The
British
successes
and the
Treaty of
Amiens,
1802.**

the event of the reopening of war with France preparations should be so pushed on that at the outbreak of war we should be enabled "to reap the full fruits of "our maritime superiority in striking an early blow "against the colonies of the enemy." No better proof is required to show how accurate was Castlereagh's grasp of the situation. "What I desire is," he wrote in July, 1802, "that France should feel that "Great Britain cannot be trifled with," and he makes it quite clear that in his opinion any attempt by France to destroy the independence of Holland should be at once resisted.

Castlereagh becomes President of the Board of Control, July, 1802.

His opinions carried great weight, and all the more so from the fact that, in spite of his views upon Catholic emancipation, he had on July 6th been appointed President of the Board of Control. In October he was given a seat in the Cabinet. He took office at a critical time. In India there was much opposition to the extension of British influence; in Ireland there was disaffection; the conduct of Napoleon, whose aggressions in time of peace never ceased, rendered the renewal of wars with France merely a matter of months.

As President of the Board of Control, Castlereagh was able to assist in dealing an overwhelming blow to the hopes which Napoleon held of ousting the British from India and of establishing there French influence. In spite of the defeat and forced withdrawal of French troops from Egypt, Napoleon continued to indulge in hopes of driving the British from Egypt, of converting the Mediterranean into a French lake, and of establishing French supremacy in India.

Castlereagh and India,

In spite of the critical condition of affairs in Europe

Castlereagh never allowed his attention to be diverted from the affairs of India. As President of the Board of Control, he followed closely the startling series of events which resulted in the firm establishment of the British Empire in India. After the overthrow of Tippoo the danger of a Mahratta confederacy became especially serious, as with the reopening of the war with France came the renewal of Napoleon's ambitious schemes. In "the complex, fanatical, and "irreconcilable antagonism of England and revolutionary and Napoleonized France," India played no small part. Napoleon was bent on conquering England in India. French agents were to be found at the Courts of the leading Mahratta chiefs, and Napoleon aimed at using Shah Alum, the Emperor at Delhi, as a political tool. A French faction was already supreme in Scindia's dominions, and decided action was necessary unless we were to be "caught "unprepared in the tornado of Indian warfare, "reinforced by Gallic blasts."

Wellesley's policy in making a strict alliance with the Peishwa by the Treaty of Bassein in December, 1802, was a statesmanlike act. By it the Mahratta confederacy would be deprived of the authority of its executive head. By it the French would be prevented from landing on the long Mahratta western seaboard, and could not hope to obtain access to Guzerat. By it many of the smaller chieftains were propitiated, and, what was of immense importance, future occupation of Bundelcund, which would "turn "the flank of Scindia " and of his French adviser Perron in Hindostan, was facilitated. Wellesley considered that his duty was "to defend, consolidate, "and improve the British Indian Empire," and in

**Wellesley's
policy in
in India.
The Treaty
of Bassein.**

view of the alarming progress made from 1804 to 1810 by the French Empire towards subduing Europe it was well not only that British interests in India were controlled by a man of Wellesley's mettle, but that in 1803 and 1804 a statesman like Castlereagh presided at the Board of Control. In August, 1803, war was declared by Wellesley upon Scindia and the Raja of Berar.

Wellesley's
victories
in India.

On September 23rd, 1803, Scindia with his French allies was beaten in the battle of Assaye, and shortly afterwards, on December 15th, he and the Raja of Berar were entirely defeated in the battle of Argaum. At the same time General Lake was winning similar successes in the valley of the Ganges, and on November 1st had won the great battle of Laswari. By the treaties which these defeated Rajas made with Wellesley, the province of Cuttack and some strong places in the Dooab became British possessions. In 1804 Holkar renewed the struggle, and it was not till the end of 1805 that the struggle came to an end, leaving the British the victors.

Castlereagh's
Indian
policy.

Before news of Wellesley's victories had reached Europe, Castlereagh had considered carefully the policy adopted in India, and on March 4th, 1804, he sent Wellesley a long and interesting despatch containing some criticisms of the Treaty of Bassein. In it he intimated that, in his opinion, the Treaty ought to be so altered as to restore the Peishwa "to a state of more *ostensible independence*, and to give "to the alliance less the aspect of aiming at an interference in Mahratta affairs." Both Castlereagh and the Directors feared that Wellesley's policy would involve the Company too much in Mahratta politics, and while approving of a defensive alliance

with the Peishwa, they deprecated any attempt (such as the terms of the Treaty of Bassein implied) to give the Company a commanding influence at Poonah.

Owing to the long period required for communication between England and India, a Governor-General was practically absolute, and Castlereagh's despatch was on its arrival in India of little value. Nevertheless, to this despatch Wellesley wrote a very able reply. He pointed out that the Company's Government in India was connected with the Home Government, and as an Asiatic power was liable to be "involved in wars with European powers possessing territories in India whenever His Majesty shall be at war with those powers." He then explained the aggressive nature of the Mahratta Confederacy, and showed that the Treaty of Bassein would eventually conduce to the establishment of peace in India, especially as it would check intrigues between the Mahrattas and European powers.

On hearing of the victories of Wellesley and Lake in the autumn of 1803, Castlereagh sent the former his warmest congratulations "on the series of events than which none have ever occurred in the military history of our country more proudly calculated to confirm and even exalt the reputation and glory of the British arms."

Though Castlereagh can claim to have had little share in the victories of the British in India, he had done Wellesley good service in two ways. He had steadily supported him against the Board of Directors who, perhaps, naturally dreaded a policy of expansion, and feared a consequent reduction of dividends; he had abandoned a great part of his official patronage leaving Wellesley to make what appointments seemed

to him best ; he had liberally supported the College of Fort William. Wellesley himself gives striking testimony to the admirable manner in which Castlereagh discharged the duties of the President of the Board of Control. Castlereagh had certainly no reason to be otherwise than satisfied with his tenure of office, during which he had seen the destruction of the French power in the East. He came to the chief conduct of Indian affairs at a most critical period in the history of India ; he had supported Wellesley in the conduct of his war with the Mahrattas ; and he had successfully defended Wellesley's policy in Parliament. Castlereagh, unlike many of his contemporaries, realised the great objects for which Wellesley was striving, and had every right to congratulate himself and Great Britain on the success of his Indian policy. As President of the Board of Control, Castlereagh had witnessed an important and necessary development of the British power in India. The Treaty of Bassein had, as he anticipated, involved us in further complications, but the overthrow of the Mahratta Confederacy proved to be an enormous boon to the people of India, and a necessary step in the development of the East India Company. But neither he nor Wellesley could persuade the Court of Directors to introduce free trade. Supported though they were by Dundas and the mercantile interest in England, they were unable to overcome the opposition of the Company. In 1805 Wellesley, finding that his whole policy was objectionable to the Court of Directors, gave up his post and returned to England. During his long period of office he had established "throughout India the ascendancy of the British " power."

It was, indeed, most fortunate that Wellesley and Castlereagh had the affairs of India under their control. Three months after the Treaty of Amiens Napoleon had sent General Decaen to India in order to revive and strengthen French influence there. His secret instructions prove to the hilt the perfidy of Napoleon, and had they been published in 1803 would have justified, and no doubt occasioned, a declaration of war on the part of Great Britain. Decaen was to be "quietly reinforced by troops in "French pay sent out by every French, Spanish, or "Dutch ship going to India, so as to avoid attracting "notice." All this was to take place while France was ostensibly at peace with Great Britain, and while Fox and other English whigs were loud in proclaiming the straightforwardness and pacific nature of Napoleon. Had Decaen had time to organise and send his battalions to the aid of Scindia the battles of Assaye and Argaum might have proved disastrous to the British. Luckily, however, Wellesley, aware of the precarious nature of the Anglo-French relations, had refused to hand over Pondicherry to the French, and Decaen was forced to witness in inglorious inactivity the overthrow of all his hopes in the campaigns of Arthur Wellesley and of Lake.

Napoleon's
designs
upon India.

Perron, the French agent at Scindia's Court, angry at the incapacity of the Mahrattas, retired from his post, and thus "in three months the results "of the toil of Scindia, the restless ambition of "Holkar, the training of European officers, and the "secret intrigues of Napoleon, were all swept to the "winds." But, though foiled in India, Decaen continued to use his French ships to inflict damage

upon British commerce, and endeavoured to obtain from the Imaum of Muscat "a station for commercial purposes at that port." Wellesley, however, had foreseen the possibility of such a demand, and had contracted an alliance with the Imaum, who in the autumn of 1803 refused Decaen's request. On all points Napoleon's oriental policy was defeated, and this in itself would render noteworthy the period of Castlereagh's tenure of the office of President of the Board of Control.

During 1803, too, schemes for the acquisition by France of Van Diemen's Land [Tasmania] failed owing to Lord Hobart, the Colonial Secretary, who by his foresight checked once and for all the Australian plans of Napoleon.

Renewal of
war with
France,
1803.

At home the year 1803 opened in gloomy fashion. The hostile designs of Bonaparte caused deep distrust, which was increased by the non-removal of French troops from Holland, and by the publication on January 30th of Sebastiani's report, in which it was stated that "six thousand French would at present be enough to conquer Egypt." This official avowal of hostile designs against Great Britain decided the Government to retain Malta, and to demand from Napoleon an explanation. Instead of acceding to the British demands, Napoleon continued making military preparations, gave assistance to Emmet, the head of a band of Irish conspirators, and demanded that we should evacuate Alexandria and Malta. Though Napoleon desired the continuance of peace until he had built an effective navy, his pride would not allow him to accede to the British demands, and war broke out between Great Britain and France in May, 1803.

During the remainder of 1803 Napoleon continued to make extensive preparations for the invasion of England. For this purpose a flotilla of flat-bottomed boats, and the temporary command of the Channel were required. Until the autumn of 1804 Napoleon seems to have hoped that circumstances would enable him to carry out his scheme for the invasion of England.

Before the year closed it became evident that the country desired the return of Pitt to power. The ministry inspired no confidence, and the general uneasiness was increased when early in 1804 it was discovered that the Navy was in a very inefficient state. On April 23rd Fox called attention to the inadequate condition of the defences of the country. Pitt supported him, and the Government's position was much shaken. Early in May the ministry resigned.

Fall
of the
Addington
ministry,
May, 1804.

CHAPTER VI

PITT'S SECOND ADMINISTRATION 1804-1806

Pitt's
second
administra-
tion,
May, 1804.

ON May 10th, 1804, Pitt returned to office. England was at that time passing through a severe crisis. War had recently been declared, and the country was for several months threatened by an invasion from France. It was obvious that a strong ministry was necessary. As early as April 29th, Pitt, in a letter to the King, had advocated a combined administration, and was anxious to admit Fox and Grenville into the ministry. The King was opposed to the admission of either, but after a long interview with Pitt on May 7th he agreed to the inclusion of Grenville into the ministry, but refused under any circumstances to admit Fox.

Influence
of
George III.

The whole history of the formation of the ministry illustrates the influence which George III wielded in politics, and the views which he expressed in the autumn of 1804 make it very evident that he followed the careers of the most prominent men of the time with the closest interest. He approved of the exchange of Lord Harrowby for Lord Hawkesbury at the Foreign Office, as he rated the talents of the former very high, and thought the latter unfit for the situation. He, however, did not at all approve of the appointment of Huskisson to the Secretaryship of the Treasury, considering that his views were too liberal and his temper not good. About Castlereagh he was indifferent, though he said he was glad that it

was not proposed to make him Secretary of State, as it might have led to his putting himself at the head of an Irish party. Nor did he like Lord Wellesley, whom in spite of his great merits he considered as inflated with pride, and as assuming to himself the exclusive merit for all that had been done in the past.

Pitt had hoped to form an administration on a broad basis. He had resolved from considerations of loyalty to the King not to bring forward the question of Catholic emancipation again during the King's life, and he thought that if Fox was included in the ministry the question would be shelved indefinitely. The King, however, refused to agree to the inclusion of Fox in the ministry, though he yielded with respect to Grenville, Spencer, Windham, and others. Pitt, however, thought that after a few months he would be able to reconcile the King to the admission of Fox into the Cabinet, and he had thus every hope of forming a strong ministry. These expectations were, however, dashed to the ground by the loyalty of the Whigs to Fox. On the evening of May 7th two meetings were held at Camelford House (the residence of Grenville). One of these meetings was attended by the friends of Fox, and the other by the friends of Grenville. It was unanimously agreed at both meetings that no friend of Fox or Grenville should take any office unless Fox should be admitted to the Cabinet. At a meeting at Carlton House it was also decided that no friend of the Prince should join the Government till Fox was a member of it.

Thus, as Grenville and his friends refused to serve without Fox, the patriotic efforts of Pitt proved fruitless.

Pitt and
the Whigs.

The new
Cabinet.

On May 18th Napoleon was declared Emperor, and on that day Pitt took his seat in Parliament (after his re-election). Owing to the attitude adopted by the Whigs, Pitt was compelled to compose his Cabinet exclusively of Tories. It included Eldon, the Chancellor; Portland, President of Council; Westmorland, Privy Seal; Chatham, Master-General of Ordnance; Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty; Harrowby, Secretary for Foreign Affairs; Camden, Secretary for War and the Colonies; Mulgrave, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster; Montrose, President of the Board of Trade; Hawkesbury, Secretary for the Home Department. Castlereagh was President of the Board of Control, and from June, 1805, when Camden became President of the Council, he performed also the duties of Secretary for War and the Colonies.

Many of these had served under Addington. Of Pitt's eleven colleagues, only Castlereagh had a seat in the House of Commons, and on him devolved the duty of representing the Government.

Napoleon
and the
invasion of
England.

The defence of Great Britain engrossed the attention of the ministry, for the camp at Boulogne had already been formed, and preparations for the invasion of England were being openly made. "Nothing," wrote Castlereagh to Wellesley, "can exceed the spirit of the nation, as well as of the Parliament, on the subject of the War. . . . The plan of raising 50,000 men to be officered by officers of the line is in progress." He then stated that the total number of armed men would reach nearly 200,000, though as a matter of fact that number was far exceeded.

In January, 1805, the ministry was strengthened

by the accession to its ranks of Lord Sidmouth (Addington), who became President of the Council, of the Earl of Buckinghamshire (Hobart), who became Chancellor of the Duchy; Mulgrave succeeded Harrowby at the Foreign Office owing to the latter's ill-health, Portland retiring from office for a similar reason, but retaining his seat in the Cabinet. In April, Melville, accused of a misapplication of the public money, resigned his post at the Admiralty, and was succeeded by Sir Charles Middleton, now created Lord Barham. In consequence of this affair Sidmouth and Buckinghamshire retired, and a rearrangement of offices took place. Harrowby found himself sufficiently restored to health to succeed Buckinghamshire as Chancellor of the Duchy, Camden becoming in July President of the Council, and Castlereagh Secretary for War and the Colonies, though he still retained his post as President of the Board of Control.

Changes in
the
ministry.

The following months will ever be known as perhaps the most exciting period in British history. Till August the prospect of a French invasion of England was ever before the British nation. It was not till the close of August that Napoleon found that owing to Villeneuve's failure to appear in the Channel, all hope of effecting a landing on the South Coast of England had to be abandoned. While he at once threw his army into the heart of Germany and captured Ulm on October 20th, the British fleet under Nelson met the combined French and Spanish fleets under Villeneuve, and on October 21st won the battle of Trafalgar. From that day all prospect of a French invasion of England disappeared. During this anxious period Castlereagh, as head of the War Department, had been brought into intimate

The
autumn
of 1805.

relation with Nelson and other naval officers, and took a keen interest in a plan for the destruction of the Boulogne flotilla. In a memorandum on the subject he shows a very intimate knowledge of the conditions necessary for a successful attack on the French town. The failure of this attack was due to circumstances beyond Castlereagh's control, and by the end of September, owing to Napoleon's march into Germany all danger from the Boulogne flotilla had passed away.

The war
of the Third
Coalition,
1805.

What was, however, of far greater importance was the consideration of some effective plan to check Napoleon's victorious progress in Germany. Already, owing to Russia's initiative, Great Britain, Russia and Sweden, alarmed at Napoleon's provocations, had come together, and though Pitt and Harrowby the Foreign Minister refused to accede to Russia's demands with regard to Malta and the maritime code, the formation of the Third Coalition, which on August 9th, 1805, was joined by Austria, was effected.

During the autumn of 1805 various projects were entertained for inflicting injury on France, and of strengthening the league against her by securing the adhesion of Prussia. No sooner had Napoleon marched for Ulm, than it was proposed to attack the flotilla in Boulogne harbour. To Castlereagh were submitted numerous proposals "for an attack by " means of submarine boats and Congreve rockets." Sir Sidney Smith was entrusted with the duty of attacking the Boulogne flotilla, but he soon discovered that without the co-operation of a land force he could effect nothing. General Moore, who was consulted, was opposed to the scheme, and Pitt

wrote to Castlereagh on October 6th, saying that Moore's report left him convinced that any attempt at landing will be attended with too much risk to justify the experiment.

During the autumn, too, constant efforts were made by the British and Russian Governments to induce the Prussian king to join the alliance.

Unfortunately, the Cabinet had only come to their decision to intervene actively in the north of Germany in the autumn, and after Napoleon had begun his famous march into Germany. In spite, therefore, of Castlereagh's energetic efforts, the British Army under Lord Cathcart arrived too late to effect the decision of the Prussian king to remain neutral. Indeed, had the Austrians and Prussians not adopted the fatal resolution to fight the French Emperor at Austerlitz, it is not improbable that the presence of the large British force in north Germany, to be shortly reinforced by Russian, Swedish, and Danish troops, all under the command of the Swedish king, would have induced the Prussian king to support actively the Coalition. Castlereagh estimated that in the spring of 1806 there would be in north Germany an army of about 100,000 men, which would at once expel the French from Hanover and Holland, and then act against Napoleon in whatever manner should be then judged to be best. Till Austerlitz, it seemed that this Grand Alliance would be crowned with success. In the autumn of 1805 Pitt had made strenuous efforts to induce Prussia to join the Coalition. Harrowby was sent to Berlin in November, and found that the King was bent on securing Hanover. Although the British Government declined even to consider the

Castlereagh's plans for British intervention in North Germany.

cession of Hanover, Harrowby continued to urge Prussia to take vigorous action. His arguments were in vain, and it has been held, perhaps without due consideration of the real condition of the Prussian army, that "the question of the Electorate ruined the coalition in those critical days, when the accession of 180,000 Prussian troops would have more than repaired the losses sustained at Ulm and Austerlitz."

Some time before the arrival of Harrowby in Berlin, preparations had been begun under the superintendence of Castlereagh for the despatch to the north of Germany of a large army, the greater portion of which did not arrive till December.

Napoleon was in the heart of Austria, and according to some writers the Allies seemed to have nothing to do but retreat to surround him in Moravia with overwhelming forces, and thus "to restore, by a victory like that of Leipzig, the balance of European power."

But the French victory at Austerlitz, followed by Prussia's alliance with France on December 15th, and by a Treaty concluded on January 15th in which Prussia agreed to close all the rivers of northern Germany against the British, produced a complete change in the policy of the British Government. The news of the king of Prussia's conduct followed by his request that the Anglo-Russian forces should withdraw from Hanover proved to be Pitt's death warrant. The news of Prussia's decision caused the expedition to be at once recalled and re-embarked at Bremen in February, 1806. Thus, owing to the rash policy of Russia and Austria, and to the vacillation and selfishness of Prussia, an admirable

Austerlitz
and the
Prussian
alliance
with
France.

opportunity of dealing a serious blow at Napoleon's power was lost. It was not for some years that a similar opportunity again presented itself, and then only after Europe had gone through the mill of French domination.

Castlereagh had already fully realized the immense advantages possessed by Great Britain owing to her insular position. With her navy supreme on the sea, Great Britain could land troops at whatever point was thought desirable. He recognised how invaluable would be the possession of "an active force disposable at the shortest notice." His views, which were shown during the ensuing years to be correct, were put into force later on in the cases of Portugal and of the Walcheren Expedition. The Walcheren Expedition indeed failed, not because the conception of such an expedition was wrong, but owing to the command being placed in incapable hands; the intervention in the Spanish Peninsula succeeded because the operations were entrusted to a man of consummate ability. But the failure of Cathcart's expedition to north Germany in 1805 is not to be regretted. The battle of Austerlitz, followed by the alliance of the king of Prussia with Napoleon, indeed killed Pitt. But had his plans been successful in 1805 and 1806 would Europe have greatly benefited? There is little doubt that the defeat of the French and the collapse of the Napoleonic Empire at that time would have been an unqualified disaster. With the exception of Great Britain there was hardly a country in Europe which did not require a thorough overhauling. The selfishness of Austria had been overwhelmingly demonstrated in 1799 and 1800; little improvement

Castlereagh's
views
premature.

could be detected in the policy of her rulers in 1805. For Prussia, her overthrow in 1806 at Jena and her enforced subordination to France was not only a well-merited punishment for her vacillation and rapacity in the autumn of 1805, but proved the greatest blessing ever conferred upon her. The abolition of the Holy Roman Empire, and the formation of the Confederation of the Rhine tended to recreate a Germany which gradually entered upon a new and prosperous career. The Revolution of 1789 brought in the end benefits to France; the European revolution was equally necessary, and in 1805 was only begun.

A period of
discipline
necessary
for Europe.

Pitt and Castlereagh, confident in the honesty of their policy and in the necessity of defending Great Britain against Napoleon, showed no realization of the difference between the political condition of their land and that of the rest of Europe. In political development Great Britain was immeasurably superior to that of other European countries. It was not till the flood of French conquest had passed over Europe, destroying effete institutions and compelling the rulers of the various states to recognise the existence of popular rights, and to learn the meaning of the word patriotism, that British money and armies could hope to overthrow the French Conqueror. It was not till 1808 that the Austrian Government listened to the voice of a statesman, Stadion, and for the first time in her history represented national aspirations; it was not till 1812 that the rise of a new Prussian nation showed that the lessons taught by its conquest by France had penetrated into all ranks of the North German people.

Though not realised by Pitt and Castlereagh, or indeed by any prominent British statesman, Napoleon's defeat at Austerlitz would have been an unqualified disaster. No better proof of the necessity of a process of purgation, to be carried out throughout the length and breadth of Europe, can be found than in Fox's description of the conduct of the Prussian king. "The conduct of Prussia," he declared in Parliament, "has been a union of everything that "is contemptible in servility, with everything that "is odious in rapacity. Other nations may have "been reduced by the fortune of war to cede many "of their provinces; but none, except Prussia, has "been reduced to the lowest stage of degradation, "that of being compelled to become the ministers "of the rapacity and injustice of a master."

Though it was undoubtedly fortunate for the future of Europe that Napoleon's arms did not receive a decisive check in 1805, there is no reason to deny to Pitt and Castlereagh the credit for having attempted to aid Russia and Austria in checking the flood of French conquest. Before his death Pitt had evidently realised the futility of small detached expeditions, and both he and Castlereagh recognised that it was only by the united efforts of Europe that Napoleon could be definitely checked. It was due to a lack of harmony in the Cabinet, and to the hesitation of the Continental Powers that delays had ensued which prevented the whole British force from arriving on the Continent till the beginning of January, 1806, some three weeks after Austerlitz, and when the treaty between Prussia and France had been agreed upon. The experience gained during the autumn of 1805 proved invaluable

The efforts
of Pitt and
Castlereagh.
Pitt's death
Jan. 23,
1806.

to Castlereagh, who, in the later stages of the struggle against Napoleon, carried out the policy which he had learned from Pitt.

On January 23rd, 1806, on hearing of the Prussian alliance with Napoleon, Pitt died, and after the failure of the King to persuade Lord Hawkesbury to take office, a Coalition Government was formed under Lord Grenville, known as the Ministry of All the Talents.

CHAPTER VII

THE TREATY OF TILSIT AND THE FAILURE OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY

THE death of Pitt was followed by the fall of the Tory ministry. It had never been a strong ministry, though, as we have seen, Pitt had been willing, in consequence of the crisis through which Great Britain and indeed Europe was passing, to secure the services of several illustrious Whigs. His death removed the one strong element in the Cabinet, and Lord Hawkesbury felt unequal to the task of forming an administration. Castlereagh himself was anxious that Hawkesbury should become Prime Minister, and on his refusal hoped that Grenville would lead an administration which should include men of all parties. The European crisis required a strong government. Fox, however, had uniformly condemned the war policy of the Tories, and he and Grenville seem to have thought that a strong and united Coalition Ministry would bring about peace.¹ The Tories as a party being therefore unwilling to take office, the King was compelled to have recourse to the Whigs, and an administration was formed known as the Ministry of All the Talents. In that

The
Ministry
of All the
Talents.

¹ Sidmouth was a member of the Cabinet, and Buckinghamshire, Bragge and Bathurst, who were his followers held non-Cabinet offices. It must also be noted that Grenville, Spencer, and Windham had served under Pitt. In the Cabinet, Fox, Grey and Henry Petty represented pure Whiggism.

Castlereagh
and
Canning
lead the
Opposition.

ministry Lord Grenville was First Lord of the Treasury, and Fox was Secretary for Foreign Affairs. The Opposition was led by Castlereagh and Canning. The former had already shown that he possessed administrative qualities of a high order, while the latter was recognised as an orator of great merit. But the relations between the two men do not seem ever to have been of a cordial nature. Castlereagh never shone in debate. He was no orator, and has been described as a clumsy debater. He often caused amusement by his Irishisms. On the other hand, he was very painstaking; he had acquired considerable knowledge of home and foreign affairs, and though he has been somewhat contemptuously termed a "laborious party tactician," he was destined to prove himself the most trusted leader of the Tories in the House of Commons and a brilliant and successful Foreign Minister. It may be that he despised Canning as the son of an actor, but the fact remains that the two men never worked very harmoniously together till after the fall of Napoleon. Canning, with his brilliant oratorical powers, never appreciated a colleague like Castlereagh, whose character differed in so many respects from his own, and with whose policy during the next few years he was to find himself at times strongly opposed.

The policy
of the
Ministry
of All the
Talents,
1806-7.

During the years 1806-7, when the government was in the hands of the Ministry of All the Talents, Castlereagh justified his reputation as one of the ablest of the young Tories by the skill which he showed in the debates on financial matters. Further, the whole course of foreign affairs during the period when he was in opposition justified the course

which he had wished to pursue in the autumn of 1805. Though on taking office Fox honestly believed that Napoleon was actuated by a sincere desire for peace, he was soon undeceived, and his efforts during the first six months of 1806 to come to some lasting pacific arrangement with the Emperor failed.

Napoleon's object was to obtain the mastery in the Mediterranean, and it became evident in the summer of 1806 that he was resolved to secure Sicily. In fact, while negotiating with Fox he ordered his brother Joseph to seize the island and expel the English. These plans were rudely upset by Sir John Stuart's brilliant victory of Maida on July 4th, and Sicily remained in British hands.

Peace negotiations, 1806.

Negotiations, however, proceeded during the month of July, Talleyrand holding secret conferences with Oubril, the Russian plenipotentiary, and hoping to force the hand of Lord Yarmouth, the British representative. The latter was soon afterwards replaced by Lord Lauderdale, who resisted Napoleon's efforts to continue his career of aggrandisement with the aid and connivance of Great Britain. In September Fox died, but not before he had realised the correctness of the views which had been held by Pitt and Castlereagh with regard to the necessity of opposing Napoleon by land and sea. His successor at the Foreign Office, Lord Howick, indeed continued to negotiate with Napoleon, who at the same time was pursuing his course of conquest.

The overthrow of Prussia in the battles of Auerstadt and Jena was accomplished with all the more ease as the Whig Cabinet made no efforts to take part in

the Continental War. In 1807 the Whigs had a still better opportunity for intervention. At Eylau, on February 7th, the Tsar held his own against Napoleon, and an interval occurred before the battle of Friedland was fought. Had "Castlereagh's" system then been acted upon, and had 50,000 "British troops been landed in the North of Germany," they could, with the addition of Hanoverians to the amount of 20,000, have thrown themselves across Napoleon's communications. Austria, defeated but by no means subdued, would have been encouraged to rise, and Napoleon's career would have received a decided check.

The Treaty of Tilsit, 1807, caused by the ineffective British foreign policy.

The failure to come to his aid caused Alexander's overthrow at Friedland, and fully justified him in making terms with Napoleon at Tilsit. Instead of acting in decisive fashion, the Whig Government had confined its efforts to sending out small and ineffective expeditions to various parts of the world, and had refused to give any pecuniary or military aid to Alexander. One expedition under Whitelocke suffered a disgraceful disaster at Buenos Ayres, another failed in Egypt, and a third under Sir John Duckworth was forced to retire from the Dardanelles. Alison is perhaps justified in his trenchant remark that "if the forces thus wasted in desultory and "eccentric operations had been concentrated in the "proper quarter, they would have brought the war "to a glorious termination in this very year" (1807). The Government ought most certainly to have sent an effective force into the Baltic early in 1807. Stralsund, Danzig and Colberg, coast fortresses of immense strategical value, should have been occupied by British and Swedish troops, and Stettin should

have been seized. By concentrating her efforts on North Germany, Great Britain, in the early months of 1807, might have inflicted a severe check upon Napoleon, and with Russia and Prussia formed a strong coalition.

That catastrophe known as the Treaty of Tilsit, as has already been said, was to a great extent due to the shortsighted policy of the Ministry of All the Talents. While Napoleon was reorganizing his forces preparatory to another great effort, the Russian and Prussian rulers had drawn up on April 26th the Treaty of Bartenstein, anticipating in a manner the policy adopted by the Allies in 1813 after the battle of Leipzig. The object of this Treaty was to force France to be satisfied with reasonable boundaries, to restore Prussia to its position before the battle of Jena, to establish Germany as a free "Constitutional federation," to enable Austria to regain the Tyrol, to make the Mincio her frontier in Italy, and generally to secure for Europe "the blessings of a solid peace."

Unfortunately, the Grenville ministry showed no inclination to support in any active manner the efforts of Russia and Prussia, with whom Sweden was allied. £500,000 instead of the £6,000,000 asked for was indeed paid to Russia, but no steps were taken to adopt the policy pursued in Queen Anne's reign and afterwards adopted by Castlereagh, viz., of sending a large and effective force to co-operate with the allies on the Continent. No attempt had been made to despatch a British expedition to the north coast of Germany, and it was quite evident to Alexander that his schemes against Turkey were not viewed with favour by

Summary
of the
policy
of the
Ministry
of All the
Talents.

the British Cabinet. He did not understand British politics, and could not appreciate the real import of the fall of the Whigs and the accession of the Portland ministry to office.

Summary
of the Acts
of the
Ministry
of All the
Talents.

The Ministry of All the Talents had indeed pursued a policy very disastrous to the fortunes and fame of Great Britain. The failures of Whitelocke, of Duckworth and of Fraser at Buenos Ayres, Constantinople and Alexandria respectively, were all due to the mistaken policy of the Grenville Administration in sending out small expeditions instead of adopting the policy which Castlereagh had advocated in 1805, namely of sending a large and well equipped force to the north of Germany which should rally round it all the opponents of Napoleon, and distract his attention from the main objects of his policy. The result of these misdirected efforts on the part of the Grenville ministry was that the prestige of Great Britain was distinctly impaired, and that Alexander was afforded some justification for his decision in June, 1807, to abandon all idea of an alliance with England, and to come to terms with Napoleon.

To the Russian Autocrat, Party Government was naturally a mystery, and he naturally concluded that the British nation could no longer be relied upon. The Ministry of All the Talents had failed to make a diversion on the Continent, and had declined to facilitate the loan which was a matter of vital importance to the Tsar. Further, the Russians naturally complained that England, instead of co-operating in a common cause, had used her forces in South America and Egypt, "at a time" when, by giving them a different destination, the "necessity of maintaining a Russian army on the

“ Danube might have been prevented, and the
 “ disposable force on the Vistula proportionally
 “ increased.”

The Ministry of All the Talents had thus by their shortsighted policy been the cause of a most serious crisis in the history of Europe, and one which now demanded the utmost vigilance on the part of the British Cabinet.

The new Tory administration was established on April 8th, 1807, and till the Reform Bill period the Tory party remained in power. In the ministry which succeeded that of All the Talents, the Duke of Portland was Premier, and Mr. Perceval, Chancellor of the Exchequer and leader of the House of Commons. Canning was Foreign Secretary and Castlereagh was again Secretary for War. It also included Eldon, Camden, Westmorland, Hawkesbury (who became Lord Liverpool on his father's death at the end of 1808), Mulgrave.

**The
 Portland
 Ministry,
 1807.**

The accession of Castlereagh to office marks a new period in his career. Up to the summer of 1807 Great Britain had signally failed in her efforts against the extension of French revolutionary influences in Europe and against the development of Napoleon's Empire. She had indeed inflicted a check upon Napoleon's plans in Egypt ; she had won the battle of Maida, and she held Sicily. But these checks seemed to be but temporary ones, and in 1807 Napoleon felt fully justified in forming ambitious schemes which implied the complete subservience of Great Britain. Hitherto Europe had shown no signs of appreciating the nature and aims of Napoleon's ambition, nor did the rulers of the various states realise that their failure before the French arms

**The
 political
 situation.**

was due to the political condition of their respective countries. But as the Napoleonic conquests continued, and Central Europe, Italy, and Spain became subservient, the necessity of checking the career of the French Emperor became imperative. After Tilsit his schemes included the complete domination over the Baltic and Mediterranean, the expulsion of the British from those seas, the supremacy of France in Eastern Europe. With the final subjection of Spain and Portugal, the Mediterranean would become a French lake ; with the establishment of French influence over Denmark and Sweden, the Baltic would also be closed to British ships and British commerce.

The new ministry came into office none too soon. In spite of the critical position of affairs on the Continent, the Whigs had not only wasted the resources of Great Britain on small expeditions to South America and elsewhere, but had neglected to support adequately the Tsar Alexander, who after Jena was left to struggle single-handed against the victorious forces of Napoleon. In order to save £4,000 a month the Whigs had totally dismantled the transport service, and had declined to guarantee a loan which Alexander wished to negotiate after the battle of Eylau.

The policy of the Whigs had thus prevented their successors from coming at once to the rescue of Alexander, and on April 22nd Lord Cathcart, the British military expert, reported that only 12,000 men, too few for any successful operation, were available for a Baltic expedition. North Germany was ripe for revolt, and Friedland had not yet been fought. The despatch in May of a large force to

North Germany, which could at least have seized Stralsund and roused North Germany, would have changed the whole aspect of affairs on the Continent. No force, however, left England till June 17th. On June 14th the battle of Friedland had been fought, and on June 25th Alexander and Napoleon had their famous interview on a raft moored in the river Niemen.

"I hate the English as much as you do, and I
"will second you in all your actions against them."
Such are the words which Alexander is reported to have used at the beginning of the interview. It is said that Alexander had no choice but to conclude a treaty with Napoleon. A cabal, at the head of which was the Grand Duke Constantine, the heir presumptive, had been formed to further the establishment of peace, and throughout the length and breadth of Russia there was a universal desire for the cessation of hostilities. Till the last moment, Francis J. Jackson, brother of Sir George Jackson, whose Diaries and Correspondence give much information about the state of Europe at this time, hoped that the Tsar would remain firm to the British Alliance. At the same time he was fully alive to the risk of relying too much on the uncertain ruler of Russia. "How far," he wrote, "can we
"rely on the constancy of our allies? The
"Emperor Alexander's character is our surest
"guarantee. But is that proof against all the
"impressions which it is attempted to make upon
"him? The Emperor of Russia is the only
"person in his court or army on whom we can rely
"His Imperial Majesty's intentions are excellent,
"and it is certainly no reproach to him if he is unable

**The Treaty
of Tilsit,
1807.**

“fully to execute them, for want of proper support
“from his ministers and generals.”

Jackson's fears were soon to be justified, and the Treaty between Russia and France was rapidly arranged. By a secret Treaty of Alliance the two monarchs agreed that if Great Britain did not accept their terms by December 1st, they would “summon
“the three Courts of Copenhagen, Stockholm and
“Lisbon to close their ports against the English
“and declare war against England. If any one of
“the three Courts refuse, it shall be treated as an
“enemy by the high contracting parties, and if
“Sweden refuse, *Denmark shall be compelled to
“declare war on her.*”

Alexander's
reasons for
making the
Treaty of
Tilsit.

Alexander's desertion of the Coalition against Napoleon has naturally been the subject of much contention. His army, even after Friedland, was by no means shattered, and Great Britain, though late, had decided to take part in the wars on the Continent. On June 17th Alexander declared to Lord Granville Leweson-Gower, our ambassador, that “he would never stoop to Bonaparte; he would
“rather retire to Kazan or even to Tobolsk.” But he soon changed his mind, and on June 25th concluded with Napoleon the Treaty of Tilsit.

There seems no doubt that at this time Alexander was actuated by a deep hatred of England. The conduct of the Whigs justified that hatred, and during the three months succeeding their fall the Tory Cabinet was unable to convince Alexander that a complete change in foreign policy had taken place. The peculiarities of the British Constitution were a mystery to him, and there was much in the conduct of the Ministry of All the Talents to justify

his hatred of England. Moreover, his generals were bringing pressure on him, and it is said that Bennigsen was plotting against him. A few days, however, before Friedland, he had written to George III that "there was no salvation to himself "or to Europe but by eternal resistance to Bonaparte."

This sudden change of front was a striking indication of Alexander's peculiar character, of which Castlereagh had now his first experience. In the future Castlereagh was destined to come into close contact with this extraordinary man, whose influence upon the course of European politics steadily grew. An impressionist, and almost a visionary, Alexander changed his convictions at times with bewildering rapidity. At this time he was full of resentment at Great Britain's apparent callousness and failure to realise the importance of the Russian resistance to Napoleon. He was, moreover, anxious to have his hands free in order to prosecute his designs upon Turkey; he was ready to believe that Great Britain's policy of wasting her energies upon small, detached expeditions was conceived with the definite aim of securing her supremacy at sea and of opening new markets for her commerce. No doubt, too, his imagination was dazzled by the idea pressed upon him by Napoleon that the two rulers of Russia and France should divide the world. Otherwise it is difficult to explain his sudden and base desertion of Prussia. Full of impulses, Alexander was now carried away by the prospect of being a great Emperor of the East, and of avenging himself upon Great Britain. At the same time this serious crisis in European history was undoubtedly due in part to the British system of Government by party, and

Alexander
I and his
projects.

afforded ample justification to Alexander for his distrust of British foreign policy, and for his decision at Tilsit to attend simply to the interests and security of his own dominions.

The
situation
in Great
Britain at
the time of
Portland's
accession
to office,
April, 1807.

Canning described the position of things when the Portland ministry took office in very downright style. The transport system, he said, owing to the false economy of Lord Henry Petty, was so completely dismantled that the new ministry found it had not a single transport at its disposal. Had the transport system not been interfered with, the ministry would, he averred, have been able to have sent out immediately 20,000 troops, who would have turned the scale at Friedland.

The Portland ministry, on coming into office on April 8th, had at once made preparations for intervening on the Continent. On June 17th the Cabinet undertook to send 20,000 men to North Germany, and on June 23rd agreed to take into its pay 18,000 Swedes. Further, it arranged to pay a large subsidy to Prussia, and to despatch troops as soon as possible to the north of Europe. But this decision came too late to save Europe from experiencing a long period of French domination, for on July 7th the Treaty of Tilsit was formally signed, and the complete command of the west seemed to have passed to Napoleon. The British ministry was, however, preparing to strike a blow in defence of the liberties of Europe.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SEIZURE OF THE DANISH FLEET AND THE CRISIS IN SPAIN—COPENHAGEN, BAYLEN, CINTRA, AND CORUNNA

THE Treaty of Tilsit represents the highest point reached by Napoleon. Although he continued till 1812 to dominate Europe, signs of resistance to his schemes began to show themselves. Before a year had elapsed it became evident to anyone closely in touch with the currents of thought on the Continent that a feeling of general uneasiness, if not of absolute dissatisfaction, with Napoleon's absolutism pervaded all Europe. The air was becoming charged with electricity, and the barometer indicated the near approach of storms. Such an arrangement as that indicated by the Treaty of Tilsit implied a European revolution of the most drastic character. Charles the Great had endeavoured to rule Europe from Aachen, but he had realised that his Empire would break up as soon as he was dead. Charles V had failed in his attempt to form an Empire, which should look only to him for political and religious guidance. Was it likely that the whole of Europe would rest contentedly under the rule of the French and Russian Emperors?

While Germany was quietly gathering strength, Great Britain and Spain began that resistance to the policy of Tilsit which culminated in Waterloo. With regard to the question of the extension of the Napoleonic system over the Baltic, and the consequent

The vital necessity for European resistance to the policy of Tilsit.

Great Britain and the Baltic.

necessity for the British seizure of the Danish fleet, Castlereagh, in his Correspondence, speaks in very precise terms. The Treaty of Tilsit had no sooner been signed than "the British Government found "means to obtain positive information of the hostile "plans projected against this country. . . . It was "discovered that one of the first objects of France "would be to secure the Danish fleet." About July 16th the British government had made a momentous decision. It resolved to compel Denmark to ally with us, or to maintain a strict neutrality. On this matter Castlereagh was in full agreement with Canning, who recognised the necessity of preventing Denmark from being forced to become the close ally of France. Napoleon had resolved to convert the Baltic into a French lake. "If England," he wrote, "refuses Russia's mediation, Denmark must choose "either to make war against England or against me." Immediate action on the part of the British Cabinet was, therefore, necessary if the Baltic was not to become a *mare clausum*. There was no time to be lost, and the British Government, recognising the urgency of the danger, acted with most commendable promptitude. Near Hamburg was a large force of Spanish troops serving under French orders, and these, combined with a French army under Bernadotte, might at any time invade and coerce Denmark. It was necessary then for the British Government to take immediate action and to prevent the Danish fleet from falling into the hands of Napoleon.

The
capture of
the Danish
fleet.

On July 15th the first division, and on July 29th the second division of the British fleet sailed from England, and on August 15th the expedition arrived off Dibeck, a village situated between Copenhagen

and Elsinore. The following day Admiral Gambier and Lord Cathcart issued a proclamation to the Danish Government. The Danish Crown Prince was offered a defensive alliance, armed assistance in case he was attacked by France, and £100,000 as a subsidy, on condition of his handing over the Danish fleet to the British Government. Somewhat naturally the Prince refused, and the Danes made a gallant but ineffectual resistance to the British attack on Copenhagen. On September 7th the city capitulated, and shortly afterwards the Danish fleet was carried off to England. It included 29 ships, 4 frigates, 6 brigs, and 25 gunboats.

Very severe criticism was naturally levelled at this action of the British ministry. Its justification was to be found in the secret articles of the Treaty of Tilsit. But these articles could not be produced, and the name of the agent who informed the ministry of their tenour could not be disclosed. So Castlereagh and Canning had to listen to the bitter attacks and scathing criticisms of their opponents, whose opinions were those of every European Court, without being able to make any effective reply, or to state fully the grounds which they held were sufficient to justify their action. To the world Great Britain had emulated the conduct of the French when the latter overran Switzerland.

The most unsatisfactory part of the affair from the point of view of the British ministry was that it did not lead, as had been confidently anticipated, to the formation of a great Northern League. Sweden had been compelled, on August 20th, to hand over Stralsund to a French force, and Gustavus, irritated at the withdrawal of Cathcart's force from Pomerania

The results
of this
action by
the British
Govern-
ment.

to Denmark, which was the immediate cause of the French occupation of Stralsund, refused to rely on Great Britain any longer. Sweden thus, owing to the departure of Cathcart and his troops from Pomerania to take part in the coercion of Denmark, could no longer be regarded as a possible ally of Great Britain. The coercion of Denmark, too, gave the Tsar an excuse for adopting a pronounced hostile attitude to Great Britain. Till October the British Cabinet had hoped that Alexander would not resent our action against Denmark; and on September 22nd Castlereagh, who fully agreed with Canning on the necessity of the Danish expedition, wrote to Cathcart: "Russia does not show any disposition to resent or to complain of what we have done at Copenhagen." And he went on to say that "the tone of the Russian Cabinet has become much more conciliatory to us since they heard of your operations at Copenhagen." As late as October 1st, our representative at St. Petersburg wrote that not only was public opinion "decidedly averse to war with England," but that "the English name was scarcely ever more popular in Russia than at the present time." But Alexander was in reality much irritated at what he called an act of "unheard-of violence," and early in November he formally adopted the Continental System.

The Justification of the seizure of the Danish fleet.

Nevertheless, the policy of Castlereagh and Canning had won a signal success. The Copenhagen expedition had been successful, and as a consequence the Swedish, no less than the Danish fleet, was no longer in danger of falling into the hands of Napoleon. In the Baltic the British fleet rode supreme, and the Russian fleet could not venture outside Cronstadt.

Though the project of the formation of a great Northern Confederacy had not been carried out, a decisive blow had been struck at Napoleon's plan of a naval combination in the North which should threaten, if not destroy, Great Britain's naval supremacy.

During the ensuing few months Castlereagh and Canning were able to frustrate another design formed by Napoleon of seizing the Portuguese fleet and uniting it with a Russian squadron under Siniavin in antagonism to England.

Continued
activity
of the
British
Govern-
ment.

And while one result of the outbreak of hostilities with Denmark was the firm establishment of British supremacy in the Baltic, a further result was the capture on December 24th of the Danish Islands of St. Thomas, St. John, and Santa Cruz by troops from Barbadoes. But their capture, together with that of Curaçoa and Madeira, was a very inadequate compensation for the loss of Buenos Ayres by General Whitelocke in July, and for the openly-declared hostility of Russia.

Though the project for the formation of a great Northern League, which should oppose that of Russia and France, had fallen through, the capture of the Danish fleet had entirely upset the plans of Napoleon in the North of Europe. But even before the British fleet had sailed for Denmark he had begun to devise schemes for the subjugation of Portugal, and for her inclusion in the Continental System. As early as July 19th, before he had heard of the British expedition to Copenhagen, he had informed the Government of Portugal that her ports must be closed to England; and no sooner was the danger from Copenhagen averted, than it became necessary for the British Cabinet to make preparations to prevent Portugal

Napoleon
and
Portugal.

from becoming an integral portion of the French system. Before the close of November the British fleet conveyed the Prince Regent of Portugal and his Court across the Atlantic. When Junot, on November 30th, arrived at Lisbon, he found that the royal family had sailed for South America, and that the Portuguese fleet was beyond the reach of Napoleon.

The King's
speech,
Jan. 21st,
1808.

Thus, at the opening of the English Parliament on January 21st, 1808, the King's Speech contained much that was of supreme interest. It began by stating that "no sooner had the negotiations at Tilsit confirmed the influence of France over the Powers of the Continent than His Majesty heard that France intended to combine those powers in one general confederacy, for the purpose *either* of entirely subjugating Great Britain, *or* imposing on Great Britain an insecure and ignominious treaty." It then went on to explain that for the purposes stated the above Powers had "determined to force into hostility to Great Britain, Denmark and Portugal, and to use their fleets. Thus the whole naval force of Europe would be brought to bear upon different points of His Majesty's dominions." In face of these dangers the Government, so it was stated in the Speech, had not been idle. The Portuguese fleet had been secured, and the Danish fleet had been seized by force. The general situation was then summed up thus:—Russia, Austria, and Prussia are now numbered among Great Britain's foes; owing to the machinations of France peace is not yet made with Turkey; retaliatory measures (the Orders in Council) in answer to the French decree declaring Great Britain and her colonies in a state of blockade, are being taken. After an allusion to the refusal of

the President of the United States to ratify a Treaty of Commerce and Amity which had been signed by Commissioners on December 3rd, 1806, the Speech was concluded by a declaration that the war against France, as far as Great Britain was concerned, was just and national "if ever one existed," that it was purely defensive, and that the King only desired a secure and honourable peace.

On January 28th, 1808, Lord Hawkesbury in the Lords and Castlereagh in the Commons moved votes of thanks to the navy and the army which had been employed in the attack on Copenhagen. Though these proposals were carried in both Houses, Ponsonby on February 3rd attacked the Danish expedition in the House of Commons, and moved for the production of the information which led to that expedition. Opposition was at once offered to his proposal by both Canning and Castlereagh. The latter asserted that various endeavours had been made to bring the Court of Denmark to an explanation of its conduct, that the Crown Prince had secretly favoured the views of France, and that an occupation of Zealand would not have been a satisfactory alternative to the measures taken. On Mr. Ponsonby's motion being put, 108 voted for it and 253 voted against it.

Five days later, on February 8th, the Duke of Norfolk in the House of Lords called attention to this important matter. "The expedition to Copenhagen," he said, "had deeply affected the character of the country," and he demanded that the House should be furnished with every kind of information on the subject. To his motion for the production of all communications relating to the Danish expedition the Marquess Wellesley replied that Napoleon had

The
debates in
Parliament.

expected that Portugal and Denmark would declare war upon England on September 1st, that without Holstein, whence she drew her provisions, Denmark could not defend herself against Napoleon, and, further, that her commercial interests, founded on the principles of the armed neutrality, made her inclined to lean towards France. Lord Hawkesbury also pointed out that Denmark must have yielded to Napoleon's wishes, for "since Austerlitz, Jena, and "Friedland, there was nothing on the Continent "that could effect any resistance to France." He further emphasized the fact that had Denmark been willing to join Great Britain an attempt at defending Zealand would have been made. While 48 voted for the Duke of Norfolk's motion, 105 voted against it; the supporters of the motion including Lords Moira, Grey, Darnley, Sidmouth, St. Vincent and Buckinghamshire; and its opponents Lords Jersey, Harrowby and Mulgrave. This debate is moreover of interest in that it brought the Marquess Wellesley into prominence as a strong supporter of the Government. That remarkable man had returned from India just before the death of Pitt, whose great friend he was, and (as a letter in the possession of the Rev. W. H. Hutton, editor of this series shows) was cordially welcomed by Castlereagh. From the day of his arrival he at once showed a keen interest in foreign affairs.

The French
invasion
of Spain.
The capitu-
lation of
Baylen,
July, 1808.

During the early months of 1808 French troops poured into Spain, the conquest of which was regarded by Napoleon as a comparatively easy matter. These troops, owing to "the contempt which the Emperor "entertained, not only for the Spanish Government "but for the Spanish nation," were far inferior in quality to the victors of Austerlitz and Friedland,

and, moreover, were largely reinforced by Italians, Germans, and even Irish. One result of Napoleon's mistake in underrating the possible strength of the Spanish resistance was the capitulation of Baylen in July, 1808, when some 17,000 men under Dupont laid down their arms. The capture of a whole French army by a Spanish force sent an electrical thrill through Europe. It forced Napoleon to modify his contempt of the Spanish powers of resistance, it determined him to arrange the famous Conference with Alexander of Russia at Erfurt in the autumn of 1808; it stimulated the resistance to the French in Spain; and it encouraged Castlereagh to form plans for British intervention in Portugal.

On June 8th, 1808, the Asturian deputies, Viscount Materosa and Don Diego de la Vega, arrived in London. They brought with them the tidings that Northern Spain had risen against the French. The news that a national rising of some magnitude was taking place in Spain had a magical effect upon the British mind.

**Castlereagh
and British
intervention
in
Portugal,
1808.**

Hitherto successive governments had preferred to send small isolated expeditions, apparently with the hope that they would form the nucleus of important national risings. The failure of such expeditions, as those sent in 1807 to Buenos Ayres, Egypt and Constantinople, had discredited this system of "pin-pricks," and this "policy of filching sugar islands." In 1808 public opinion was decidedly in favour of the policy favoured by Castlereagh since 1805, namely, of sending a large well-equipped force to the scene of operations. Changes and reforms in the British military system, due in great measure to Castlereagh, now enabled the Government to act

with vigour on the Continent. Moreover, there was no longer any danger of a French invasion, and at the time of the arrival of the Spanish envoys Castlereagh was planning an attack on the French ships which lay in Boulogne harbour, while a force was being collected in Ireland for the purpose of recapturing Buenos Ayres. The imminent return, too, of some 10,000 men under Sir John Moore from the Baltic placed a large force at the disposal of the ministry.

Expedition
to Portugal
decided
upon.

Castlereagh's reply to the Asturian envoys marked a momentous epoch in British foreign policy. He decided to forego all idea of sending an expedition to South America, and to concentrate the efforts of Great Britain upon the Spanish Peninsula. In making this decision he was acting in consonance with public opinion in England. The rising of the Asturians, and the arrival in England of the Asturian envoys, stirred up a strong feeling in this country, which found expression in articles in *The Times*. On June 29th, 1808, a strongly-worded article appeared calling upon the ministers to take immediate action. Alluding to the Asturian envoys we find the following remarks: "And now we would ask the British
"ministers with the utmost earnestness, whether
"such men and such a cause are to be betrayed, and
"betrayed they will be, if they are not supported by
"the whole vigour of which this nation is capable.
" . . . There is not a man in England who does not
"now wish the whole of the British army, if it were
"properly commanded, at once transported to the
"Spanish territory, to take its part at least in annihi-
"lating and driving out of the peninsula of Spain a
"people so base and treacherous." Sir Arthur Wellesley, in whose abilities Castlereagh had the

greatest confidence, was placed in command of an expedition, which in the summer of 1808 sailed from Cork. For the arrangements connected with its transport, commissariat and equipment, the Duke of York and the War Office were responsible. On this subject Wellesley, in a letter to Castlereagh on June 29th, 1808, expressed himself very strongly. His criticisms were well grounded, for rarely has an expedition more inefficiently provided left the shores of Britain. Professor Oman, in his "History of the "Peninsular War," remarks with truth that, "Such "little *contretemps* were common in the days when "Frederick, Duke of York, with the occasional "assistance of Mrs. Mary Ann Clark, managed the "British Army." The lack of proper arrangements for the expedition might, however, have been remedied in time, but what was far more serious was the intervention of the Duke of York and the War Office with regard to the command of the expedition. Unable to realise the value of Wellesley's experience of war on a large scale in India, the War Office placed over Wellesley two senior officers, Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard. Before he heard that he was to be superseded in the command of the troops in Portugal, Wellesley had already landed at Mondego Bay. His victory at Vimeiro on August 21st was deprived of valuable results by the appearance of Burrard, who took the command and refused to advance. On the next day Sir Hew Dalrymple, an old man with very little experience of warfare, superseded Burrard. Unfortunately, though with the best intentions, Castlereagh had written to him recommending him to "take Sir "Arthur Wellesley into his particular confidence,"

The
Convention
of Cintra,
Aug. 30th,
1808.

and "to make the most prominent use of him which "the rules of the service would permit." Somewhat naturally, Dalrymple at once conceived a dislike for Wellesley, whose plan of campaign he rejected. The proposal by Junot for an armistice was received with undisguised pleasure by Dalrymple, and the Convention of Cintra was agreed upon on August 30th. By it the French army of over 25,000 was allowed to embark at Lisbon for France. Though the evacuation of Portugal by the French troops was thus effected, the rage of the Portuguese authorities was only equalled by the indignation felt in England at this Convention, which, though possessing advantages from a military point of view, was only judged from a political standpoint.

Some arrangement had also to be made with regard to the Russian fleet, which Admiral Sir Charles Cotton had kept under blockade since 1807. The Russian Admiral Siniavin was on bad terms with Junot, and preferred not to be included in the Convention of Cintra, but to make his own terms with the British Admiral. On September 3rd a convention was therefore drawn up between Cotton and Siniavin, in accordance with which the Russian fleet, which was composed of nine sail of the line and one frigate, in the Tagus was surrendered on the condition that it should be restored on the conclusion of peace between Russia and Great Britain. Siniavin, his officers, and crews, were not to be considered as prisoners of war, and were to be sent back to Russia in English ships. By securing the Russian ships Cotton was doing a good service to his country, for it was a matter of great importance to reduce the number of ships under the power of Napoleon.

The Convention of Cintra caused great dissatisfaction in England, and Lord Castlereagh, who, as war minister, had recommended "some decision confirming" of the Convention by the Cabinet, was specially singled out for abuse. Canning was not present at the meeting of the Cabinet which confirmed the Convention, and dissented from the decision arrived at by his colleagues respecting it. After a careful investigation of all the circumstances relating to this famous Convention, Professor Oman comes to the conclusion that, "while on the military side it " was justifiable, it presented grave political faults."

Criticism
of the
Convention
of Cintra.

What was more serious than the grave faults and mistakes of Dalrymple in arranging the Convention was the delay in making any forward movement after the Convention was signed.

"I do not know what Sir Hew proposes to do," wrote Wellesley on September 1st, to Colonel Charles Stewart, "or is instructed to do ; but if I was in his situation I would have 20,000 men at Madrid in " less than a month from this time."

The Convention of Cintra, as Lord Malmesbury says, was most unpopular in England, and with good reason, for the faults and mistakes made by Dalrymple in arranging it were innumerable. In the House of Commons Lord Henry Petty (afterwards Marquess of Lansdowne) moved resolutions condemnatory of the Convention ; and on November 17th the Court of Inquiry began its sittings. In the meantime Dalrymple, Burrard and Wellesley had returned home, the last named sailing from Lisbon on September 20th, and arriving at Plymouth on October 4th.

In the "Memoirs of a Highland Lady," edited by

Lady Strachey, it is related by Miss Grant of Rothiemurchus how the Master of University College, Oxford, on hearing of the return of the British Generals from Spain, wrote the following lines :—

Sir Arthur, Sir Hew and Sir Harry,
Sailed boldly from England to Spain ;
But not liking long there to tarry,
They wisely sailed all back again.

Wellesley's
letter to
Castle-
reagh,
Oct., 1808.

Before he sailed Wellesley had written to Castlereagh a letter, the importance of which it is impossible to overrate. In it he showed that the Spanish armies were of little value, and that no reliance could be placed upon them. "A thousand French," he says, "with cavalry and artillery will disperse thousands of them." The only efficient plan of operations was, in his opinion, for the British Army in Portugal to move up the Valley of the Douro into Northern Spain, basing its advance upon the Asturias and Galicia. The army would thus be on the right flank and rear of any French force advancing to Madrid. In case Napoleon himself should resolve to attack the British force, a line of retreat must be left open, and "that retreat must be the sea." To Castlereagh belongs the credit of recognising the superiority of Wellesley's advice to that of others who were expatiating upon the patriotism and resources of the Spaniards. In consequence of his conviction that Wellesley's despatch contained suggestions which, if carried out, would upset all Napoleon's calculations, and mar his project for the conquest of Spain, Castlereagh embodied Wellesley's views in the orders which were sent to Moore on September 25th. Henceforward he never wavered in his consistent support

of Wellesley, whose plan of operations was carried out by Sir John Moore, ending with the battle of Corunna and the complete disarrangement of Napoleon's schemes for the subjugation of Spain.

Castlereagh's relations with Sir John Moore, and the detailed account of the movements which ended at Corunna, are fully described in "The Diary of Sir John Moore," which has lately been published. During 1807 and the early part of 1808 Moore had been employed in the Baltic with the hope that he would be able to keep "the mad and impracticable" King of Sweden true to the English alliance. The Swedish Alliance was regarded by the ministers as of great importance; but in June the King of Sweden placed under arrest Moore, who thereupon, in July, managed to escape. On his arrival in England he was coldly received by the ministers, though the King and the Duke of York treated him with great consideration. On hearing that he was to be employed in Spain in a subordinate position to Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard he was naturally indignant, and in an interview with Castlereagh expressed his views very warmly. "It may," he said, "perhaps, be my lot never to see you again. I, therefore, think it right to express to you my feelings of the unhandsome treatment I have received from you. . . . Had I been an ensign, it would hardly have been possible to treat me with less ceremony. . . . I have a right, in common with all officers who have served zealously and well, to expect to be treated with attention, and when employment is offered to me, that some regard should be had to my former services."

Sir John
Moore.

In a letter which was sent after Moore, Castlereagh

assured him that nothing but the urgency of the situation prevented him from advising His Majesty "to relieve you from a situation in which you appeared to consider yourself to have been placed without a due attention to your feelings as an officer."

Moore's
character.

The fact was that both Castlereagh and Canning, especially since Moore's experiences in Sweden, had good reason to distrust the General's diplomatic tact. The situation in Spain required careful handling, and Moore, though a great General, probably was inferior to Wellington in the power of dealing with political difficulties. Both Castlereagh and Canning, therefore, were justified in their apprehension that Moore's qualities did not fit him for dealing with a situation in Portugal "where judicious handling of sensitive individuals was only second in importance to military prowess."

Canning, especially, was very dissatisfied with the temper of mind in which Moore had left England; and Stapleton, in his "Life of Canning," recounts that when Canning heard at a Cabinet meeting Castlereagh's account of his interview with Moore, he exclaimed, "Good God! And do you really mean to say that you allowed a man entertaining such feelings with regard to the expedition to go?"

Moore in
Spain.

However, Moore set sail, and it does credit to both him and Castlereagh that during the General's short but highly important campaign they did not allow their personal feelings to interfere with their efforts to further the national interests in the struggle against Napoleon. At the same time in his Diary he has no hesitation in expressing his own private views. Thus, for instance, he styles a despatch

which Sir Hew Dalrymple had received from Castle-reagh at the beginning of September as "plausible "verbose nonsense," and shows how impossible it was for a minister in London to direct operations in Spain. On October 7th Moore was entrusted with the chief command of the British army in Spain, and till his death at Corunna busied himself in upsetting Napoleon's plans "for the subjugation of the Peninsula." During this period he was in frequent communication with Castlereagh, to whom he described the difficulties which he had to encounter in November and December. It is impossible to overrate the importance of Moore's campaign. Without it Napoleon, for a time at any rate, would have easily subjugated Spain and Portugal. Without it Wellington's Peninsula Campaign would have been rendered impossible.

Owing to Moore's attack on the French line of supplies, Napoleon was forced to give up his plan for the immediate subjugation of Spain, and to devote his energies to crushing Moore's force.

**The value
of Moore's
campaign
—Corunna.**

Napoleon's failure to carry out his intention led to his own return to France, and enabled Wellesley to enter upon the Peninsular War in the following year. On January 1st, 1809, Napoleon, at Astorga, decided to leave Soult to continue to follow Moore. His decision implied a recognition of the magnitude of Moore's services to the civilized world.

Canning, in the House of Commons, rightly estimated Moore's advance on Sahagun, when he described how that movement contributed to draw off the French army from Madrid and "from the prosecution of operations against the capital and the "Southern provinces."

Though the ministry had been led to believe that the state of things in Spain was flourishing, no sooner was it realised by them that they had been wrongly informed than preparations were made to reinforce Moore.

To Castlereagh Moore wrote very fully with regard to what was urgently required, and Castlereagh at once sent immense quantities of biscuit to Corunna ; but, we are told, "the district was so denuded of " transport, and the silver difficulty at the time it " was most wanted was so great," that it could not be forwarded.

Though Moore's death and the return of his army to England seemed to imply the abandonment of active operations in the Peninsula, this was far from being the case. Moore's campaign rendered further intervention in Spain not only possible, but likely to be fraught with the best results. In consequence, Wellesley was early in 1809 appointed to the command in Portugal.

The Court of Inquiry into the circumstances leading to the Convention of Cintra issued its report on December 22nd, 1808. Though Dalrymple and Burrard were credited with "fair military reasons " for their conduct, it was quite clear that their services would not again be required. Wellesley, on the other hand, was complimented for his action down to the battle of Vimeiro, and four months later he was appointed to the command of the army in the Peninsula. For some three months after the battle of Corunna British operations in the Peninsula were practically suspended. The British troops at Lisbon were commanded by Sir John Cradock, who maintained a defensive attitude, while in Spain the

Spanish troops suffered a series of defeats at the hands of the French.

During this period Castlereagh had frequent conferences with his brother, Colonel Charles Stewart, who had accompanied Moore on his campaign, and with Arthur Wellesley. The opinion of the latter with regard to the possibility of defending Portugal had no little effect in confirming the views of the Cabinet on the subject. "I have always been of opinion," Wellesley wrote, "that Portugal might be defended " whatever might be the result of the contest in " Spain ; and that, in the meantime, the measures " adopted for the defence of Portugal would be highly " useful for the Spaniards in their contest with the " French."

Meanwhile, affairs both abroad and at home remained in a very unsatisfactory state. On the 16th of January, 1809, the battle of Corunna was fought, followed by the return of the British troops to England. It was openly said by Grenville that the English war in Spain was, according to the reported opinions of the ministers, practically over. Grenville also spoke of " the squabbles among the ministers, " the usual consequence of embarrassments and " disgraces which each labours (in such cases) to throw " upon his colleagues." He also declared that the ministers " all agree in falling foul of Lord Castle- " reagh." Fortunately, Castlereagh was strong enough to insist upon the necessity of prosecuting the war with Napoleon, was sufficiently capable to carry out the reorganisation of the militia system (above alluded to), and had sufficient influence to secure for Arthur Wellesley the command of the British forces in Portugal.

Attacks on
Castlereagh,
Jan., 1809.

CHAPTER IX

THE VICTORY OF TALAVERA AND THE FAILURE OF THE WALCHEREN EXPEDITION 1808-1809

Military
reorganisa-
tion.

THE year 1808 had seen the beginning of the Peninsular War. With the arrival of Arthur Wellesley in Portugal in the spring of 1809, the British intervention in the Spanish Peninsula became a matter of European importance, and slowly but surely contributed to the overthrow of Napoleon. That such intervention was possible and that it proved effective was entirely due to the reorganisation of the British army which had been carried out by Castlereagh in 1808 and 1809. While the militia system was made the basis of the military establishment, a system of second battalions was partially put into force. The losses which the regular army might incur were to be supplied by annual volunteering from the regular militia, which itself was to be kept up partly by ballot, partly by voluntary enlistment. The militia was then used as a recruiting ground for the regular army. By these means the army in the Peninsula was adequately supplied, and was able when well led to defeat Napoleon's most trusted veterans.

The appointment of Wellesley to the command of the troops in Portugal, the responsibility of which rests entirely with Castlereagh—as a letter from the King proves—implied the transference of Sir John Cradock, who was then at Lisbon and of

superior rank to Wellesley, to some other post. Cradock had shown ability while in Portugal, and Castlereagh in offering him the command at Gibraltar took the opportunity of referring to his services in laudatory terms. In his letter to Cradock, Castlereagh openly avowed the immense belief which he felt in Wellesley's military fitness for his new post. "It would neither be kind nor manly "in me," he wrote, "not to avow that the advice "the King's ministers have felt it their duty to "offer to the King on the present occasion, has been "dictated by the peculiar value they are disposed "to attach to Sir A. W.'s services generally, and "particularly in Portugal, which in times and under "circumstances of peculiar difficulty, has in every "instance met with their unqualified approbation." Sir John Cradock accepted the appointment at Gibraltar, and Wellesley succeeded to the command of the army in Portugal.

The
appoint-
ment of
Arthur
Wellesley
to the
command
in the
Peninsula,
1809.

Castlereagh's instructions to Wellesley, who landed in Portugal on April 22nd, 1809, were characterised by his usual good sense. He spoke of the necessity of at once reorganizing the Portuguese army, and teaching it to co-operate with the British troops. The Portuguese army was under the charge of Beresford, with whom Wellesley was to be in close communication. The defence of Portugal was, however, to be Wellesley's first concern, but Wellesley was to use his own judgment with regard to the most suitable time for advancing into Spain, the interests of which were so closely connected with those of Portugal. The whole despatch shows that Castlereagh placed implicit confidence in the judgment and military skill of Wellesley. And

this confidence was fully justified in the Talavera Campaign. After having on May 26th effected the passage of the Douro and driven Soult out of Portugal, Wellesley defeated Victor on July 27th in the famous battle of Talavera. Confronted by unexpected difficulties, however, Wellesley was forced to retreat, and to establish his headquarters between the Tagus and the Douro.

Castle-
reagh's
support of
Wellesley.

The short but brilliant campaign fully justified Castlereagh's confidence in Wellesley, who on September 4th was given the rank of Viscount with the title of Wellington. During the progress of the campaign, Castlereagh did all in his power to supply the needs of the army, and, moreover, sent out reinforcements to the amount of 5,000 men, who proved of service at Talavera. "I am doing what "I can to promote it" (your future success), Castlereagh wrote to Wellesley on May 26th, "by "strengthening you from hence, and I shall press "everything forward as much as possible." On June 1st he wrote congratulating Wellesley on the passage of the Douro, and assuring him that "the "result of the present operation, under the relative "circumstances of the two armies, has in no respect "fallen short of what might have been expected "from the talents of the General and the gallantry "of the troops." Castlereagh, satisfied with the outlook in Portugal, then authorised the advance into Spain, and Wellesley won the battle of Talavera.

Results
of the
Talavera
campaign.

The campaign had great direct and indirect advantages. The projects and calculations of the French were upset; Galicia, Asturias, and part of Leon were permanently freed from the enemy, and the invasion of Portugal was postponed for a year,

during which Wellesley had time to strengthen his army and to construct the lines of Torres Vedras. Moreover, he had been able to estimate at their real value the Spanish troops, whose conduct at Talavera had shown that no reliance could be placed on them. "I don't think," wrote Wellesley to Castlereagh on August 1st, "that the Spaniards are yet in a state of discipline to contend with the French, and I prefer infinitely to endeavour to remove them from this part of Spain by manœuvre to the trial of another pitched battle." He further stated that not only were the Spanish troops in a miserable state of discipline, but that they suffered from the want of properly qualified officers. In a further letter, on August 27th, to Castlereagh, Wellesley spoke highly of the Spanish artillery, but described in some detail the cowardice of the Spanish infantry, some 2,000 of whom, frightened by the noise of their own fire, ran off on the evening of July 27th. These troops, who were neither attacked nor threatened with any attack, fled, leaving their arms and accoutrements on the ground, their officers with them, "and they and the fugitive cavalry plundered the baggage of the British army which had been sent to the rear. Many others went whom I did not see." It was as obvious to Castlereagh as it was to Wellesley that the time had not yet arrived for a serious invasion of Spain, and that in view of an organised attempt on the part of the French to drive the British from the Peninsula, it was necessary for Wellesley to fortify himself in Portugal, and to endeavour to withstand the attacks which would certainly be made upon him.

In a masterly despatch of September 14th,

Castle-
reagh's
views
on the
campaign.

Castlereagh shows a remarkable grasp of the situation in Portugal, and of the measures necessary for the defence of that country. Moreover, in a speech on the Talavera campaign, he alluded to the losses sustained in the battle itself in terms which should commend themselves to a generation accustomed to the letters from special correspondents. "The loss on that day," he said, "has been much dwelt upon, and none can lament the brave men who perished on that occasion more sincerely than I do. Sharing as I do to the very utmost that feeling, I must at the same time deprecate that careful searching into the details of loss which is calculated to unnerve the military energy of the country." Wellesley's retirement into Portugal, however, more or less connected with the failure of the Walcheren expedition, strengthened the criticisms of the opposition upon the policy of the Government and the hostile feeling to Castlereagh, who as War Minister was regarded by the general public as answerable for all military failures and disasters.

The Orders
in Council.

Meanwhile, the Government, in addition to its intervention in Portugal, had endeavoured in other respects to defend British interests against the hostility of Napoleon. The "Continental System," which had been established by the Berlin Decree of November 21st, 1806, in order to ruin British trade, had been answered by the Orders in Council in January, 1807. Napoleon, in reply to these orders, had in 1808 still further extended the Continental System by including in its scope Italy and Austria. The rising in Spain in 1808 had, however, thrown open that country to British commerce, and had afforded some relief to British traders.

It was therefore of paramount importance to Great Britain to prevent the dependence of Spain and Portugal upon France. By preserving their independence, Great Britain was compelling Napoleon to postpone indefinitely his plans for the partition of Turkey and for an attack upon the British power in India. The British intervention in Spain was thus of vital necessity, not only to Great Britain, but to the whole civilised world. Owing to that intervention, the Spanish rising became each year more formidable, Great Britain was enabled to exist in spite of the "Continental System," and Napoleon's dreams of Eastern conquests vanished into thin air.

The importance of the British intervention in Spain.

That such vital interests were at stake was, very characteristically, not recognised in Great Britain during the early months of 1809. Parliament met on January 13th, 1809, and while Lord Grenville in the House of Lords attacked the policy of sending an English expedition into Spain, Lord Henry Petty moved in the House of Commons a vote of censure upon the ministers on account of the Convention of Cintra. Both motions were easily defeated, as was a motion by Ponsonby, the leader of the Whigs in the House of Commons, for an enquiry into the affairs of Spain. Nevertheless, it was clearly apparent that the ministry was far from occupying a strong position. The Convention of Cintra was by no means forgotten, and had roused a great amount of discontent, which vented itself upon Castlereagh as War Minister. For a time, however, the attention of the House of Commons was directed from foreign affairs to the conduct of the Duke of York as commander-in-chief. His former mistress,

Opposition to the policy of the Government.

Mrs. Clarke, had transferred herself to a Colonel Wardle,^F a member of Parliament, who now accused the Duke of being cognisant of corrupt practices carried on in the past by Mrs. Clarke. The Duke had proved an excellent administrator, and most unfortunately the ministry decided to hold an enquiry into the accusations. After a Committee of the whole House during nearly two months (from January 26th to March 20th) had conducted the enquiry the House by a small majority acquitted him of all the charges brought against him. The Duke, however, late in March resigned his post of Commander-in-Chief. The zeal for reform of abuses was nevertheless stimulated by the smallness of the majority in favour of the Duke, and many cases of corruption were unearthed. Both Castlereagh and Perceval were shown to have used on certain occasions undue influence, but the only result of the agitation was a bill brought in by Perceval himself to check the sale and brokerage of offices.

The
Wagram
campaign,
1809.

Meanwhile, stirring events were taking place on the Continent. On April 6th the Archduke Charles of Austria issued a proclamation calling upon the Austrians to deliver Germany from the French. For a time "all hopes of European independence" centred in Wellesley and the Archduke Charles." But while Wellesley was able to hold his own, the Archduke was overthrown on July 6th in the battle of Wagram, and Austria was compelled to accept the humiliating terms of the Treaty of Vienna. Had a strong British force landed in Hanover or at some other place in northern Europe in 1809, Napoleon's attention would have been distracted, and the overwhelming disaster of Wagram would have been averted.

But Great Britain and Austria were still formally at war. In Vienna and in London negotiations advanced slowly, and promptitude did not characterise the proceedings in Downing Street or at the Austrian Court. Wagram was fought on July 6th; it was not till July 29th that the Austrian ratification of peace was received by the British ministry. As early as January, 1809, the idea of British intervention at the mouth of the Elbe had been definitely raised. Canning sent by way of Trieste £25,000 to Austria, but George III seems to have insisted that a formal peace between Great Britain and Austria should be concluded before any assistance on a large scale was given to the Viennese Court.

Other reasons, too, contributed to the delay on the part of the Cabinet in finally determining upon the expedition. An intrigue in the Cabinet to remove Castlereagh from his post had been entered upon as early as April, 1809, and the knowledge of this intrigue did not contribute to united action on the part of the ministers. The resignation, too, of the Duke of York in March was a most unfortunate event, and deprived the country of a capable Commander-in-Chief. His successor, Sir David Dundas, was singularly incapable of dealing with a situation which demanded ability and energy. No sooner had he succeeded to the post lately held by the Duke of York than he asserted that we could not spare 15,000 men for foreign service, and in consequence of this opinion no definite steps were taken till June, when it became apparent from the muster rolls that as many as 40,000 troops could be spared for foreign service. Consequently the project known as the

**Causes of
British
inaction.**

Walcheren Expedition was not finally accepted by the Cabinet till June 14th.

The
Walcheren
expedition,
1809.

For that project Castlereagh was mainly responsible. In April, 1807, when he took office, Castlereagh had drawn up a memorandum advocating a Walcheren expedition. In the autumn of 1808 he again brought forward the matter, and suggested that Sir John Moore should be placed in command. On April 1st, 1809, he placed before the Cabinet a most exhaustive memorandum on the subject, in which he specified the exact number of ships necessary, and showed a remarkable knowledge of all the details connected with the proposed expedition. The results of immediate action on the part of the ministry, and the despatch of the expedition under an able commander would have been stupendous. Napoleon was then engaged in a desperate struggle with the Austrians on the Danube, and received a serious check at Aspern on May 22nd. In the Peninsula Soult was rapidly retiring from Portugal. It was not till July 6th that the battle of Wagram was fought, and Austria again forced to submit to Napoleon. The despatch of the Walcheren Expedition early in June under able leaders was therefore of the utmost importance. The Cabinet, however, insisted on consulting a number of military men whose opinions widely differed, and it was not till June 14th that the expedition was decided upon. Further delays took place, and it was not till July 28th, three weeks after the battle of Wagram had been won by the French, that the expedition set sail. An Englishman describes how he saw "the departure of the grandest "fleet that ever sailed, at once, from the shores of

"England. Above three hundred vessels spread
"their wings to the wind, and from North Foreland
"to South the Channel was one cluster of moving
"vessels—a sight never to be forgotten whilst
"‘memory holds a seat.’"

The failure of the expedition was due to the **Its failure.**
incapacity of Lord Chatham, who deliberately
disobeyed Castlereagh's explicit instructions. Every-
thing depended upon an immediate dash at Antwerp,
which was practically undefended. All French
ships and arsenals in the Scheldt could then have
been destroyed, and a very serious blow would have
been struck at Napoleon's power. Castlereagh's
instructions to Lord Chatham were most explicit:
"Your lordship will consider the operation in
"question as, in its execution, more immediately
"directed against the fleet and arsenals of France
"in the Scheldt. The complete success of the
"operation would include the capture or destruction
"of the whole of the enemy's ships, either building
"at Antwerp or afloat in the Scheldt, the entire
"destruction of their yards and arsenals at Antwerp,
"Terneuse, and Flushing, and the rendering, if
"possible, the Scheldt no longer navigable for ships
"of war." Chatham was further ordered "to
"advance at once a considerable corps against
"Antwerp," and at the same time to attack and if
possible take Flushing.

Unfortunately, instead of attacking Antwerp and
Flushing at the same time, Chatham only attacked
Flushing. The delay which followed gave Napoleon
time to reinforce Antwerp, disease broke out among
the British troops, and the expedition proved a
disastrous failure. A French General at the time

assured an English officer that "if the British troops "had immediately attacked Antwerp, they must "have succeeded in taking that place, and in the "destruction of the French fleet."

The project
justifiable.

The conception of the Walcheren Expedition was statesmanlike, and Castlereagh had formed a correct idea of the immense value to England and Europe of a successful attack upon Antwerp. Moreover, Wellington himself approved of the expedition, and writing on August 25th to Castlereagh, he remarked, "It may be satisfactory to you to know that I don't "think matters would have been much better if you "had sent your large expedition to Spain instead "of the Scheldt. You could not have equipped "it in Galicia or anywhere in the north of Spain. "If we had had 60,000 instead of 20,000 in all "probability we should not have got to Talavera "to fight the battle, for want of means and of "provisions. But if we had got to Talavera, we "could not have gone further."

The
ordinary
version
of the
causes
of the
duel
between
Castlereagh
and
Canning.

Castlereagh's plan, so wisely conceived, had thus been ruined by errors in its execution. On him, however, fell the whole brunt of the dissatisfaction felt in England. This dissatisfaction was increased by the news that after Talavera Wellington had retired into Spain. It was just at this time that the intrigue in the Cabinet for his overthrow came to the ears of Castlereagh. That intrigue had for its object the substitution of the Marquess Wellesley for Castlereagh as Secretary for War. Canning was the originator of the movement against Castlereagh. On April 2nd, 1809, he had informed Portland that he would resign unless Castlereagh was removed

from his office. The Duke never mentioned the subject to Castlereagh, but gave Canning to understand that after the close of the session in June Castlereagh should be transferred to some other department. Throughout, Portland seems to have been acting with the King's full cognisance. But after the close of the session Portland took no steps to acquaint Castlereagh with the views of the Cabinet and it was not till September that Castlereagh heard of what had been going on from his brother-in-law, Lord Camden. This account of the main features of the intrigue against Castlereagh is probably correct. The exact details with regard to what occurred between April and September vary. The supporters of Canning represent the position somewhat as follows. The Duke of Portland himself, they say, recommended that the proposed removal of Castlereagh to some other office should be concealed from that minister till the end of the session. Canning repeatedly protested against this concealment, and Perceval, on hearing at the close of the session from Portland of the intended removal of Castlereagh, remonstrated strongly against the whole transaction. On September 2nd Chatham's abandonment of the expedition to Flanders was announced, and Canning in a letter called upon Portland to replace Castlereagh by Lord Wellesley. As a way out of the difficulty, Perceval, on September 4th, suggested to Portland that he (the Duke) should now resign, so that some new arrangements might be made which "should cover Castlereagh's removal to some other office." To this the Duke, who was in bad health, consented.

It is not easy to arrive at the exact truth with **Summary.**

regard to the whole affair, but it seems clear that the Duke of Portland had promised Canning by letter (1) that on the close of the Walcheren expedition Castlereagh should be removed from his department to some other office; (2) that Lord Wellesley should succeed to the War Department. It is also certain that on September 6th Canning resigned on hearing from Portland that if Castlereagh's resignation was insisted upon he (the Duke) and Perceval would resign.

On hearing from Camden an account of the intrigue which had been in existence since April, to procure his removal from the War Office, Castlereagh very naturally was most indignant. He had practically been under sentence of dismissal ever since April, and in spite of that fact, he had been allowed to equip and send out the Walcheren expedition. "In this state of delusion," he had been permitted "to continue to conduct the entire management of the campaign and to engage in a new expedition of the most extensive, complicated, and important nature under the full persuasion, not that Mr. Canning had supplanted him in office, and possessed in his pocket a promise of his dismissal, but that he really enjoyed (as during the period he in outward show and daily concurrence experienced) Mr. Canning's sincere, liberal, and *bonâ fide* support as "a co-operating and approving colleague." It was most unfortunate that Canning had acquiesced in Portland's determination to delay making a communication to Castlereagh. On September 6th Canning had resigned, and on September 20th Castlereagh wrote a letter to Canning in which he rested "his ground of complaint principally and

“almost exclusively on the concealment from himself
 “of the whole transaction, and everything connected
 “with it till after the Expedition to Walcheren
 “was over,” and demanded satisfaction.

The above represents the hitherto accepted version of the circumstances which led to this famous duel. It has, however, been stated that the immediate cause of the duel was a proposal by Canning that the Government should “throw over Moore’s reputation,” and acquiesce in the popular judgment—which for the moment was hostile—of the dead General. Until, however, the publication of Castlereagh’s letter to the King, explaining the immediate causes of the duel, we must be content to merely state what were considered at the time to be the circumstances which brought it about. At any rate, in a letter from Castlereagh to his brother Charles, written on September 22nd, it is distinctly stated that one of Canning’s reasons for dissatisfaction with the existing state of things was that “Moore was not given up.” In fact that letter places Canning’s position in a most unsatisfactory light, and confirms the view expressed by Croker, that Canning’s genius was “liable to
 “every gust of wind, and every change of weather.
 “ If he does not take care, the Canning
 “bonfire will soon burn itself out.”

What was
 possibly
 the true
 cause of
 the duel.

In the Diaries and Correspondence of George Rose,¹ is a full account of the “affair” which he received from Charles Ellis, who had acted as Canning’s second in the latter’s duel with Castlereagh, which took place early on the morning of September 21st. “On the first fire both escaped. Mr. Ellis

The duel
 between
 Castlereagh
 and
 Canning.

¹ Rose : “Diaries and Correspondence,” vol. II, p. 385 *seq.*

“ then said to Lord Yarmouth (Castlereagh’s second)
“ he supposed enough had been done, but it must be
“ as Lord Castlereagh wished, as Mr. Canning came
“ there only to satisfy him. Lord Yarmouth then
“ talked with Lord Castlereagh, and addressing
“ himself to Mr. Ellis said there must be another
“ shot, after which he should leave the ground, as
“ he would not witness any further proceedings.
“ The parties then fired together a second time,”
“ and Mr. Canning was wounded in the flesh of the
“ upper part of the thigh, the ball passing through.”
After his wound had been attended to in a cottage
near the spot by Mr. Home, a surgeon, Canning
returned to his own house in London. In the
Creevey Papers is an amusing letter from Lord
Folkestone on the subject of the duel. Writing
on September 21st, the day of the duel, he says
“ (Canning) well nigh this morning quitted this
“ sublunary globe, as well as the Foreign Office, for
“ his friend Castlereagh on Wimbledon Common
“ about 7 o’clock this morning, as neatly as possible
“ sent a bullet through the fleshy part of his thigh.
“ These heroes have quarrelled and fought about
“ the Walcheren affair—Castlereagh damning the
“ execution [performance] of Lord Chatham, and
“ Canning the plan of the planner, and being Lord
“ Chatham’s champion.” He goes on to state that,
while Chatham’s friends declare that the latter has
a complete case against Castlereagh, who it is said
will never have anything more to do with his present
colleagues. Castlereagh had, like Canning, resigned
his office before the duel took place, and thus at a
grave crisis in her history the country was deprived
of two men whose abilities, diverse yet considerable,

were more than ever required to guide her through the dangers of the Napoleonic War.

Of the invaluable services rendered by Castlereagh during his tenure of office as War Minister, students of the history of the period are fully cognisant. He was the first minister to recognise the futility of sending out a number of small and isolated expeditions when measures of far greater magnitude were rendered necessary by the successes and ambition of Napoleon. He had supported Canning in the attack on Denmark, and the removal to England of its fleet. He had inaugurated the intervention of Great Britain in the Spanish Peninsula, and had never swerved from his early belief in the abilities of Wellington. By the interventions in Denmark and Portugal a decisive blow had been given to Napoleon's ambitious maritime projects. The principle underlying the Walcheren Expedition was correct, and had Castlereagh's plan been carried out a very serious blow would have been dealt at Napoleon's power. As it was, the incompetence of Chatham, like the obstinacy of Cuesta in Spain, led to disasters, the causes of which were ascribed to Castlereagh. The proposed attack on Antwerp and the advance of Wellington into Spain were conceived on the soundest principles, and might easily have proved brilliant successes.

Though circumstances forced Castlereagh to relinquish office, it was impossible that during the crisis through which it was passing, the country could long forego the services of one of the few Englishmen who were capable of carrying out a resolute and statesmanlike policy.

At the time of his resignation in 1809 he could at

The value
of Castlereagh's
services as
War
Minister.

any rate congratulate himself that he had secured the independence of England, established an army scheme, arrested the course of French victories and, by the appointment of Wellesley to the command of the army in Portugal, had "set in motion a train" of events which finally produced the decline and "fall of Napoleon."

The legend, so dear to some writers, that Castlereagh was an incapable War Minister is thus at once dissipated, if his work in that capacity be carefully and impartially examined.

CHAPTER X

OUT OF OFFICE

October, 1810 to March, 1812

MEANWHILE, the Duke of Portland had died on October 30th, shortly after his withdrawal from office, and the Government had been reconstituted under Perceval as Prime Minister. Hawkesbury, now Earl of Liverpool, became Secretary for War and the Colonies ; the Marquess Wellesley, on his return from Seville in December, became Foreign Secretary. The post of Secretary at War, which had been filled since the preceding June by Lord G. Leveson-Gower, who now retired, was given to Lord Palmerston, who held it for eighteen years. It was not till February, 1812, that on the resignation of Wellesley, Castlereagh re-entered the Cabinet. During the intervening two years he supported the ministry as an independent member. His advocacy of the Government was all the more necessary, as the Whigs during the next two years attacked the Home and Foreign policy of the ministry in a most violent manner. Although Great Britain was engaged in a life and death struggle with Napoleon, the opposition never ceased their attempts to defeat every measure that was brought forward. Parliament met on January 23rd, 1810, and a stormy session ensued. In the King's Speech deep regret was expressed at the unavailing exertions made in the previous year by the Emperor of Austria against Napoleon. Though Austria, it stated, " entered upon the war without any encouragement

Debates
in Parlia-
ment, 1810.

"from Great Britain, nevertheless, we did what we could," and though the Walcheren Expedition, so far as its principal objects were concerned, was not successful, still "it is hoped that Great Britain will profit from the demolition of the docks and arsenals of Flushing." Wellington's "glorious victory of Talavera" was alluded to, and it was declared that the Government intended to continue its efforts to frustrate the designs of France against the independence of Spain and Portugal.

Opposition
to our
support of
Spain.

During the ensuing weeks the policy of the Government was bitterly opposed. Wellington's operations in Spain were violently attacked, and the Walcheren Expedition was severely criticised. A Committee of Enquiry was appointed, 195 voting for it and 186 against it. Before that Committee numerous witnesses, including Sir David Dundas and Lord Chatham, were examined. In the debate on the Walcheren question, which lasted from six on the evening of March 26th to two on the morning of the 27th, Lord Castlereagh spoke for three hours in support of the expedition. On March 30th the debate came to an end, the House exculpating both the land and the naval service, the votes being: for the Government, 275, and against 227. Meanwhile, other questions had provoked Castlereagh into taking a definite position as a supporter of the ministry. The disappointment caused by Wellington's retreat into Portugal had strengthened those who, like Lords Grenville and Grey agreed with Mr. Whitbread in deprecating the continued prosecution of the Continental War, and in advocating the abandonment of the Peninsular struggle. The opposition had the support of all those

who were disappointed at Wellington's retirement, and of the City of London whose Common Council, with remarkable shortsightedness, presented George III with a petition urging the views of Whitbread and his friends. The defeat of Austria at Wagram, the failure of the Walcheren Expedition, and the retreat of Wellington into Portugal, had indeed strengthened the views of those who held what has been called "a Carthaginian view" of the struggle with Napoleon, and who preferred that England should wage war on "commercial rather than on "military considerations." Those who held these views considered that England's true policy was to grant subsidies to those Powers who were opposing Napoleon on the European Continent, and to devote her main energies, as she did during the Seven Years' War, to breaking through the hostile cordon wherever possible. The expeditions to Sicily, Turkey, Egypt, and even Buenos Ayres, all illustrated the efforts of Great Britain to prevent Napoleon "from hermetically sealing up all foreign markets against us." Nevertheless, to those who held these views, Wellington's position in Spain ought to have appealed. Owing to our occupation of Portugal, we were enabled to enjoy free trade not only with Brazil but generally with the markets of Central and South America.

British merchants thus profited enormously by Napoleon's mistaken policy in alienating the Spanish nation, and during 1809 a great impetus was given to British commercial enterprise. Though it is customary to abuse successive governments for adopting the "pin-prick" policy, it remains true that Great Britain, "in waging war on commercial "rather than on military considerations," had no

British
Trade.

alternative. She could not compete with Napoleon as a military power, and we were thus forced to concentrate our efforts upon keeping open markets for our broadcloth and hardware. The Walcheren Expedition had as its primary object the seizure of the naval and mercantile depot of Antwerp ; the expedition to Portugal was in the first instance directed to preventing Napoleon from closing the Spanish Peninsula to our trade. The more the situation in 1809 is examined, the more justifiable appears Castlereagh's policy with regard to the expeditions to Antwerp and Portugal.

Castlereagh
supports
Wellington
1810.

Castlereagh fully realised the necessity of combating the popular desire to withdraw Wellington and his troops from Portugal, and on February 1st, 1810, he made a forcible reply in Parliament to General Tarleton, who opposed a vote of thanks to Wellington and the army for their services at Talavera. He explained the object of the operations which had culminated at Talavera, showing that Wellington had acted in accordance with a definite plan, and claimed that his victory had been attended by most important and beneficial consequences. At the close of his speech Castlereagh deprecated strongly the practice of drawing attention to the losses sustained in a battle. He always, and wisely, resisted the popular tendency to search into the details of loss as calculated to unnerve the military energy of the country.

Talavera marked, moreover, an epoch in the British resistance to Napoleon. The reputation of the British army was established, and Great Britain, which hitherto had appeared in the eyes of Europe as a great naval power, now assumed the position

of a great military power. This speech extorted praise even from Mr. Whitbread, and no division on the vote of thanks to Wellington and the army took place in the House of Commons.

Nevertheless, during 1810 there was no enthusiasm felt in England at the way in which Wellington held his own in Portugal. The expedition under Moore had ended in failure; the intervention in Flanders had resulted in loss and disaster. Was it likely that Wellington with 50,000 or 60,000 men would succeed in beating off the attacks of Napoleon's Marshals in the Peninsula? The Perceval ministry somewhat naturally took a gloomy view of Wellington's powers of resistance, and during 1810 he was practically told that "he must shift for himself."

Castlereagh, however, did not share in the general despondency with regard to the Peninsular War. He realised the immense value to the cause of European liberty of the British occupation of Portugal. He believed that sooner or later Napoleon's arbitrary conduct would lead to a general rising on the Continent. His hope was that Wellington would hold his own in Portugal, and prolong the struggle in the Peninsula till the expected general insurrection in Central Europe took place. As long as the Spaniards continued to resist, and as long as Wellington remained firmly entrenched in Portugal, Napoleon was unable to use the naval resources of Spain, or to secure its valuable trade. In these views he was supported by Wellington, who had realised the natural advantages of Portugal for purposes of defence. His construction of the lines of Torres Vedras was fully justified, and in November, 1810, Masséna, recognising the futility

Torres
Vedras,
1810.

of further attempts to expel Wellington from Portugal, was forced to retreat into Spain. His retreat fully justified the confidence felt by Castlereagh in Wellington's ability to hold Portugal against the French, and in the immense importance of prolonging the struggle against Napoleon. Valuable time had been gained, and when in 1811 Napoleon began to withdraw many of his best troops from the Peninsula in order to lead them to Moscow, the wisdom of Castlereagh's policy became apparent.

The
Bullion
Committee,
1810.

But during the trying year of 1810 the difficulties in the way of supplying Wellington with specie were immense. Cash payments in England had been suspended for many years, and no means had been devised for obtaining gold and silver sufficient for the payment of the troops. At one time it seemed possible that this lack of specie might lead to the complete abandonment of the Peninsula campaign. In order to collect information on this difficult subject, the Government appointed a Bullion Committee which included Horner (the Chairman), Canning, Vansittart, Castlereagh and several others. The majority drew up their celebrated report (published on September 20th, 1810) which among other suggestions advocated the resumption of cash payments in 1812. Vansittart and Castlereagh were in the minority, and differed on various points from the majority. Both men opposed the compulsory resumption of cash payments in 1812. Castlereagh, in an able speech delivered on May 11th, argued against the report of the Bullion Committee. "I thoroughly admit," he said, "a recurrence to cash payments, when circumstances will permit, to be essential to public credit," but as long as the struggle

with Napoleon continued, a resumption of cash payments was, in his opinion, to be deprecated. His speech carried great weight, and on May 15th, 1811, the report of Horner's Committee was not accepted by the House of Commons, 75 voting for and 156 voting against it.

Meanwhile Wellington, who had defeated Masséna at Bussaco in September by means of the Lines of Torres Vedras, had forced him to retreat from Portugal in November, fought the battle of Fuentes d'Onoro on May 3rd to 5th, 1811, while Beresford, on May 16th, won the battle of Albuera. This victory gave Castlereagh an opportunity on June 7th, when a vote of thanks to Beresford was moved in Parliament, of speaking enthusiastically of the cause of the Allies in Spain. The year 1811 was a year of great distress in England, and "must be regarded as "the crisis of the commercial struggle between us and "our mighty antagonist. Machinery was ever increasing our productive power at home, and was "displacing hand labour. Work was scarce and "bread dear after the bad harvests of 1810 and "1811."¹ Further, a reaction had followed the impetus to trade afforded in 1809 by the opening of the markets of Central and South America, and in January, 1811, it was stated that "Confidence in "the commercial world seems nearly at an end," and that in Manchester, in Birmingham, Sheffield, and other towns, trade was at a standstill.

The result was that at the time when Castlereagh made his speech about Albuera, the war was being more and more regarded in England as burdensome, and very despondent views were held with regard

The year
1811.

¹ J. Holland Rose : "Napoleonic Studies," p. 194.

to its effects upon the trade and commerce of the country. Castlereagh, therefore, felt strongly the necessity of encouraging the English nation to persevere in the struggle. "No one," he said, "can doubt that the war as at present maintained "is a great burden, but is any man prepared to say "that the time has arrived when it should be "abandoned."

The
Regency
question,
1810-1811.

At the close of 1810 the question of a Regency arose. In November George III lost his reason as well as his sight. The death of his favourite daughter, the Princess Amelia, on November 2nd, had been a serious blow to him, and occurred at a time when he had been much disturbed by the failure of the Walcheren Expedition, and by the disgrace of the Duke of York. On November 1st, Parliament met and a Committee was appointed to confer with the physicians, whose report held out such little hope of the King's recovery that the ministers brought forward a bill to make the Prince of Wales Regent so long as the King's malady continued. A debate took place on December 31st, 1810, on the proposed bill, the opposition declaring against the restrictions which it was proposed to place on the power of the Regent. In the debate Castlereagh, whose views received the general support of Canning, defended the proposed restrictions in a speech of considerable vigour, and the bill was carried on February 4th, 1811, by 105 to 102 in the Lords and by 217 to 214 in the Commons. As the Regent had always been closely allied with the Whigs, it was thought that a change of ministry would follow the Prince's formal acceptance of the Regency on February 5th, 1811. But the dictatorial tone adopted by the leading Whigs, Lords Grenville

and Grey, was resented by the Prince, who after a short interval declared his intention of supporting the Perceval ministry.

In the following month Castlereagh made a speech which was practically a vindication of his conduct as War Minister. After alluding to the fact that upon his head had fallen the odium of all the necessary measures since 1805 for levying men, he declared that his efforts had achieved the object to which they were directed : " That the zeal and perseverance " of the nation, in cheerfully submitting to these " burdens, has been rewarded by the powerful army " which it now possesses, unexampled in any former " period of our history, and which has now left to " Parliament only the easier task of upholding what " by past labours has been created. The army," he said with justifiable pride, " now consists of 211,000 " regulars, 24,000 artillery, and 80,000 militia, in " all respects in as efficient a state as the line. " Compare this with its state in 1805, viz., regulars " 150,000 ; militia, 90,000 ; artillery, 14,000 ; thus " showing an increase after supplying all the waste " of war of 56,000 regulars, and a decrease of 10,000 " militia." The year 1811, however, was a critical one for Wellington. Unable to secure adequate reinforcements from England, and confronted by the superior forces of the French headed by Marmont and Soult, Wellington had to rely upon his own efforts to resist his foes. As it was, he held his own in Portugal, but from want of reinforcements was unable to adopt an aggressive attitude, and at the same time had to reckon upon the possible reappearance of Napoleon in Spain. Fortunately for the British cause, and indeed for the future of Europe,

Castlereagh's
defence of
the War in
1811.

Napoleon decided in 1811 upon the Moscow Expedition, which took place the following year. For that expedition immense preparations were made. Large numbers of veteran troops were withdrawn from Spain, and Wellington, freed from all fear of the advent of Napoleon at the head of an overwhelming force, was enabled to adopt early in 1812 an aggressive policy, and to capture Ciudad Rodrigo (January 19th) and Badajos (April 6th). Before, however, Badajos had fallen, Castlereagh had in February, 1812, been readmitted to office as Foreign Secretary, in succession to Lord Wellesley. Possessed of greater abilities than any of his colleagues, and aware of the necessity of supporting actively the British operations in Portugal, Wellesley was constantly thwarted by his colleagues in his endeavours to further the efforts of his brother in the Peninsula. He therefore retired from office on February 19th, 1812, and thus made way for Castlereagh, who remained at the head of the Foreign Office for the rest of his life.

CHAPTER XI

CASTLEREAGH AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE

1812

IN March, 1812, Castlereagh entered upon his duties at the Foreign Office, and he remained Foreign Secretary till his death in 1822. During that period, 1812-1822, he was one of the most, if not the most prominent figure among leading Englishmen. Of all men in Europe he may be said to have been most instrumental in bringing about the fall of Napoleon. And he devoted himself to bringing about that event from his return to office in 1812 to the battle of Waterloo.

Castle-
reagh's
ability as
Foreign
Minister.

His influence in the House of Commons became gradually paramount, and the recognition of his merits does credit to its members. For Castlereagh, though he had "the advantages of a splendid presence" and a graceful bearing," was no orator. Indeed, his Irishisms, which are often quoted, supplied his opponents and critics, such as Brougham, Moore, and Byron, with ample opportunities for ridicule and sarcasm. Nevertheless, though Castlereagh was, like Walpole, neither a wit nor a scholar, he was essentially a statesman. And no better proof of the recognition by the men of his day of his qualities as a statesman can be found than in the enormous influence which he wielded in Parliament in those exciting years—1813, 1814, 1815, which witnessed the final struggle of Europe with Napoleon.

In the early days of 1815, before the Conferences

at Vienna had ended, Lord Liverpool insisted on his immediate return to England, on the ground that nobody else was capable of managing the House of Commons.

The very existence of the Government depended for many years on the presence of a man who, in spite of verbosity and blunders of speech, had won and preserved till his death the confidence of members of the Lower House. The late Lord Salisbury, in his illuminating essay on Castlereagh, says that he "had not the talents that captivate the imagination, or the warmth of sympathy that kindles love. Men felt to him as to the pilot who had weathered an appalling storm, the physician who had mastered a terrible calamity."¹ He had none of the popular qualities which characterised the two Pitts, and he never sought popularity, nor sought popular applause. A calm, cold, and self-contained Castlereagh was not calculated to attract a large following of devoted and enthusiastic admirers. But no British statesman has shown more courage and patience in times of difficulty, and it is impossible to overrate "the faultless sagacity which contributed so much to liberate Europe, and to save England in the crisis of her fate." Europe was passing through one of the most critical periods in her history. The power of Napoleon was apparently not likely to be seriously diminished in the near future. Though the seizure of the Danish fleet, and the continued presence of Wellington in Portugal, had checked Napoleon's designs in the Baltic and in the Spanish Peninsula, it was uncertain how long Great Britain would be able

The
political
outlook.

¹ Salisbury, Robert Gascoyne, Marquess of: "Essays Biographical," p. 67.

to maintain her costly struggle with the French Empire. Moreover, the outlook in America was threatening, the depression of our foreign trade was unparalleled, the distress in our manufacturing districts was beyond all precedent. Only the Spaniards and Portuguese could be numbered among our allies.

It was at this juncture, when the outlook both at home and abroad seemed so dark, that Castlereagh was restored to office. Castlereagh at once inspired new life into the conduct of British foreign policy, while his accession to office coincided with remarkable developments in the European situation. Wellington had already taken Ciudad Rodrigo, and was making preparations for his successful assault upon Badajos. These successes were to prove the prelude to a general advance by Wellington into Spain. This advance was to be facilitated by the concentration of the attention of Napoleon upon his invasion of Russia. Hitherto, the Cabinet, fearful of hostile criticism, and unable to grasp the vital importance of sending adequate supplies of men and money to Wellington, had refused to yield to the urgent representations of Wellesley. Castlereagh's accession to office, however, was marked by a change in the attitude of the British Government towards the operations in Spain.

Moreover, on April 17th, Napoleon, in view of the coming Russian campaign, made overtures to the British ministry for the conclusion of peace between Great Britain and France.

**Napoleon's
peace
overtures,
1812.**

He offered: (1) The renunciation by France of all extension of her empire on the side of the Pyrenees; (2) That the reigning dynasty in Spain should be

declared independent; (3) That the House of Braganza should reign in Portugal; (4) That Murat should continue to rule Naples; (5) That Spain, Portugal, and Italy should be evacuated by the French and British forces.

Death of
Perceval.
Lord
Liverpool
premier.
May, 1812.

Apart, however, from Napoleon's evident determination to maintain Joseph Bonaparte on the Spanish throne, it was evident that these proposals for peace with Great Britain were merely caused by a natural desire on the part of the French Government to have its hands free in Spain and Italy during the progress of the expedition to Russia. Before, however, Castlereagh had been in office three months, Perceval was assassinated on May 11th in the lobby of the House of Commons by a man named Bellingham. For a time it seemed likely that the Tories would be succeeded by the Whigs, as the Prince Regent had always regarded the latter as his special friends. At first the Prince hoped to form a coalition ministry under Wellesley, and failing him, under Moira. But the Whig leaders and the Prince Regent differed over the question of the nomination to certain household posts, and eventually in June Lord Liverpool was given the task of forming an administration composed entirely of Tories.

Canning's
refusal to
join the
ministry.

He at first attempted to secure the services of both Wellesley and Canning. The former refused to serve, as he was in favour of Catholic emancipation, a subject which Liverpool's Cabinet would not discuss; the latter was willing to enter the ministry on condition that with the Foreign Office should devolve upon him the leadership of the House of Commons. Castlereagh was willing to resign the Foreign Office, but insisted on retaining the leadership.

The result was that Castlereagh remained Foreign Minister and leader of the House of Commons during the rest of his life, while Canning was excluded from all share in directing Great Britain's policy during one of the most eventful periods of modern history. He said himself with regard to this period that "Two years at the Foreign Office would have been worth ten years of life." As it was, it devolved upon Castlereagh to conduct the foreign policy of Great Britain, and to mould its international destinies during those eventful years which saw the fall of Napoleon and the reconstruction of Europe.

Of the ministers who had served under Perceval, Castlereagh, Eldon, Westmorland and Mulgrave retained their offices. Otherwise considerable changes were made : his personal followers, Sidmouth, became Home Secretary ; Buckinghamshire, Vansittart and Bragge-Bathurst entered the Cabinet ; Harrowby became President of the Council ; Earl Bathurst, Secretary for War and the Colonies. This re-constituted Tory ministry was destined to guide Great Britain through the exciting years which saw Napoleon's fall ; and of the ministers who had a leading share in bringing about that fall Castlereagh was the chief. Upon Castlereagh, who with Vansittart represented the ministry in the Lower House, devolved the duties of leader of the House of Commons, and till his death he held that position, together with the Secretaryship for Foreign Affairs.

Before the final arrangements with regard to the constitution of Lord Liverpool's Cabinet had been made, Castlereagh had exerted successfully his influence in order to bring about peace between Russia and Turkey. It was obviously a matter of

Liverpool's
ministry,
1812.

Castlereagh's
relations
with
Russia,
Turkey,
and Sweden
1812.

supreme importance in the coming invasion of Russia by Napoleon that Alexander should be able to concentrate all his forces upon the defence of his country. Castlereagh, therefore, was instrumental in revealing to the Ottoman Government those articles in the Treaty of Tilsit which dealt with the future partition of Turkey. Realising that its best chance of safety lay in the weakening of France, the Sultan willingly made the Treaty of Bucharest with Russia on May 28th, and on July 18th signed a Treaty with Great Britain. Thus mainly through Castlereagh's efforts, Russia's left flank was rendered secure from a Turkish attack during the Moscow Campaign. Equally successful were Castlereagh's efforts to bring about a Treaty between Sweden and Russia, so as to secure the latter's right wing from all danger of attack by Bernadotte. War between Sweden and Great Britain had indeed broken out in 1810, but it was conducted in a very half-hearted manner, Bernadotte being more anxious to add Norway to his possessions than to inflict injury upon British commerce. Finding that the relations between Sweden and France were very strained, owing to Napoleon's refusal to unite Norway with Sweden, Castlereagh sent Mr. Thornton, an English diplomatist, early in 1812 to the Court of Stockholm. The accession of Bernadotte to the ranks of Napoleon's enemies could, however, only be secured by the promise of the cession of Norway to Sweden. Though Castlereagh disliked the project, he recognised the necessity of securing the alliance or the neutrality of Sweden, and accordingly made no opposition to the Treaties which on April 5th and 8th, 1812, were concluded between Sweden and

Russia. On condition that Sweden aided Alexander in the coming war with France, Norway was guaranteed to Sweden. On July 12th peace between Great Britain and Sweden was concluded at Orebro, and as far as Sweden was concerned, the Continental System was no longer enforced.

Not only had Castlereagh been instrumental in rendering the flanks of the Russian army during Napoleon's march to Moscow free from attacks, he had at the same time infused new energy into the British campaign in the Peninsula. He was as resolved as ever that the war in Spain should be conducted in the most vigorous manner. In June, 1812, he dispatched to Wellington 51,000 troops, of which 6,546 were cavalry, and in October he sent an additional force of 20,000 men.

**Castlereagh
and the
Peninsular
War.**

By these measures Castlereagh may be said to have largely contributed to the fall of Napoleon. The presence of Wellington in the Peninsula compelled Napoleon to keep large bodies of troops in Spain, while the conclusion of Treaties, advocated by Castlereagh, by Russia with Turkey and Sweden enabled the Tsar to devote his undivided attention to the overthrow of the French army, which in the autumn of 1812 advanced as far as Moscow, only to be decimated during its famous retreat to France.

On July 18th a treaty was concluded between Great Britain and Russia, and by it an important step was taken towards the removal of that distrust of the British Government which the Tsar had felt ever since 1807. Henceforward, the Tory Government remaining in office and Castlereagh being able to pursue a consistent policy, Alexander was justified

**Russia and
Great
Britain.**

Repeal
of the
Orders in
Council.
The
Luddite
Riots,
1812.

in his confidence in British promises and in the continuity of British policy.

On June 16th Brougham moved the repeal of the Orders in Council which had been issued when Castlereagh was Minister for War. Owing to the resentment felt in America with regard to the Orders, trade between the United States and Great Britain had practically ceased. In England itself distress was widespread, and was, it was said, aggravated by the policy which dictated the Orders in Council. There was no question as to the existence of widespread misery in England. The Luddite riots caused by the belief that this misery was due to the introduction of machinery, had broken out in the autumn and winter of 1811, and in 1812 these riots became so serious that drastic means were taken by the Government for their suppression. The depression of industry which led to these riots was due partly to Napoleon's Continental System: partly to the American Non-Intercourse Act, which, re-enacted in February, 1811, had closed the American market to the products of British Industry; partly to the great improvements which had been effected in the spinning and weaving industries. In his speech on June 18th, Brougham laid especial stress upon the effect of the Orders in Council on our trade with America. The Non-Intercourse Act prohibited all commercial intercourse with Great Britain and France, and closed an immense market for British manufactured goods at a most critical period in our history. Between Napoleon's Continental System and the American Non-Intercourse Act, British traders seemed likely to be completely ruined, and Great Britain to be forced to withdraw from

her herculean struggle against France. In his speech Brougham insisted that "the alarming decline in our exports was owing, not so much to the hostility of Napoleon, or to the Continental System . . . as to the British Orders in Council, which had given rise to the American Non-Intercourse Act and had lost to us the North American market."

He then enlarged upon the immense value to Great Britain of her American trade, and of the necessity of re-establishing friendly relations with the United States. In his reply Castlereagh defended the Orders in Council, which he declared were only issued after the Berlin Decree as a measure of retaliation. The Orders in Council had been a political, not a commercial measure, and had had beneficial results. But the passing of the American Non-Intercourse Act had not been foreseen by the British Government, and had done British trade great injury. Consequently the Government were prepared to cancel the Orders in Council. "As against France," Castlereagh declared in his speech, "the retaliating system adopted has perfectly succeeded. Severely as our commerce has suffered in the struggle, hers has suffered still more considerably. It was not the effect of the Orders in Council or the Continental System of the enemy which has caused the distress so severely felt in this country during the last year, but the interruption of our commercial intercourse with America in consequence of the Non-Intercourse Act passed in that country." On June 23rd the Orders in Council were repealed, but to the notice of repeal which appeared in the *London Gazette* was added a declaration that "if the American Government did not after due notice

The Non-Intercourse Act.

War with
the United
States,
1812.
Salamanca.
Moscow.

“repeal the Non-Intercourse Act, this revocation
“should become null and the original orders revive.”

Before, however, news of the repeal had reached America, the Government of the United States, anxious to conquer and annex Canada, had declared war (June 18th) upon Great Britain, and till December, 1814, a large number of British troops were employed in America. The remainder of the year was marked by a series of important events. In July Wellington won the battle of Salamanca, and in August entered Madrid; while on September 14th Napoleon at the head of his army entered Moscow, which was shortly afterwards burnt by the inhabitants. On September 29th the Prince Regent dissolved Parliament, and on November 24th the new Parliament met. The year ended with Napoleon's disastrous retreat from Russia, and with the rising of Prussia against the French yoke. For Great Britain the close of the year was full of hope. Not only had Napoleon's victorious career received a signal check, but the attempts of the Americans to gain a hold upon Canada had ended in failure. There seemed at last to be some justification for Castlereagh's optimism, and for his belief in the possibility of inflicting a decisive check upon the ambitious schemes of Napoleon. Russia's lapse from the Continental System was now assured, and Napoleon's belief in his power of stamping out the Spanish rising was seen to be groundless. England has shown that she was not as he believed “in her “last agonies,” and all chance of a French partition of Turkey to be followed by the establishment of a French Empire in the East was gone for ever.

Though, however, these events justified optimism

on the part of the opponents of Napoleon, there were yet many obstacles to the complete emancipation of Europe from the French yoke. The Emperor Francis looked with suspicion upon the presence of the Russians in Germany and upon the "Pan-Germanism preached by Prussian enthusiasts." Moreover, the French power in Spain was as yet by no means broken, and Wellington had some months of hard fighting before he was able to enter France.

The political situation at the close of 1812.

Though out of office, Lord Wellesley had continued to urge upon the Government the adoption of adequate measures in the Peninsula, where his brother still lacked reinforcements. On July 22nd, 1812, Wellington had won the battle of Salamanca, and on August 12th had entered Madrid. But want of money, political difficulties, and the lack of reinforcements compelled Wellington to retreat for the last time into Portugal. It was the necessity of this retreat which drew from Lord Wellesley a powerful speech in Parliament on November 30th. The opening of Parliament, says the painter Haydon, was a very grand affair. He went into the House of Lords, where, as he relates, "the beautiful women, "educated, refined, and graceful, with their bending "plumes and sparkling eyes, the Chancellor

"The sceptre and the ball,
"The sword, the mace, the crown imperial,
"The tissued robe of gold and pearl,"

"gave a grand sensation."

The Prince Regent read the King's speech "with "the greatest perspicacity, and without the slightest "provincialism—pure English. He appeared affected "at the conclusion."

In the speech the victory of Salamanca was mentioned, though that victory was qualified by the eventual retreat of Wellington into Portugal. Allusion was also made to the conclusion of peace with Sweden and Russia, and the latter's gallant resistance to Napoleon on his Moscow expedition. Notice was also taken of the war which had broken out with the United States, of the acts of hostility on the part of the Americans towards the Canadians, and of the efforts of the government of the United States to seduce the inhabitants of Canada from their allegiance to George III. In the evening Lord Wellesley, we are told, made a fine, energetic speech. "He affirmed, in a strain almost amounting to frenzy, that Lord Wellington's means were inadequate, that before the battle of Salamanca, so far from his retiring to draw the enemy on, he was in full retreat . . . and that it was entirely owing to an error of Marmont that the battle was gained." He went on to say that Wellington had not the means of transport for his artillery, and towards the end of his speech appealed to his hearers thus: "My Lords, if your hopes of success are grounded on the errors of French Generals, I fear they have a very shallow foundation."

CHAPTER XII

THE FALL OF NAPOLEON

IT is impossible to overrate the importance of the year 1813. The issues at stake, the character and career of Napoleon, the determination of his opponents,—all gave a special interest to the struggle in 1813. The French Revolution had done its work, and had resulted in a European Revolution of immense proportions. In no part of Europe had that revolution been more effectually and drastically carried out than in Germany. Under Napoleon the desire for despotic power over the Continent had taken the place of those generous impulses which had characterized the early French Revolutionists. Writhing under his tyranny, Europe determined to regain its freedom, and before “the rising of the nations,” Napoleon fell.

The year
1813.

No man took a greater share in bringing about that fall than Castlereagh, and it is impossible to overestimate the value of his services to Europe at this critical time. It was not sufficient to drive the French from Russia, and later to overwhelm Napoleon at Leipzig and to force him to retire into France. To bring about the liberation of Europe from the thralldom of Napoleon, to re-establish Prussia as a strong kingdom, to free Germany from its dependence upon France, required unity of action on the part of the Great Powers. The aims and objects of Austria were often so diametrically opposed to those of Russia and Prussia, the jealousies so

Castle-
reagh's
immense
influence.

unavoidable among rulers united for the moment in a coalition were so deep-seated, that the rupture of the ties which bound together Great Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia seemed often on the verge of taking place.

Castle-
reagh's
determina-
tion.

In the task of bringing together the Great Powers, and, having done so, in keeping them united, the value of the influence of Castlereagh cannot be overestimated. It is not too much to say that the downfall of Napoleon was due as much to Castlereagh as it was to the armies of the Continental Powers.

In the field of diplomacy Castlereagh stood supreme, and under his guidance Great Britain took the lead in bringing about the overthrow of Napoleon. Over and over again during the ensuing three years it becomes more and more evident that the forces of the Coalition which overwhelmed Napoleon owed their success to the skill, courage, and determination of Castlereagh. "England" during these years "was in effect Lord Castlereagh," whose tact and practical views were never more strikingly illustrated. The Radicals in England might snarl, and do all in their power to hamper Great Britain's efforts, and Goethe might ruin his reputation for political foresight by declaring that Napoleon would prove too strong for the German national uprising, but Castlereagh never wavered in his determination to free Europe from the French yoke.

His
influence
on the
Spanish
and
German
resistance
to
Napoleon.

Already Castlereagh's influence and determination had been rewarded in Spain. He had steadily supported Wellington ever since the beginning of the Peninsular War, and the British General's pertinacity and victories had contributed to rouse

and encourage the resistance to Napoleon in Central Europe. In 1813 Castlereagh's efforts were mainly directed to strengthening that resistance in Central Europe and to providing money for those States which had risen against the French domination. It would probably have been utterly impossible for Russia and Prussia to have continued the struggle after Lützen and Bautzen had not Castlereagh provided immense sums to enable them to keep their armies in the field. It would certainly have been impossible for Austria to join the Allied Sovereigns in August, 1813, and to play the notable part she did in bringing about Napoleon's overthrow without the subsidies with which Castlereagh lavishly supplied her. But not only in providing the sinews of war was Great Britain's assistance invaluable; it was due to Castlereagh's diplomacy and to that of his agents that Bernadotte, Prince Regent of Sweden, was kept firm in his opposition to Napoleon.

The situation at the beginning of 1813 was certainly calculated to encourage Castlereagh. Wellington's eventual success in Spain seemed assured, while the overthrow of Napoleon's grand army in Russia had encouraged a national uprising in Germany. The Treaty of Kalisch united the Tsar and the Prussian King, and Bernadotte, Crown Prince of Sweden, had already been won over to the side of the opponents of the French Emperor. Castlereagh's most pressing care was to keep Bernadotte true to his policy of opposition to Napoleon and to bring about the landing of a large Swedish army in the North of Germany. He had also to encourage the resistance of the Russians and Prussians to Napoleon, and at the same time to continue his efforts to induce

**The
European
situation
in the
Spring of
1813.**

Austria to throw in her lot with the Allies. Rarely, if ever, has a British statesman essayed a more difficult task, and never has a British statesman achieved a more brilliant diplomatic success. The entry of the Allies into Paris in the spring of 1814 was a remarkable testimony to the foresight, tact and tenacity of Castlereagh.

The
influence
of Sir
Charles
Stewart.

In his Lives of Lord Castlereagh and Sir Charles Stewart, Alison draws attention to the valuable assistance given by the latter to his half-brother. Stewart had a practical knowledge of military affairs, understood the methods adopted by Wellington in the Peninsula, and emphasized the immense importance of supporting the Spanish opposition to Napoleon. It was in no small measure due to Stewart's explanations that Castlereagh was able during 1812 to persuade the Cabinet to continue to send reinforcements to Wellington. In consequence, by the close of 1812, Wellington was in a position to prepare for the eventual expulsion of the French from Spain.

No less useful did Stewart prove in the important task of encouraging the warlike feeling in Prussia and of bringing the Courts of St. James and Berlin into intimate relation. Further, upon Stewart devolved the even more difficult task of keeping Bernadotte, the Crown Prince of Sweden, faithful to and in close touch with the Russian and Prussian monarchs.

On April 9th, 1813, Castlereagh wrote to Stewart a formal letter, which, while notifying to him his appointment as minister at the headquarters of the King of Prussia, explained the duties which he was called upon to fulfil. "It is His Royal

Highness's pleasure," so ran the letter of appointment, which was written by Castlereagh from the Foreign Office, "that you should consider yourself "specially charged with the military superintendence "so far as Great Britain is concerned, of the Prussian "and Swedish armies. . . . In order to give greater "weight to your representations, His Royal Highness "has been pleased to accredit you to his Prussian "Majesty, to whose headquarters you will in the "first instance proceed, for the purposes of presenting "your credentials, and of discussing, in concert with "Lord Cathcart, Ambassador to the Emperor of "Russia, the plan of operations to be executed by "the respective armies. Whilst His Majesty's "Ambassador to the Court of Russia shall continue "with the armies, it is His Royal Highness's pleasure "that the British mission to the Courts of Berlin and "Stockholm should correspond with his Lordship "as well as with this office."

Before he despatched Stewart on his mission, Castlereagh had received from Lord Walpole, who had just returned from a secret mission to Vienna, some information regarding the views of the Austrian Government. That Government, taught by experience, was anxious not to make a false step, and had adopted a waiting policy. It realized the importance of the Treaty of Kalisch, lately concluded by the Russian and Prussian monarchs, but it was resolved to watch events, and in the meantime by preparing for all eventualities, to be able at a later stage in the struggle to interpose with decisive effect.

The Austrian Court had no sympathy with Stein's idea of a United Germany, and, moreover, was already alarmed at the prospect of Russian

The policy
of Austria.

predominance in Europe. Until August Austrian diplomacy had for its aim reconciliation with Napoleon. As months passed, the value of the Austrian alliance increased, and thus by her neutrality during the first half of 1813 Austria was able to exercise a predominant influence in the final settlement of Germany.

Lord Walpole had in vain attempted to secure the alliance of Austria by offering to assure to her the restoration of the Tyrol, Illyria and Venetia. Similarly Napoleon endeavoured to win her to his side by making the tempting offer of Silesia.

Castle-
reagh's
support of
Prussia and
Russia.

In the meantime, while Austria watched events, and Russia and Prussia prepared to wage open war with the French, Castlereagh never ceased his efforts to strengthen the opposition in Germany and Sweden to Napoleon. On April 19th Stewart landed at Hamburg, and before long arranged with Castlereagh for the despatch of arms and accoutrements from England. By this means the universal arming of the Prussians was expedited, and to Castlereagh's action can in part be ascribed the success which attended the efforts of the Prussians in the ensuing campaigns. Since the opening of the year the preparations of the Russians and Prussians for the ensuing campaign in Germany had not ceased, while Austria, fearful of Russia and jealous of Prussia, endeavoured to bring about a general peace.

Her efforts met with no favourable response from Castlereagh, who justly considered that by involving herself in negotiations, Great Britain would tend to weaken the efforts being made by Russia and Prussia. Moreover, Castlereagh had had experience of Napoleon's intractability, and further,

he was in honour bound not to relax his efforts to aid the Spaniards, no less than the Swedes and Russians. Before the end of May Napoleon had won the battles of Lützen and Bautzen, but the Russian and Prussian armies had retired in good order, and Napoleon had merely won the first round in a struggle in which he was doomed to be overwhelmed.

On June 4th the Armistice of Pleswitz, or Poischwitz, was signed, and in signing it Napoleon "signed his own death warrant." For by agreeing to a suspension of arms for two months Napoleon gave time to Prussia and Russia to reorganize their armies after the battles of Lützen and Bautzen. During the suspension of hostilities, too, Austria gradually realized the impossibility of making terms with Napoleon, and decided to throw in her lot with Prussia and Russia. Further, the period of the suspension of arms was utilized by Castlereagh for strengthening and encouraging the European opposition to Napoleon. For Castlereagh, as indeed for every opponent of the French Emperor, the summer of 1813 was an anxious time. Would the Coalition hold together, and would Austria join the Allies? The irresolution of the Emperor Francis had been increased by Napoleon's successes at Lützen and Bautzen, and Castlereagh's anxiety on the subject of the Alliance holding together and with regard to the line which Austria would take was only natural. Far-sighted men were already prophesying that the Emperor Francis would bring his vacillating policy to an end by making some inglorious compromise with Napoleon. On June 23rd he wrote to Sir Charles Stewart: "We are in

**The
armistice
of Pleswitz
June-Aug.,
1813.**

“ great anxiety to hear from you upon the Armistice. Its extension to the 20th of July puzzles and alarms us for the temper of Austria. We have done everything to prevail upon the Prince Royal (Bernadotte) to manage matters with *your parties*, and I trust all may be arranged before the resumption of hostilities.”

The
position of
Bernadotte.

All through the spring Castlereagh had been endeavouring to obtain some definite assurances from that crafty and astute adventurer. His chief aim was to secure Norway, and on March 3rd, 1813, we, reluctantly, by the Treaty of Stockholm agreed to support the Russo-Swedish compact of 1812, by which Norway was assured to Sweden. We also promised to pay £1,000,000 to Bernadotte for the support of a Swedish army, which was to be used against Napoleon, and we promised to present to Bernadotte the Island of Guadaloupe. In a letter addressed to Bernadotte on March 23rd, Castlereagh had urged in the strongest language the necessity of immediate action on the part of the Swedes, who should “ take a prominent part in the advanced operations of the Allied armies.” He stated clearly that he should regret any delay which “ may retard the moment when your operations may assume a more enlarged character.” Bernadotte did indeed land at Stralsund with 24,000 men on May 18th, but his language and actions became so equivocal, and his movements were so slow, that the suspicions of Alexander were aroused. The Armistice of Pleswitz on June 4th threw him, however, into a state of panic, and he wrote urging the Tsar not to make peace with Napoleon. Castlereagh’s suspicions as to Bernadotte’s good faith had led him

to despatch Sir Charles Stewart to the Swedish Camp, and on June 9th the latter wrote an account of his conversations with the Prince Royal of Sweden. In it he described Bernadotte's "engaging manners, "spirited conversation, facility of expression, and "talent." Stewart's opinion was that behind "his "brilliancy," the "warmth of his expressions," and the "splendours of his designs," there was nothing to justify confidence. He did not think it was possible to believe him fully in earnest until he was seen fairly in action at the head of his Swedes with French troops for his opponents. "He clothed "himself in a pelisse of war, but his undergarments "were made of Swedish objects and peace." In a later despatch to Castlereagh, Stewart made it quite clear that Bernadotte intended to keep the Swedes in reserve, and as far as possible "to prevent "them from being even brought into collision with "the French troops." But there seems no doubt that Bernadotte was personally hostile to the French Emperor. At the same time he was suspicious of Russia, though he had an unqualified admiration for the Prussian monarch and people. The cause of his halting policy would seem to be explained by the fact that while he desired to become Emperor of the French in place of Napoleon, he had no wish to alienate the French nation. The Tsar had encouraged these hopes, and we can thus understand the alarm felt by Bernadotte lest the Armistice of Pleswitz should prove a second Tilsit.

During these weeks Castlereagh never ceased his efforts to unite closely the enemies of Napoleon. While Austria was wavering, and by her conduct rousing the suspicions of the Allies, Great Britain

The
Treaties of
Reichen-
bach, June
14th and
15th.

was exerting her influence in favour of strengthening the resistance of Russia and Prussia to France. On June 14th and 15th treaties were signed at Reichenbach with Russia and Prussia, the latter owing to Cathcart's efforts consenting to an increase in the territories of Hanover, and, what was of vital importance to the continuance of the Russo-Prussian resistance to the French Emperor, Castlereagh agreed, on the understanding that Prussia maintained 80,000 men in the field and Russia 16,000, to pay a subsidy of two-thirds of a million pounds to Prussia and a million and a third to Russia. Great Britain also supported by her credit the issue of paper money to the extent of five millions, which was nominally also guaranteed by Russia and Prussia. Castlereagh further offered to advance £50,000 to Austria as soon as she had definitely thrown in her lot with the Allies. But for a time Austria persisted in preserving her neutrality, and Castlereagh's anxiety "on the subject of the Alliance holding together," and with regard to the attitude of Austria became intense. On June 22nd he wrote to his brother to say how anxious the Cabinet was with regard to the temper of Austria, and on June 30th he wrote to Cathcart: "In the
" present wavering state of Austrian politics, I
" have deemed it advisable to direct your Lordship
" to endeavour to bring the Court of Vienna to a
" private explanation of its views. It is not for
" Great Britain to goad other powers into exertions
" which they deem inconsistent with their own
" safety; but it is material that we should know
" on whom we have to reckon as well as to evince
" the disposition we feel, as far as our means will

“ permit, to sustain the Continental powers in
“ accomplishing their own, as well as the general
“ safety ; and as a proof that such is our disposition
“ towards Austria, your Lordship is authorized
“ to make them an advance if actually *en lutte* against
“ France. The rapid progress of the British arms
“ in Spain will, I trust, prove that we are not
“ disposed to be inactive, and that it is not by pecu-
“ niary efforts alone that we are ready to contend
“ for a better order of things.”

As the only available British forces were fully occupied in Spain and Canada, and as Bernadotte on the first sign of weakness on the part of the Allies would have undoubtedly retired to Sweden, it was of vital importance to secure the adhesion of Austria to the Russo-Prussian alliance.

To Stanhope, an English traveller who was in Germany at this eventful time, the conduct of Austria appeared farsighted and wise. While men were taunting the Austrian Cabinet with weakness, imbecility and indecision, Metternich was, in his opinion, playing his part with consummate skill. Had Austria, he says, joined the Allies on their advance, “ her conduct would have been attributed
“ to fear ; and she must have been contented to
“ assume a secondary position and bend to the pride
“ of Russia. . . . She waited, on the contrary, till
“ that pride had been humbled by defeat, till the
“ Allies were on the point of losing all the advantages
“ they had gained ; she then summoned them to
“ her tribunal, and disclosed the terms upon which
“ she would join the Allies.” During the early part of the Armistice, Stanhope stayed in a village near Reichenbach under the care of Lord Cathcart, to

The
experiences
of
Stanhope.

whom Castlereagh had written on behalf of the young English traveller who makes some interesting remarks upon the condition of affairs. He notes that Cathcart was not on very good terms with either Sir Charles Stewart or with Sir Robert Wilson ; he also saw a good deal of Werry, Cathcart's Secretary of Legation. Werry, who had been in the Foreign Office for some years, was a favourite with Castlereagh, and when he found that the Russians looked upon him with some contempt because he had no military rank, Castlereagh "at once sent him a Commission in his own regiment of militia, accompanied by the complete uniform." Before the Armistice had terminated, Stanhope returned to England, travelling by Frankfort and Stralsund. At Stralsund he found Bernadotte with thirty thousand men. Steinheld, the Secretary of Bernadotte, told Stanhope that his master declared that England alone among the Powers had fulfilled her engagements, and as the Russians had not sent him any of the promised troops, that he was not going to advance into the heart of Germany with only thirty thousand men.¹

Metternich
and
Napoleon.

Disunion among the Continental powers had been the primary cause of Napoleon's early successes, and Castlereagh was fully alive in 1813 and 1814 to the necessity of bringing the Russian, Prussian and Austrian monarchs to put aside all petty jealousies, and to unite in a great effort to free Europe from the domination of one man.

The month of July was an anxious one for Castlereagh and the Allies, Metternich's famous interview with Napoleon took place on June 28th,

¹ Pickering : "Memoirs," pp. 546, 547.

and lasted six hours. Its dramatic character has been often described, while its duration illustrates the importance attached by Napoleon to the influence of Austria. The following day Napoleon and Metternich arranged that the Armistice should be prolonged from July 25th to August 10th. The news of the British victory at Vittoria, gained on June 21st, was known in Germany by the beginning of July, and helped to confirm Metternich in his decision which was soon to be made by the Austrian Emperor of throwing in his lot with the Allies.

While these issues, so vital to the future of Europe, were occupying the attention of the Russian, Prussian, Austrian and British statesmen, the lighter side of the drama was illustrated by Bernadotte. In a letter written on July 12th, by Sir Charles Stewart, to Castlereagh, a picture of Bernadotte is drawn which explains the comparative uselessness of the Swedish Alliance. After describing the personal fascination of the eloquent language of the Prince Royal, Stewart draws a picture of him, "armed, " as he always is, with a bottle of eau-de-Cologne "in one hand, and a white handkerchief in the "other, inundating everything round him with "the perfume." He then alludes to "the elegant "flattery of this extraordinary man who always "addresses you as *mon ami*, and admits you "seemingly into his entire confidence." But the conclusion that Stewart arrived at was that Bernadotte's procrastination was the result of careful thought, and that, should Napoleon's ascendancy again be asserted, he would at once retire to Sweden.

Attitude to
Bernadotte.

But before the middle of July, Napoleon's pride

and the compact of Trachenberg lessened, if it did not entirely destroy, all prospects of peace. The influence of Vittoria was very considerable. As Napoleon rightly anticipated, it gave Austria fresh courage, and the news of the victory could not have arrived at a more opportune moment.¹

Austria
joins the
Allies,
August
11th.

On July 12th the important Compact of Trachenberg was signed, and Bernadotte unreservedly threw in his lot with the Allies. From that time the adhesion of Austria to the allied cause was almost certainly secured, and on July 25th Metternich urged Cathcart to encourage Wellington to invade France. The fixed determination of the allied Sovereigns to resist Napoleon, and the latter's obstinacy, rendered any avoidance of a renewal of war impossible. On August 6th, just before the close of the Armistice, Castlereagh, from the Foreign Office, wrote the following note to Lord Aberdeen, who had been selected as our ambassador at Vienna :

" Your Lordship will collect from these instructions
 " that a general peace, in order to provide adequately
 " for the tranquillity and independence of Europe,
 " ought, in the judgment of His Majesty's Govern-
 " ment, to confine France at least within the
 " Pyrenees, the Alps and the Rhine ; and if the other
 " Great Powers of Europe should feel themselves
 " enabled to contend for such a peace, Great Britain
 " is fully prepared to concur with them in such a line
 " of policy. If, however, the Powers most immedi-
 " ately concerned should determine, rather than
 " encounter the risks of a more protracted struggle,
 " to trust for their own security to a more imperfect

¹ Those who desire more detailed information should consult the " Cambridge Modern History," vol. X.

“arrangement, it never has been the policy of the
“British Government to attempt to dictate to other
“States a perseverance in war which they did not
“themselves recognize to be essential to their own
“as well as to the common safety.” At the time,
however, that the above despatch, so moderate in
tone, was penned, the Armistice was rapidly drawing
to its conclusion. The terms offered by Metternich
were rejected by Napoleon, and on August 11th
Austria declared war against France.

The War of Liberation had now entered upon
its final phase, and Castlereagh's policy was at last
to be fully justified. Realizing the immense im-
portance of the step taken by Austria in declaring
war, Cathcart and Stewart at once arranged for the
immediate advance to the Court of Vienna of half
the subsidy promised at the Treaty of Reichenbach
in the event of the Emperor Francis joining the
Allies. During the following two months Napoleon
held his ground in Saxony, and it was not till the
16th of October that his fate and that of Germany
was decided at the battle of Leipzig. Till that day
Bernadotte had played a waiting game, and it was
only at that critical moment which saw the con-
cluding struggles round Leipzig, that Sir Charles
Stewart forced him to declare himself. Writing to
Castlereagh after the close of the battle, Stewart
says, “I feel conscious that if I had not been here
the Northern Army would have played no part
before Leipzig.” It was, however, not till October
17th (the second day of the battle) that the Swedish
army proved of real use. Stewart writes some very
frank criticisms of Bernadotte's attitude. . “He is
“as subservient to me as need be ; he knows I can

The
victory of
Leipzig.

"show him up, and therefore fears me. He has
 "been made to play his part, however, and perhaps
 "he is an instrument we may yet need, but I wish
 "we were not to be the means of confirming his
 "power, when he has done more than enough to
 "lose it for ever." The decisive victory of Leipzig,
 while from a military point of view a triumph for
 Blucher and Gneisenau, was to a great extent only
 rendered possible by the efforts of Castlereagh and
 his brother. Had not the former "provided the
 "subsidies and established the guaranteed paper
 "currency the forces of Europe would never
 "have been arrayed on the field of Leipzig," and
 had not Stewart "forced up Bernadotte and his
 "army at the decisive moment, that great fight
 "would at best have been a drawn battle, if not a
 "defeat."

**The
 Frankfort
 Terms.**

After Leipzig and Napoleon's retreat to France,
 the most serious of Castlereagh's difficulties began.
 With the overthrow of the French army and the
 destruction of the French predominance in Europe
 came questions (1) As to the position to be held in
 the future by France, and (2) Relating to the
 re-organization of Germany. On November 8th and
 9th Metternich made at Frankfort offers of peace
 which Napoleon would have been wise to accept.
 But he hesitated, made vague answers, and it
 became evident that he was not in earnest. Charles
 Stewart discovered the negotiations which Metternich
 had concealed from Aberdeen, and at once informed
 Castlereagh. The acceptance by Napoleon of these
 terms would have defeated the British aims and
 ruined the Coalition. On the subject of Antwerp,
 Castlereagh throughout this and the following

months was adamant. On November 13th he wrote to Aberdeen: "I must particularly entreat you to keep your attention upon Antwerp. The destruction of that arsenal is essential to our safety. To leave it in the hands of France is little short of imposing upon Great Britain the charge of a perpetual war establishment." There was to be no compromise on the subject of Antwerp, though Castlereagh was otherwise willing to give Napoleon generous terms.

Gradually the mere idea of allowing France to keep what Napoleon called her natural frontiers was put on one side, and it became evident that the Allies were practically decided to take back Belgium, Savoy, Nice, Holland, and the Rhineland, as well as all Italy. But the question of the settlement of Europe was, like that of France, beset with difficulties. The various members of the Coalition were only unanimous with regard to the necessity of clipping the wings of France. On all other points they were more or less at variance. The views of Austria differed widely from those of Russia and Prussia. The Emperor Francis and Metternich were in favour of allowing Napoleon to keep the "natural frontiers," while the Tsar and the King of Prussia were resolved to bring back France to her old boundaries. In the jealousies which always tend to weaken a league lay Napoleon's opportunity, and it is difficult to imagine how those jealousies could have been removed and concord among the Allies established without Castlereagh's personal intervention. Historians have tended to overlook the immense importance of Castlereagh's mission, and Whig writers have concurred in ignoring the effects of

Necessity
of Castle-
reagh's
presence at
the allied
camp.

his personal influence. And yet no one who studies the history of those months, of such vital importance in the history of Europe, can fail to come to the conclusion that Napoleon's final overthrow was due primarily to the energy and tact of Castlereagh.

Metternich's conduct at Frankfort rendered Castlereagh's presence at the headquarters of the Allies absolutely necessary. On December 31st, 1813, Castlereagh left England for Holland, and on January 18th, 1814, he reached Freiburg, the headquarters of the allied army. He found that, owing to divergence of views and jealousies, the Alliance was on the verge of breaking up. The Tsar wished to replace Napoleon by Bernadotte and to make an immediate advance, while Metternich was prepared to make peace with Napoleon, and agreed with Castlereagh in regarding Bernadotte as a traitor to the Alliance. He was not anxious to advance, as he dreaded a fresh struggle with Napoleon. Stein was anxious for the return of the Bourbons.

Amid these conflicting interests and aims Castlereagh's influence made itself at once felt. Great Britain had no ulterior aims, had till the beginning of 1813 borne the brunt of the struggle, and was prepared to restore some of her conquests if by doing so she could obtain for Europe a lasting peace. Moreover, had it not been for the advances in money made by Great Britain, the Alliance against Napoleon could not have held together. Thus from the first Castlereagh was able to take up a very strong position among the Allied Sovereigns, a position the strength of which was increased by his firmness, courtesy, and what has been called "the proud simplicity of his conduct." Thus the

obvious disinterestedness of the policy of Great Britain, combined with the personality of Castlereagh, tended to bring about harmony in the allied camp.

A few days after his arrival the Allies marched into France, and it was arranged that a Conference should be opened at Châtillon-sur-Seine on February 5th, and that there Caulaincourt, the French envoy, should receive the terms of the Allies. Further, it was hoped that one result of the Conference would be the strengthening of the Alliance, and the removal of all misunderstandings. Castlereagh had thus two difficult tasks before him. He had to see that at all hazards Belgium and Holland were freed from French influence, and at the same time that the union of the Allies was kept intact. On February 7th Caulaincourt was informed that France must give up Belgium, the left bank of the Rhine, Savoy and Nice. In a word, she was to retain merely her boundaries of 1791. But Napoleon was resolved to keep Antwerp, and sooner than accept the terms offered, he preferred to attempt to overthrow his foes by attacking first Blücher and then Schwarzenberg. On February 13th he succeeded in inflicting a severe defeat upon Blücher, but he was unable to follow up his advantage, and had to fall back in order to provide for the defence of Paris. This success, however, made Napoleon all the more determined not to yield Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine. His refusal of an armistice alienated his father-in-law, the Emperor Francis, and by the Treaty of Chaumont (March 9th) the four Powers bound themselves to continue the war till France accepted their terms.

The
advance
into
France
and the
Conference
of Châtillon

Castlereagh's
efforts
successful.

Castlereagh was naturally much pleased at his

success in bringing the three Powers, Prussia, Austria and Russia into harmonious relations. "I send you my Treaty," he wrote to his Government, "which I hope you will approve. We four ministers when signing, *happened to be sitting at a Whist Table*. It was agreed that *never were the stakes so high at any former party*." He then commented upon the immense sums which Great Britain contributed to the Allied Cause. "What an extraordinary display of power! This, I trust, will put an end to any doubts as to the claim we have to an opinion on Continental matters."

Castlereagh's tact and firmness had proved successful. The battle of Arcis-sur-Aube, on March 19th, proved decisive; on March 31st the Allies entered Paris; on April 11th Napoleon signed his abdication.

The determination of Castlereagh, and indeed of Alexander, had now been crowned with success. Unfortunately, the Tsar arrived in Paris before Castlereagh and Metternich, and at once made arrangements for Napoleon's exile to Elba. It is justifiable to hold the view that had Castlereagh been present when Caulaincourt made his appeals to Alexander, a different settlement would have been made, and Europe would have been spared the Hundred Days and the Battle of Waterloo.

At the moment, however, no one anticipated an early renewal of the struggle. Castlereagh had confounded his critics by the brilliant success of his diplomacy, and Paris after many years was open to Europe.

On April 29th, 1814, William Jerdan, editor of *The Sun*, sailed from Dover in the *Lady Francis*,

The
mistake in
sending
Napoleon
to Elba.

Paris open
to visitors,
1814.

the first regular packet for Calais. At Dessein's Hotel he hired a cabriolet and drove to Paris, passing on the way Russian and Prussian regiments and one Cossack patrolling alone "a central province of ancient France." Jerdan gives a most interesting account of the condition of Paris, where "the gay "and giddy" populace seemed to welcome the Russians and Austrians, but to detest the Prussians. On May 4th Louis XVIII entered Paris, amid a scene of great enthusiasm, the crowds which witnessed his arrival including men from every part of Europe. The same day the Duke of Wellington arrived from Toulouse, "and in plain clothes, so as "to attract no attention, he rode along with Lord "Castlereagh, Lord Aberdeen, and other distinguished "Englishmen, in the cavalcade of the British "Ambassador, Sir Charles Stewart, which swept "up about noon to the grand review of the allied "troops quartered in Paris." Wellington was, however, soon discovered by the crowd, which "hurra'd and shouted as if they were demented "and a French Conqueror of Great Britain had "suddenly descended among them." In the evening of that eventful day Sir Charles Stewart gave a ball, at which were present all the generals and statesmen most renowned in Europe. "It was," writes Jerdan, who owed his appearance there to the kindness of Lord Burghersh, "a strange vision—"Schwarzenberg and Berthier, Blücher and Ney, "Platoff and Marmont, Wittgenstein and Mortier, "the Archduke Constantine and Talleyrand, "Hardenberg and Augereau, Czernicheff and "Moncey, Davidoff and Brune, Yorke and Servurier, "Woronzoff and Jourdan, St. Priest and Macdonald,

"all strolling about and conversing in the most
 "amiable manner—a perfect mob of princes, com-
 "manders, and famous politicians and warriors ; and
 "still among the foremost—Wellington."

The ball was opened by the Tsar, who danced with Madame Ney, the Princess of Moskwa. Before he left Paris, Jerdan went to the opera, where he says, "the noble presence of Lord and Lady "Castlereagh eclipsed every other box, and were "admired specimens of the Island race."¹ Shortly after Jerdan's return to England, the painter Haydon visited the French capital, and describes how he found Russians, Poles, Cossacks and Tartars looking at the pictures in the Louvre. "The Russian officers "were," he says, "the most refined, with fair complex-
 "ions, soft hair, and expressive features, and speaking
 "French fluently. In the Rue St. Honoré in the
 "middle of the day," he says, "you met not only
 "Cossacks, English, Prussians and Austrians, but
 "now and then a Bashkir Tartar in the ancient
 "Phrygian cap with bows and arrows and chain
 "armour, gazing about him from his horse."

The
 critics of
 Castle-
 reagh's
 policy.

It is difficult to believe, if it were not continually forced upon the notice of every student of British history during the Napoleonic War, that the virulence of the attacks upon the policy of the Government increased as the struggle with Napoleon became more and more a life and death one. The similarity of the tactics of the Opposition in 1812 and 1813, and those employed by opponents of the Boer War in 1899 and the following years is forced upon the notice of the reader. In the Wellington Despatches will be found complaints by the Duke of

¹ Jerdan : "An Autobiography," vol. I, p. 193.

the Debates in Parliament, and of newspaper comments as *currish* and likely to embarrass his Commissariat and defeat his measures. It seemed, writes one who lived at that time, "as if between "terror and admiration the opposition writers "had exalted Bonaparte into an idol, and would "rush through the fire to worship this Moloch, "colouring every advantage on his side, and "disparaging every success against him."

Before Wellington's final successes in Spain, the *Chronicle* exultingly declared that Napoleon, having finished the war in the north, would send a force to the Peninsula strong enough to compel Wellington to retreat, and "once more leave the enemy the "undisputed occupancy of the greater part of Spain." In utter ignorance of the character of the Napoleonic tyranny, many so-called Liberals in Great Britain expressed a sentimental tenderness for Napoleon, apparently on the ground that his tyranny was not due to any hereditary claim.

As 1813 proceeded, the desire for the latest information increased, and the evening newspapers published frequent editions with the news from the Continent, "which was in one sanguinary ferment "from the Tagus to the Vistula." Frequently a French newspaper smuggled across would be sold for ten, twenty, or even a hundred guineas, if it was of recent date and contained any fresh account of Napoleon's German Campaigns.

Excitement
in England
in 1813.

In the House of Commons, after his return from France, Castlereagh made an unanswerable defence of the Treaty of Paris. Having in one triumphant sentence scattered to the winds all the imputations and inaccurate assertions which had been continually

Castlereagh
in the
House of
Commons.

made by the opponents of the Government in Parliament and in the Press, regarding the conduct of the war, he continued: "The conduct of Great Britain has been vindicated; it has been proved that she entered into the war from nothing short of an over-ruling necessity; and that she was ready to relinquish everything of which for her own security she had been obliged to take possession as soon as it became manifest she could make that sacrifice without danger." With pardonable pride he then reminded his audience of the proud position in which Great Britain now found herself. "If the country has for twenty years," he said, "sustained the most severe burdens, and done so with a noble fortitude, it is at least gratifying for her to find that she has come out of the tremendous conflict in which she had been engaged with the acquisition of that security for which she contended, and with a reputation unstained by reproof. She bravely stood by the Powers of Europe in circumstances of unprecedented peril, feeling that it was her duty to enter the lists in defence of all those moral and political principles which were endangered, abstaining from too cautious and minute calculations of the conflict, and leaving the result to Providence."¹ On July 8th the Tsar and the King of Prussia, accompanied by many distinguished statesmen and generals, including Blucher and Platoff, visited England, where they were received with the utmost enthusiasm. They were entertained at the Guildhall; they visited Oxford, and traditions of the strength of Blucher's constitution still linger round the rooms which he occupied in Christ Church;

Visit of the allied sovereigns to England, 1814.

¹ Alison: "Life of Lord Castlereagh," vol. I, p. 485.

they were present at a naval review at Portsmouth and at the Ascot Races. During their stay in England it seemed "as if the British Empire had been turned into one Greenwich Fair"; and few anticipated that within a year the Waterloo Campaign would take place.

CHAPTER XIII

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA AND THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO

**The
Congress
of Vienna.**

AFTER the first downfall of Napoleon, it was arranged that the Great Powers of Europe should meet in a Congress to arrange the terms of a general pacification and to guard against the recurrence of the evils associated with the French supremacy in Europe. The first of a series of European Congresses met at Vienna in the autumn of 1814, and after discussions lasting about eight months, the leading European Powers (with the exception of France) decided upon certain territorial rearrangements in Europe, which they hoped would ensure a "real" and permanent equilibrium among the various states. Owing to Castlereagh's inability to leave England earlier, in consequence of his Parliamentary duties, and owing to the inability of the Sovereigns of Russia and Prussia to arrive at Vienna till September 25th, the Congress did not meet till the 29th of the month. In his laborious duties at Vienna Castlereagh was assisted by his brother, Lord Stewart, by Earl Cathcart, British Minister at St. Petersburg, by the Earl of Clancarty, and by Stratford Canning, the British minister at Bern. The settlement arrived at by the Congress was on the whole a satisfactory one.

Alexander I

The most conspicuous and distinguished of the famous personages assembled at Vienna were undoubtedly the Tsar Alexander, Metternich, and

Castlereagh. Alexander I, by the part which he had taken in the overthrow of Napoleon, was already recognized as the most influential potentate in Europe. His personality itself was sufficient to attract the attention of all European statesmen. Placed by destiny at the head of an Empire which could only be ruled by a despotism, Alexander constantly wavered between autocratic and democratic tendencies. His own authority was based on despotic conditions, but at the same time he was open to influences which made for democracy. The democratic bent of Swiss institutions interested him, the emancipation of Greece attracted his sympathy, the growth of the feeling of nationality in Germany roused his favourable attention. He hoped to grant to Poland a full measure of Home Rule, he aimed at founding on the ruins of the darkest despotism a new Byzantine Empire. Intelligent, high-minded, sympathetic, Alexander, by the force of his personality, was one of the most interesting personages at the Congress.

In Metternich, Austria's Minister of State and of Foreign Affairs, the Congress saw one of the ablest diplomatists in Europe. While the policy of Alexander, owing to his impressionable character, was quite incalculable, that of Metternich was definite and decided. In 1813, while anxious to check Napoleon, he had realized the danger of making Russia's position too strong, and henceforward it was his policy to confine both France and Russia within their natural limits. It was Metternich who on the downfall of Napoleon had proposed that all questions concerning the balance of power in Europe should be settled at the Congress of Vienna.

At this time Alexander not unnaturally regarded him with a suspicion which was not removed for some years.

Castlereagh With Metternich Castlereagh had much in common. Metternich fully appreciated the tenacity of purpose, the clearness of mind, the power of decision which characterized the British Minister. During the progress of the Congress the reputation of Castlereagh was enhanced in the eyes of his colleagues, and there is little doubt that the satisfactory and peaceful conclusion of the deliberations of the great European Powers was in a great measure due to the British minister's tact and firmness. At the opening of the Congress, when the foreign representatives appeared in full uniform and covered with medals and orders, Castlereagh very characteristically appeared in his ordinary dress coat, which was merely decorated with the Riband of the Garter. The contrast was sufficiently striking to draw from Talleyrand the exclamation, "*Ma foi ! C'est distingué.*"

**Opening
of the
Congress.**

At the opening of the Congress, Great Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia—the Four Allied Powers, "*les quatre*," as they were named—at once declared their intention of settling the difficult questions connected with the distribution of the German, Polish, and Italian lands. Talleyrand in vain raised objections to this decision, and the late autumn saw the four great Powers busily engaged in rearranging the map of Europe. In the discussions, which lasted for months, Castlereagh occupied a unique position. Great Britain had secured in the Mediterranean and elsewhere those positions which were necessary for her supremacy at sea, and thus, as she had no ambitions to gratify in Europe,

Castlereagh found that his influence at the Congress was thereby considerably strengthened. With regard to the Polish-Saxon difficulty, which at one time seemed likely to lead to a break-up of the Congress, if not to actual war between its members, Castlereagh took up a firm attitude.

That the opposition to the plans of Russia was successful was in great measure due to Castlereagh, and Europe owes him a debt of gratitude for his calm judgment and determination. Alexander had wished to make the annexation of Poland to Russia, and the confiscation of Saxony by Prussia a preliminary to all negotiations. It is said that at Vienna, when the map of Europe was laid upon the table, he had placed his hand upon Poland, saying, "*C'est à moi.*" With an army of 200,000 men in Poland, he imagined that he could defy the wishes of Europe, and that those who opposed his wishes would hesitate before endangering the peace of the world. But though Castlereagh was the last man to wish that the Alliance of the Four Great Powers should be weakened, still less broken up, he was resolved not to acquiesce in Russia's demands.

In the early stages of the Congress he had advocated the union of all the powers in an effort to save Poland from Russia; and in order to gain Prussia was prepared to recognize its sovereignty over the whole of Saxony. The prospect, however, of the disappearance of Saxony from among the ranks of the smaller German powers raised much opposition among the lesser states. The Prince Regent, as future King of Hanover, became interested in this question, and opposed the project of entirely transferring Saxony to Prussia. The influence of France was thrown on the

same side, and Talleyrand vigorously defended the cause of the King of Saxony. Public opinion in Bavaria, and throughout Germany, and generally in England, supported Frederick Augustus, and in the British Parliament questions were asked. Castlereagh therefore, finding it impossible to detach Prussia from Russia, changed his views, and henceforward vigorously opposed the absorption of Saxony by Prussia, no less than the absorption of all Poland by Russia. The immediate result of this change of attitude on the part of Castlereagh with regard to Saxony was the increase of the chances of a European war. Prussian troops at once occupied Dresden and several Saxon towns, and Hardenberg declared at Vienna that "Prussia would not restore Saxony. "She had won it and she would keep it."

Castlereagh
and the
Polish
crisis.

In the Autobiography of Metternich, the conduct of Castlereagh during what may be called the Polish crisis is criticised sometimes severely. It is stated that in the early autumn of 1814 he addressed to the Tsar three private memoranda, in which "he showed with much vigour and sometimes with little tact the injustice of his conduct and pretensions, and the dangers with which his projects would threaten Europe." According to Metternich, "the Tsar replied by bad arguments, sometimes in an evasive manner, sometimes with disdain." In any case, Metternich was probably right in styling this private correspondence useless and, moreover, absolutely hurtful to the success of the negotiations. "Lord Castlereagh," he says, "was wrong in undertaking it; we were wrong in consenting to it."

In Saxony public opinion declared itself strongly against union with Prussia, and it found support in

popular indignation in England and elsewhere. Castlereagh, who at first had hoped by sacrificing Saxony to moderate the Russian demands in Poland, attempted in October to bring about a peaceful solution of the difficulties. But before Russia and Prussia would assent to a compromise, it was necessary for England, Austria, and France to unite together. Owing to Castlereagh's insistence, France, as represented by Talleyrand, had been admitted to the Congress, but on the Saxony questions he did not at first support the British Minister. Castlereagh and Metternich urged in vain that the King of Saxony should be consulted with regard to the proposed disposal of his kingdom, and on January 3rd, 1815, a defensive Triple Alliance was secretly but definitely formed between Great Britain, Austria and France. War seemed inevitable, and with its outbreak the return of Napoleon to France was a certainty which had to be faced.

**Triple
alliance
between
Great
Britain,
France,
and
Austria.**

Warlike preparations had already been made, 25,000 Austrian troops marched into Galicia; and Bavaria, Holland, Piedmont, and Hanover promised to send contingents. All Europe was thus in arms, and while the forces of the Russians and Prussians numbered roughly 435,000, those of their opponents were estimated at about 535,000. The conclusion, however, of the Peace of Ghent, in December, 1814, between Great Britain and America, contributed to strengthen Castlereagh's hands. Some 30,000 veteran British soldiers were now rendered available for service in Europe. Moreover, the very prospect of the outbreak of a war which would in all probability lead to the return of Napoleon to France, caused the Allies to hesitate, and even before the end of

**A critical
situation.**

December signs had not been wanting of the willingness of the Tsar and the King of Prussia to abate something of their exorbitant pretensions. By dint of much perseverance, and aided by his conciliatory manner, Castlereagh induced the Tsar to recognize the Austrian claims upon part of Poland, and the King of Prussia to be satisfied with a portion of Saxony. Moreover, Castlereagh made great efforts, which were not wholly unsuccessful, to preserve the nationality of Poland, and to obtain for it a constitution. It was undoubtedly due to Castlereagh that an arrangement on the Polish question—the most difficult one which the Congress had to consider—was satisfactorily arrived at. On December 17th, 1814, Castlereagh wrote to the Duke of Wellington: “I consider the Polish question as settled, Prussia “never having contended it in earnest, and Austria “consequently has yielded. The Saxon one is now “the only one that is of much difficulty. . . . “The Saxon point is apparently the only one of “much difficulty, or that can lead to serious “consequences.” The settlement of the Saxon question had, however, never presented any insuperable difficulty and after December ceased to be a danger to the peace of Europe. The Powers now recognized the folly of their divisions, the spirit of compromise was awakened, and a settlement was in the early months of 1815 arrived at by which the King of Saxony was left in possession of part of his kingdom, Prussia obtaining Magdeburg, Wittenberg and Torgau.

**Castlereagh
successful.**

Before the actual conclusion of the Congress Castlereagh had returned to England, leaving the Duke of Wellington to act for him. By that time

most of the points to which Castlereagh attached importance had been settled. The union of Genoa with Piedmont had set up a barrier to French aggressions in the direction of Italy, and Prussia had been strengthened on its Western frontier. He had firmly insisted upon the union of Holland and Belgium in a new State which also included the Duchies of Luxemburg and Limburg and the dominions of the Prince-Bishop of Liège. To Castlereagh, the establishment of this new kingdom of the Netherlands was one of the most important of the territorial arrangements arrived at by the Congress. As separate kingdoms, Holland and Belgium would be in danger of falling victims to some strong neighbour; united they would not be likely to invite attack or absorption.

On the question of the slave trade Castlereagh was able before his departure for England in February, 1815, to make his influence felt. Since 1806 the Slave Trade had come to an end in the British dominions; since 1807 the same may be said of the United States. During the war the British Navy had effected its almost total abolition, but after the close of the Napoleonic War there was a distinct danger of its revival. France was ready to support the anti-slave trade attitude which Castlereagh adopted at the time of the First Peace of Paris, and Russia, Prussia, and Austria offered no opposition. Spain and Portugal, however, raised objections, but eventually after much discussion the eight leading European Powers unanimously agreed to a Declaration which, without binding any one Power to carry out the abolition of Slavery by a definite date, united all Europe in a general

The slave
trade.

condemnation of the system. Thus the efforts of Wilberforce and his friends were successful, and when Castlereagh returned to England he was satisfied that the eventual extinction of the slave trade was assured. At the same time Castlereagh was fully sensible of the inappropriateness of the agitation over the slave trade at a moment when Europe was just emerging from its mighty struggle with Napoleon. While the great powers were busy discussing various points connected with the re-establishment of the Balance of Power, and the setting up of barriers against any fresh French irruptions, England had been seized with one of those paroxysms which "though creditable to the warmth of our hearts, "are hardly so to the coolness of our heads."

**The
settlement.**

Thus, when on February 15th, 1815, Castlereagh left the Congress to defend at home by his unimpassioned and unadorned oratory the ministerial policy, the work connected with the resettlement of Europe had made rapid strides. "Russia had reduced her "Polish pretensions, the new dominion of Prussia " (including her share of Saxony) had been settled; "Austria was established in the control of Northern "Italy; Great Britain had virtually secured "satisfactory boundaries for the Netherlands, while "those of Hanover had been enlarged; a broad "basis for the Swiss Confederation had been "preserved; the Kingdom of Sardinia had been "materially strengthened, and the abolition of the "slave trade had been brought within sight." Moreover, the cloud threatening disunion, if not open hostilities, among the Allies had passed away. Castlereagh's hope that the early days of 1815 would see the settlement of all the territorial arrangements

of Europe seemed likely to be realized. In that settlement his tact and influence had made themselves conspicuous, and the reputation which he had acquired during the march of the Allies upon Paris in the early days of 1814 was now considerably enhanced.

With the opening of 1815 had arrived at Vienna urgent letters from Lord Liverpool, pressing Lord Castlereagh to return to England. "It is," he says in one written on January 16th, "absolutely necessary that you should be here as soon as possible after the meeting of Parliament. This is the unanimous opinion of all my colleagues and of those members of the House of Commons whom we are in the habit of consulting on such matters." Apparently all interest in the proceedings at Vienna had evaporated among the members of the House of Commons. The War over, they had begun to turn their attention to domestic matters. "Very few persons," continued Lord Liverpool, "give themselves any concern with what is passing at Vienna, except so far as it is connected with expense; and I never have seen more party animosity than was manifested in November, and I understand still appears at the Clubs and in private societies." What more striking instance could be found of that rapid change of opinion which is so characteristic of popular assemblies? Apparently, discussions on the Property Tax, on the Bank Restriction, and on the Corn Laws were expected to come on early in the year. All these questions were of considerable importance, and though Peel had already gained great credit, he and other members of the ministry could not

Return to
England.

speak on matters not connected with their departments with the authority of Castlereagh. The rapid diminution of expenditure by the Government, consequent upon the cessation of hostilities, was already causing discontent. Already, before the Battle of Waterloo had been fought, social questions were fast rising into operation which were destined to cause grave embarrassment and make Lord Liverpool's Government very unpopular in the country. The question of finance, too, was giving the Cabinet much anxiety. The expenses connected with the struggle against Napoleon and with the American War rendered it necessary for what amounted to a war expenditure in time of peace. The landed interest were alarmed at the great "fall in the prices of every description of "grain," while the poorer classes were still suffering from the heavy taxation. To a Government weak in effective debaters, the absence of Castlereagh on the Continent had been seriously felt. Equally necessary was his presence for the purpose of defending the arrangements lately made at Vienna.

His
triumphant
reception
in the
House of
Commons.

On February 15th, 1815, Castlereagh left Vienna, and after a short stay in Paris returned to England. His arrival at Dover was marked by a striking ovation from the assembled crowd, and on his appearance in the House of Commons the whole House spontaneously rose and celebrated his return with vociferous cheers. Probably on no previous occasion had a minister received such a welcome. His return had been anxiously awaited by his colleagues, who felt unable to defend adequately the domestic and foreign policy of the Government.

Suddenly, when all pointed to a period of peace,

the news arrived at Vienna on March 4th that Napoleon had on February 25th escaped from Elba. On March 8th he effected a landing at Cannes, in April he arrived in Paris, and before the end of that month he was apparently master of all France. Then ensued a short but famous period in the history of Europe. The Allies had lost no time in declaring on March 13th that Napoleon was an outlaw, and on March 17th Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia made a treaty binding themselves to keep 150,000 men in the field till "Bonaparte should have been rendered absolutely incapable of stirring up further troubles." As usual, the Allies looked and not in vain to Great Britain for pecuniary aid, and the ministry at once promised a contribution of five million pounds towards the expenses of the enterprise. In so acting the ministry was supported by the feeling of the whole country, and the Opposition to war in the House of Commons could only muster 72 votes against 273 in favour of a warlike policy.

The Escape
of
Napoleon
from Elba.

The months of May and June proved an anxious time for all Europe. "Never was there such a period," writes one who lived through it. To the present generation, which remembers how many men of ability opposed the Boer War, and earned the name of Little Englanders, it may be interesting to know that even during that critical period which ended at Waterloo there were not a few well-educated men who rejoiced when Napoleon threatened to overthrow the liberties of Europe. Hunt, the Radical, on hearing on May 27th of Napoleon's landing at Cannes, said with glee, "He will soon give an account of Master Wellington," while Hazlitt

The Battle
of
Waterloo,
June 18th,
1815.

was much affected at Napoleon's final overthrow. He apparently thought that "Crimes, want of honour, want of faith, and want of every virtue on earth, were nothing on the part of an individual raised from the middle classes to the throne, if they forwarded the victory of the popular principle." Leigh Hunt, however, held the view "that there was less excuse for Napoleon than for hereditary princes, because they were educated in hatred of the very constitutional government they affected to work for, whilst Napoleon had risen on the shoulders of revolution, and he was deservedly punished for his misfortunes." One evening in June, while crossing Portman Square, the painter Haydon met a messenger from the Foreign Office who enquired for Lord Harrowby's house, and offered the information that the Duke had beaten Napoleon, taken 150 cannon, and was marching on Paris.¹

The Allies in Paris.

After the Battle of Waterloo, the allied armies advanced to Paris. The Prussians distinguished themselves by their outrageous conduct, pillaging and destroying "everything that came within the reach of their rapacity." "You cannot," writes an eye-witness, "conceive the misery which I have witnessed, and the insolent wantonness of these barbarians." Nevertheless, the same writer allows that considering the past aggressions of the French, one cannot wonder at the conduct of the Prussians, and one must "view it in the light of a just retribution." On July 7th the Duke of Wellington entered Paris, through which the Prussians marched. On July 8th Louis XVIII returned to Versailles. A grand review was held shortly afterwards, and a

¹ See Haydon's "Reminiscences,"

few days later Lady Castlereagh gave a party, at which many distinguished soldiers and statesmen were present, as well as Ouvaroff, the reputed assassin of the Tsar Paul. Owing to Castlereagh's influence, the rapacity of Blücher and the Prussians was checked, while it was due to his firm representations that Napoleon was sent to St. Helena.

Meanwhile, the Congress of Vienna had completed its labours, and Great Britain's maritime supremacy met with no opposition. Her position as the paymaster of Europe had placed her in such a unique relation to the other Great Powers of Europe that the question of the balance of maritime power was somewhat naturally not raised. On all questions vital to Great Britain, or to the balance of power in Europe, Castlereagh's influence had been successful. Great Britain came out of the war in possession of Malta, Ceylon, Cape Colony, Heligoland, Corfu and the other Ionian Islands, and Demerara.

The Second Peace of Paris, signed on November 20th, 1815, restricted France to the boundaries of 1790 with certain modifications, arranged for the continued occupation of French territory by the Allies, and also for the payment of a war indemnity by the restored monarchy of Louis XVIII.

**The Second
Peace of
Paris.**

After the long period of Napoleonic conquests, it was impossible to satisfy the expectations of each country or the laudable aspirations of every patriot. Europe required repose, and the settlement effected at Vienna gave her a long period of rest. Much of the work which was ratified at the Congress had been already done by means of separate Treaties between sundry of the Great Powers. At Abo the separation of Norway and Denmark had been decided.

At Töplitz and Frankfort Austria's possession of Venetia had been agreed upon.

Nevertheless, there was ample room for the exercise of Castlereagh's tact and statesmanship. He was as firmly convinced as any other European statesman of the necessity of setting up barriers to future French aggressions, whether by the union of Holland and Belgium or by the incorporation of Genoa with Piedmont. He was equally convinced of the necessity of strengthening Frederick William's kingdom by the addition of Rhenish Prussia and a portion of Saxony. Castlereagh's immense influence at the Congress of Vienna had most beneficial results. He was ever a strong supporter of the balance of power, and once Napoleon was overthrown, became an ardent advocate of the preservation of European peace. In spite of revolutionary disturbances and of the Greek struggle for Independence, Europe did not witness for some forty years a war between any of the great Powers who met at the Congress of Vienna.

Defence of
Castlereagh's
policy.

The various accusations that have been made against Castlereagh and the Allied Sovereigns are summed up in the charge that the revolutions of 1830 in France, Belgium and Poland were due "to the vicious system adopted at Vienna of parcelling out the populations of Europe like herds of cattle among the various royal litigants who claimed to own them."¹ This accusation is easy to make, it appeals to all those who are ignorant of history and who are captivated by telling phrases. But,

¹ Essays by Robert, Marquess of Salisbury, Biographical, p. 29.

like the commonplace with mob orators that Magna Carta was the work of an oppressed people, it not only is unhistorical, but is absolutely false. Castlereagh in 1813 and 1814 had to recognize accepted facts. He had to accept the arrangements already agreed upon with regard to Italy and Norway, he had, more especially, to see that by no action of his was the somewhat doubtful allegiance of Austria to the Allied Cause endangered. And there is little doubt that his policy was not only wise, but it was the only one possible under the existing circumstances. In the settlement of Vienna it is interesting to notice that Castlereagh in many respects carried out the views which Pitt had held. From 1799, Pitt, realizing that Austria was unwilling, if not unable, to hold the Belgian lands, decided that they ought on the first opportunity to be united with Holland. From that time till 1814 the British Cabinet firmly held to the project of a Dutch-Belgian union. The fulfilment of this project was one of Castlereagh's chief aims, and he never wavered in his determination to secure for Holland an adequate military frontier on the side of France. With regard to the settlement of Italy, Pitt's forecasts proved equally accurate, and his views were endorsed by Castlereagh. Genoa, in his opinion, must belong to Sardinia, and Castlereagh strongly supported the annexation of the republic to the kingdom.

In other respects Pitt's forecasts were equally accurate. He foresaw that in Italy, and not in Germany, Austria would seek her compensation; he approved of the idea that Prussia should strengthen herself in the lands west of the Rhine; he recognized that Great Britain must maintain her hold upon

Malta and the Cape of Good Hope. The independence of Switzerland, the evacuation of Italy and Germany by the French, the strengthening of Prussia and Sardinia, the union of Holland and Belgium—all these objects of Pitt's policy were carried out by Castlereagh.

The
question of
nationality.

On the much debated question concerning the recognition of the principle of nationality and of popular aspirations, it can be asserted that while Pitt showed no recognition of their importance, many of Castlereagh's measures prepared the way for their development. The union of Genoa with Sardinia proved a valuable step towards Italian unification, the acquisition by Prussia undoubtedly aided in the growth of German national feeling. But it would be inaccurate to pretend that Castlereagh advocated what is called the rights of nationalities at the Congress of Vienna. The attacks that have been made upon his statesmanship on that ground are now recognized to have been due entirely to ignorance or misconception. The cases of Italy and of Belgium are the ones usually brought forward by the critics of his policy. But the idea of a united Italy was in 1815 completely outside the range of practical politics. Italian Unity was not desired by the Italians themselves, and in 1815 it was impossible to effect. The various races in the Italian Peninsula had not forgotten their ancient feuds, and desired to preserve as far as possible the independence of their several states. This historical fact was at that time and is still unpalatable to poetical idealists and imaginative writers, who are either carried away by an inaccurate knowledge of Italian history, or are under the influence of the

“spirit-stirring stanzas” of poets. In 1814, Sicily was opposed to an union with Naples, Lombardy merely desired to be ruled by a resident Austrian Archduke. There was in 1814 no national sentiment in Italy.

Though in 1830 Belgium broke away from Holland, it is none the less, from the condition of European politics of the present day, much to be regretted that Castlereagh’s plan of a Dutch-Belgian Union could not have been rendered lasting by the adoption of a reasonable attitude on the part of the Dutch Government. To the hidebound tyranny of the Stadtholder was due the rupture of an arrangement which is an admirable testimony of Castlereagh’s statesmanship.

CHAPTER XIV

AFTER THE FALL OF NAPOLEON

1815-1822

England
after the
conclusion
of peace.

AFTER the conclusion of the Great War in 1815 Great Britain entered upon a new period in her history. Just as France was in 1815 very different from what she had been in 1789, so the Great Britain of 1815 was far removed from the Great Britain of 1793. France in 1815 had passed through the revolutionary and Napoleonic period, while Great Britain was experiencing the results of that Industrial Revolution which, while transforming her into a manufacturing country, had created a class of capitalists and wealthy merchants. Though Great Britain's prestige had been enormously increased by her efforts during the late War, and though she controlled the carrying trade of the world, she found herself during the first years of peace face to face with discontent and increasing misery at home. A great opportunity was thus given to the able but, as far as politics were concerned, ignorant literary class, to attack and belittle the policy of Castlereagh and his colleagues.

Opposition
of the
literary
class to the
Govern-
ment.

During the years in which Great Britain was struggling against Napoleon, literary criticism was far from being inactive. In February, 1811, Peter Finnerty, an Irish journalist and editor of a newspaper called *The Press*, was sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment in Lincoln prison for certain statements which he had made about Castlereagh.

This sentence roused the indignation of the poet Shelley, who was overflowing with philanthropic and radical instincts, and for the benefit of Finnerty he published a poem, the sales of which brought in nearly one hundred pounds. Like many other literary men, Shelley seems to have adopted, even during our life and death struggle with Napoleon, an attitude of hostility to the British Government. Notice has already been taken of the unpatriotic character of a portion of the Press during Wellington's Peninsular Campaign, and of the almost open sympathy which was given by a small section of Englishmen to Napoleon until the latter's downfall at Waterloo.

No sooner, however, had the European settlement been effected by the Congress of Vienna, and the restoration of the Bourbons finally accomplished, than the literary critics of Castlereagh and the Government found that they not only had the support of the Whigs, but that they also gave expression to the discontent which, owing to economic causes, was inevitable. That discontent, which was social and economic rather than political, naturally levelled its attacks upon the Government, which having triumphantly put down Napoleon, and placed Great Britain in the forefront of European Powers, now found itself violently attacked at home. Its political opponents somewhat naturally took advantage of the social discontent in order to push forward their political schemes. Consequently, till his death Castlereagh, while engaged in the difficult task of conducting the foreign policy of the country, was compelled to support drastic and unpopular measures in order to preserve order at home.

**The
Reaction.**

Brougham. Among his political opponents were men of consummate ability. Of those opponents Brougham, that "political Ishmael," was probably the most formidable. Both as a writer in the *Edinburgh Review* and in Parliament (from 1810 to 1812, and from 1816 onwards) he never ceased attacking the Government or advocating important reforms. His influence, based upon a varied knowledge of all questions connected with foreign, domestic, and Colonial policy was at times considerable. He had attacked with some justification the Orders in Council, he urged the suppression of the Slave trade, he pressed the cause of popular education. In 1816 the financial policy of Vansittart, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, gave him an opportunity of making a fierce attack upon the character of the Prince Regent, whose extravagance had become a matter of public concern. But, though highly gifted, Brougham was not a great man, and allowed himself too often to be influenced by feelings of envy, hatred, and malice. A "swashbuckler" in debate, he was liable to find his statements and accusations refuted, and himself compelled to abandon the position which he had taken up.

The
distress of
1816-1817
aggravated
by the
Whigs.

Early in the year 1817 Brougham and all opponents of the Government found an opportunity of attacking the policy of Sidmouth and Castlereagh. The harvest of 1816 had failed, and much misery among the poorer classes was caused during the winter of 1816-1817. In Cambridgeshire, Suffolk and Essex riots broke out in consequence of the agricultural depression. Moreover, the sufferings of many were aggravated by the contracted coinage, and by the reduction of expenditure on the part of the

Government. This suffering was especially acute in the manufacturing districts. The causes of this state of things were unavoidable, and were essentially economic. But the extreme radicals used the social and economic distress to further their own political designs, and most unfortunately were supported by the Whig party generally. Instead of employing their efforts to alleviate the distress which was very real, the Whigs and Radicals did all in their power to stir up the passions of the mob. While the Whigs demanded an immediate return to cash payments by the Bank of England (though the prospect of this return had caused a panic among the bankers, and was one cause of the increase of the general misery), and a further reduction in expenditure by the Government (though this, too, was another temporary cause of the widespread distress), the Radicals demanded various reforms. But the extreme members of the Radical Party went much further, and desired to overthrow the monarchy and to establish a republic. They were led by a man named Hunt, who went about the country making inflammatory speeches and recommending the most violent measures.

December 2nd, 1816, was fixed upon for a large meeting of the disaffected at Spitalfields, which was to be followed by a general rising. At twelve o'clock a crowd collected, and under Watson and Thistlewood, two well-known Radical leaders, marched to the Exchange. The Lord Mayor, however, had made preparations, the leaders were arrested and the mob dispersed. At one o'clock Hunt had arrived at Spa Fields and addressed a meeting, which was, however, adjourned to "the

The
repressive
Acts of
1817.

"second Monday after the meeting of Parliament, "viz., February 10th." His object was to secure the adoption of his demands, and for that purpose numerous secret societies were formed at or near "Leicester, Loughborough, Nottingham, Mansfield, Derby, Chesterfield, Sheffield, Blackburn, Manchester, Birmingham, and Glasgow." Owing to the general unrest which was apparent in many parts of the country, considerable alarm was felt by the well-to-do classes at the beginning of the year 1817. That alarm was increased when on January 28th, 1817, the Prince Regent was attacked on his return from opening Parliament, and the windows of his carriage broken by stones. Parliamentary Committees were at once appointed to consider the situation and the truth of the contention that a "secret and widespread conspiracy existed in the country" which had for its object the overthrow of the Government. The report of these Committees which declared that secret societies "are spreading "in some parts of the country to every village," made it evident that vigorous measures were necessary in order to check the growth of sedition. The ministry, fortified by this report, determined to take immediate action, and were perfectly justified in doing so. It is difficult to understand on what ground Whig writers of a later generation have persisted in declaring that the estimate of the situation held by those best qualified to know was an entirely wrong one.

Castle-
reagh's
defence
of the
repressive
Acts.

The suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act and four other measures, which had for their object the prevention of disorder, were brought forward on February 24th, 1817. They were vigorously attacked

in Parliament, and Castlereagh was called upon to defend the action of the Government. "It is peculiarly painful to me," he said at the beginning of his speech, "to find that after having passed through all the dangers and pressure of War, it has become necessary notwithstanding the return of peace abroad, to require the adoption of proceedings that might ensure the continuance of tranquillity at home." He then expressed his regret and surprise that the close of the French revolutionary period, and the restoration of peace should have been followed by sedition and riot in England. "I had fondly hoped," he continued, "that after the dreadful record of the sufferings of mankind which the French Revolution had afforded—after the proof which the annals of the last twenty-five years had presented, that those who engaged in such hazardous enterprises brought not only destruction on their own heads, but ruin on their country—it would be impossible to find any individual so dead to all feeling of private and public duty as to attempt to lead others on to similar undertakings." He then consoled his hearers by declaring that if a treasonable spirit exists it was confined to the lower and less educated orders of society, and assured them that effective measures would at once be taken to stamp out the evil. At the same time he did not under-rate the influence of the doctrines of the Radical and other Societies. "Some of the doctrines, he went on to say, "now taught with so much diligence by the leaders of the movement are so absurd that with men of education and intelligence they need no refutation. The doctrines of the Luddites, the Spenceans, the Philanthropists, the

"Hampden Clubs, which recommend an equal division of property, may safely be left with such classes to work out their own cure. But it is otherwise with the uninformed, ignorant multitude to whom they are addressed. With them they are only the more attractive, that, like fairy tales, they are new, and propose the establishment of a state of society in which novelty forms the basis, but hope gilds the superstructure."¹ He then described to the House the nature of the report on which the bills which were about to be proposed were based. That report was the work of a secret Committee composed of men of all classes and parties, and was *unanimous*. Castlereagh and the ministry, were, therefore, not only justified but compelled to take action. The report revealed "the existence of a conspiracy, having for its object not only the subversion of the Government, but," as Castlereagh declared, "the destruction of every moral and social principle." The conspirators undoubtedly intended to take immediate action, and the execution of their projects was only prevented by the energetic action of the Government. He then described the real character of the Societies whose fine names—Spencean Club, Union Club, Hampden Club—did not prevent their members from aiming at the destruction of what they termed the privileged orders.

In spite of the opposition of the Whigs and Radicals, headed by Burdett, Ponsonby, and Brougham, bills for giving the magistrates extraordinary powers, together with a motion for the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act, were passed by large majorities.

¹ Alison: "Lives of Lord Castlereagh and Sir Charles Stewart," vol. III, pp. 39-44.

No impartial reader can doubt that the Government was fully justified in taking these precautionary measures. Though the march of the Blanketeers from Manchester to London proved a fiasco, a large district in the centre of England was for some weeks terrorised by a gang who expected support in London and elsewhere. Under these circumstances Sidmouth had no other course open to him but to renew the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act at the beginning of July. Whether his circular authorizing magistrates to apprehend persons charged on oath with seditious libel was wise is more questionable.

For Castlereagh, personally, the year 1817 was noteworthy owing to the attack made upon him in Parliament by Brougham. On July 11th, Brougham accused Castlereagh of being responsible for various acts of cruelty in connexion with the rebellion of 1798 in Ireland. Brougham was supported by Burdett and Mr. Grey Bennet, whose speech reflected the narrow and bitter views of many of those composing the Opposition. Castlereagh had no difficulty in overthrowing the feeble arguments and inaccurate statements of his opponents, and was supported by Canning, whose powerful speech was received with much applause. In later days, Brougham, when writing his sketch of Castlereagh, declared that "far from taking part in these atrocities" he uniformly and strenuously set his face against "them." Before the year closed, the death of the Princess Charlotte took place. Her death on November 6th has been termed the chief historical event in 1817, and caused profound grief to the nation.

Brough-
am's
attack on
Castle-
reagh's
Irish
administra-
tion, July,
1817.

From the beginning of 1818 may be dated the

The year
1818.

period of Castlereagh's extreme unpopularity. He had never been a popular minister, though his successful policy during the later years of Napoleon's career had extorted a grudging recognition on the part of many of his political opponents. But after the close of the Great War, it became necessary to adopt drastic measures in order to preserve order in the country, and from that year to the present time it became the fashion with historians—with few exceptions—to belittle the immense services which he had rendered to the country. The year 1818, indeed, opened with signs of improvement in the economic condition of the country. In January the Cabinet was strengthened by the admission of Frederick John Robinson, afterwards Lord Goderich, who was President of the Board of Trade and Treasurer of the Navy. Already the importance of finance had been recognized by the Government. In 1817 Castlereagh had secured the extension of the restriction on cash payments with very advantageous results to British industry. On May 1st, 1818, a bill was introduced for continuing beyond July 5th, 1818, the suspension of cash payments by the Bank of England. This measure was indispensable, and was strongly supported by Castlereagh and the Tory party. But though the bill was conceived in the interests of the people, and was brought in with the object of preventing a return of the distress of 1816, it was fiercely opposed by the Whigs, and only carried after a long debate by a majority of 65.

The
massacre
of Peterloo.
1819.

In spite, however, of the paramount importance of financial considerations, the year 1819 proved chiefly noteworthy on account of the so-called "Manchester or Peterloo Massacre," which took

place on August 16th, at a suburb of Manchester known as Peter's Fields. The country had continued in a state of political ferment owing to the efforts of several men of extreme views, who received encouragement from certain leading men of the old Whig families. The mischief caused by this encouragement was great, and while the more moderate aimed at radical changes in the representation, the ignorant masses were led to support the revolutionary doctrines of the extreme Radicals who desired to overthrow the Government by force. Violent language had been used at reform meetings in Stafford, Birmingham, Leeds and other places, and extensive drilling of the people had taken place. The meeting in Peter's Fields, where some 50,000 or 60,000 people had assembled, was charged by some yeomanry and troops, several persons were killed and wounded, Hunt was arrested, and the meeting was dispersed.

Parliament met in November, while public opinion was still excited over the massacre of Peterloo. The Government, which had approved of the action of the Manchester magistrates, was in a strong position. Many of the Whigs who were not in sympathy with the views and actions of Hunt and his followers supported the ministerial attitude. "The Radicals," Brougham had written to Lord Grey on October 24th, "have made themselves so odious that a number of their own way of thinking would be well enough pleased to see them and their vile press put down at all hazards."

On November 23rd the speech from the throne admitted the existence of deep distress all over the country, and emphasized the necessity of curbing

The speech
from the
throne,
Nov., 1819.

the prevalent seditious spirit. While the depression was deplored, the speech contained the assertion that "the seditious practices, so long prevalent in "different parts of the manufacturing districts of "the country, have been continued with increased "activity." Mention was then made of the depression which still continued in certain branches of manufactures, and of the consequent distress. But the most noteworthy portion of the speech related to "the proceedings incompatible with the public "tranquillity and with the peaceful habits of the "industrious classes of the community," and to the existence of a spirit inconsistent with the political institutions of Great Britain.

An amendment to the Address was proposed by Tierney, who, supported by a number of members of the Opposition, declared that "the resort to "military force in the absence of any riotous, overt "acts, was an unwarrantable and dangerous interference with the right of public meeting." In defence of the Government, Canning made a brilliant oration, while on November 29th Castlereagh in a vigorous speech upheld the ministerial policy as represented by the Six Acts. It is quite evident that the Cabinet considered the crisis to be serious and one which required to be dealt with by Parliament in a strenuous manner. He stated that the danger had assumed a tangible and pressing form. Disaffection, he asserted, was proved to exist in Lancashire, in Cheshire, and in Somerset, and he insisted that the working classes were being deluded by specious arguments, with the result that a state of things bordering on rebellion existed in several of the manufacturing districts. With regard to

Castle-
reagh's
speech
proposing
the Six Acts
Nov. 29th,
1819.

the prohibition of military training by large bodies of men, Castlereagh demonstrated the necessity of that prohibition. He declared that Thistlewood—afterwards so notorious—was boasting that there was no law to prevent the assemblage of 100,000 or of even 1,000,000 men, and that in some manufacturing districts 60,000 or 80,000 men could be assembled in a few hours. To meet this organization of the Radicals, the Six Acts were proposed, by which the assembling of large multitudes would be prevented and other measures taken for the protection of Society.

The large majorities by which the Six Acts were passed showed that the nation as a whole regarded them as necessary, and called for by the circumstances of the time. "One of the Acts, the Training "Prevention Bill," says Sir Theodore Martin in his *Life of Lord Lyndhurst* (p. 162), "has retained its "place on the Statute Book, and another, the "Misdemeanours Bill, is admitted by Mr. Walpole (*History of England*, vol. 1, p. 518) to have been "in its ultimate shape a beneficial reform." With "the other four, which were directed against "blasphemous and seditious libels, incendiary "political journals, seditious meetings, and the "acquisition of arms for seditious purposes, modern "legislation has found itself able to dispense in "Great Britain because of the wholesome changes "in the state of the press and of public feeling." Even Brougham declared that the proceedings of the Radicals were "bad enough to make reflecting "men consider that the time was come for taking "some steps in support of order." And in spite of the inaccurate statements of later Whig writers,

The Six Acts necessary and acceptable to the nation.

there is no doubt whatever that the Acts were approved by "the general verdict of the public opinion of the day."

The view
of a French
writer.

The passing of the Six Acts roused a storm of indignation among the opponents of the Government. Of the literary men, Byron, Shelley and Moore distinguished themselves by the bitterness of their vituperations. A French writer's sarcastic remarks, quoted by Lady Londonderry in her interesting sketch of the life of Castlereagh, with regard to the value of the criticisms of Byron, Shelley, Moore and other literary celebrities, is worth reproducing: "*Fallait il laisser périr l'Angleterre pour plaire aux poètes. Fallait il seconder les desseins des brûleurs de métiers et des voleurs de maisons? Lord Castlereagh ne fit que son devoir d'homme d'état; il sauve la société, et que veut on de plus? Au péril même de sa renommée; immense sacrifice de ceux qui se vouent aux idées d'ordre au milieu du desordre.*"¹

The necessity of the Six Acts was undoubted, and even if there was no proof as to the objects and designs of the malcontents, there was no dispute about the fact of military training. The Six Acts were therefore necessary and justifiable, and proved successful. But they were very unpopular among the disaffected classes, and were the immediate cause of Thistlewood's plot against the Cabinet, of which the most unpopular members were Sidmouth and Castlereagh.

The return
to cash
payments,
1819.

Before, however, that series of measures which led to the Cato Street Conspiracy was passed, Castlereagh had been forced to witness the return

¹ The Marchioness of Londonderry: "Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh," p. 60.

to cash payments, followed, as he anticipated, by a commercial crisis. In February, 1818, a Committee, with Robert Peel as Chairman, was appointed to inquire into the effect of the Bank Restrictions Act, and in its report it recommended a resumption of cash payments. In spite of the opposition of the bankers of London and Bristol to this recommendation, Castlereagh received little support in the House of Commons, and the resumption of cash payments took place. A rapid increase in general distress followed at once. "The industry of the nation was speedily congealed, as a flowing stream by the severity of an arctic winter." The 3 per cents. fell from 79 in January, 1819, to 65 in December, and the number of bankruptcies in England in 1819 was 531 in excess of those in 1818. To meet the financial distress, Castlereagh supported Vansittart, Chancellor of the Exchequer, in bringing forward resolutions in favour of a Sinking Fund which were supported by a large majority.

In an able speech on behalf of Vansittart's finance resolutions, Castlereagh declared that the object of the Government was to establish and confirm Pitt's plan of a sinking fund. In his opinion the country ought to make some effort to enable it to meet the burdens of a new war, should such a "calamity visit it." The ministry, he asserted, claimed to be armed to meet the difficulties and dangers of the State, and—this sentence was received with great applause—"if we are not to be entrusted "with them [full powers] we are willing to resign to "more favoured, perhaps more able, but not more "zealous champions." The proposals were carried by a majority of 197.

Castle-
reagh's
defence of
Vansit-
tart's
proposals.

The Cato
Street
Conspiracy,
1820.

The opening of 1820 was marked by the discovery of the famous Cato Street Conspiracy, at the head of which figured the same Arthur Thistlewood whose non-conviction in 1817 had been due to the skill and eloquence of Copley. Since that time the incorrigible Thistlewood had suffered a year's imprisonment for sending a challenge to Lord Sidmouth. On his release he arranged a plot which had for its object the assassination of all the members of the Cabinet. The conspirators finally determined to carry out their project on February 23rd, 1820, on which night all the ministers were to dine at the house of Harrowby, President of the Council, in Grosvenor Square. It was arranged that after all the ministers had been assassinated, the heads of Sidmouth and Castlereagh should be carried away as trophies. The cavalry barracks were then to be set on fire, and the Bank of England and the Tower stormed. The discovery of the plot and the punishment of the chief conspirators proved a death-blow to attempts at anarchy and insurrection, and from that time reformers relied upon political agitation for the furtherance of their political objects.

In a letter to Lord Stewart at Vienna, Castlereagh gives a very interesting and minute description of the plans of Thistlewood and his fellow conspirators. "Had our information," he wrote, "not been such as to enable us to watch all their movements, and to interfere when we deemed fit, the fifteen Cabinet Ministers would have been murdered yesterday in Harrowby's dining parlour. Thistlewood, amongst this party of assassins when assembled, had fourteen picked men, all ripe for slaughter. They would have moved to the attack in ten minutes

"had not the police arrived." After describing the arrest of Thistlewood and his associates, Castlereagh continues, "The whole had been arranged without a fault, and if you consider that we ministers have been for months the deliberate objects of their desperate concerts, planning our destruction, sometimes collectively, sometimes in detail, but always intent upon the project, and with our complete knowledge, you will allow that we are tolerably cool troops."

If the Cato Street Conspiracy was not sufficient vindication of the policy of the ministry in passing the Six Acts, the events which occurred in Scotland were an ample justification for a precautionary policy. On April 2nd, a riotous mob near Glasgow was dispersed by the military in what was called the "Battle of Bonnymuir." The policy of the Government had now triumphed, and the policy of the Radicals had failed. Order was restored, secret conspiracies ceased, and the middle classes after a short interval took up in a constitutional manner the cause of parliamentary reform.

Riots in
Scotland.

For some months, however, England was agitated by the proceedings connected with Queen Caroline. The accession of George IV in January, 1820, had been at once followed by a claim of the Queen to enjoy the status and privileges of royalty. Brougham, as the confidential adviser of the Queen, had been charged with the duty of proposing certain very advantageous terms to her, as an inducement to her to remain on the Continent. Had she been informed of these terms, it is very probable that she would not have returned to England. But Brougham, anxious to increase his own importance, and secure

The
Queen's
Trial, 1820.

all the *éclat* attaching to the Royal *cause célèbre*, never informed the unfortunate Queen of the proffered terms. The Queen, therefore, returned to England from the Continent, and her return rendered inevitable the famous Bill of Pains and Penalties which the ministry introduced, and with regard to which Castlereagh was much consulted by the King. That Bill was brought forward in August and dropped in November. At first the Queen was "extensively popular with the multitude," while the Whigs rejoiced in the opportunity which was now given them of revenging themselves on the King for their disappointment at the beginning of 1812, and, at the same time of regaining with the masses their popularity, which had latterly become much diminished. The debates on the Divorce Bill had given Brougham an opportunity, of which he fully availed himself, of dealing a severe blow at the Government, which had become very unpopular. After her triumph, when the Bill was withdrawn, the popularity of the Queen, as Eldon had prophesied, rapidly decreased, and at the time of the King's Coronation had almost disappeared.

The
Coronation
of
George IV,
1821.

Under the existing circumstances, however, the Coronation of George IV in July, 1821, roused much attention. Owing to the strong feeling in many quarters that the Queen ought to be allowed to take her share in the ceremonial, it was deemed necessary by Lord Sidmouth to collect some 8,000 troops, which were stationed in Palace Yard and in various positions near the Abbey. The attempt of the Queen to force her way into the Abbey by the south-western door and her repulse by the doorkeeper are well-known incidents in the history of George IV's

Coronation. In the *Reminiscences of Lord Teignmouth* is a description of Castlereagh (Londonderry) on his way to the Banqueting Hall, among peers, ambassadors, and other notables. "His noble presence and dignified but easy bearing . . . set off by the magnificent robes of the Garter, marked out Lord Londonderry as the 'bright particular star' of that brilliant galaxy."

The Queen's death on August 7th provoked no widespread feeling of regret. It, however, removed from the path of the ministry a difficulty which the Opposition had hoped would prove insurmountable. Beyond the loss of the services of Canning, who owing to his past friendly relations with the Queen, considered that he ought no longer to remain a member of the administration, the ministry suffered no loss of strength. All that was now wanting to the "full measure of Castlereagh's prosperity was reconciliation with his native Ireland."

In the autumn of 1821 Castlereagh, and shortly afterwards George IV, visited Dublin. His father had died at Mount Stewart on April 8th at the age of eighty-two, and Castlereagh succeeded him as second Marquis of Londonderry. Both King and Minister were received with the greatest enthusiasm. In a letter to his wife, dated August, 1821, Castlereagh declares that the visit to Ireland had "been without alloy—everything perfect. I have not seen a drunken man in the streets—I have not heard an unkind word drop from a single individual, and yet I have mixed unsparingly with the people; and the effect is not less strong in the remote parts of Ireland, where every village has been illuminated for

Castlereagh's
visit to
Dublin.

"the King's arrival." Castlereagh and Sidmouth were the two Cabinet Ministers in attendance on the King, while Lord Talbot was the Lord Lieutenant. But the festivities which had been prepared had to be considerably curtailed owing to the Queen's death on August 7th, the announcement of which reached the King at Beaudesert, Lord Anglesey's residence in Anglesea, on his way to Ireland. The reception which Castlereagh received on his return to his old quarters after an absence of twenty years was very gratifying. Their attitude resembled that which Grattan had recommended his son to adopt towards Castlereagh. "If you get into the House of Commons," he said, "I must beg you not to attack Lord Castlereagh. The Union is past, the business between him and me is over, and it is for the interest of Ireland that Lord Castlereagh should be a minister. I must beg you again not to attack him, unless he attacks you, and make it my dying request." The crowd evidently realized that Castlereagh, like Grattan, loved Ireland, and hence the cordial greeting which he received while he was at the Castle. There he met Alexander Knox, whom he had not seen for twenty-two years. For two hours they conversed. In 1811 Castlereagh had written to Knox urging him to write a history which should "dispel the unwholesome mists that overhung the Union. . . . The demons of the present day are at work to make those who carried the Union odious, as, first, having cruelly oppressed, and then sold their country. The world's forgetfulness of the events which are a few years gone by, enables them to mislead numbers." In 1811, however, Knox was in bad health, and "the

“ Rebellion of 1798 thus lost its best chance of
“ finding an efficient historian.”

From the time of his return from Ireland, to his death in the following August, Castlereagh's attention was chiefly occupied with foreign affairs. In the autumn of 1821 he visited Hanover. The political situation was by no means assured. In western Europe the danger of popular risings alarmed the members of the Holy Alliance, while in the East the opposition of the Greeks to the Turkish rule threatened new complications. Owing to his resolute policy England was tranquil, the attempts to stir up Jacobinism had been crushed, anarchy had been checked. He had during the anxious years which followed the fall of Napoleon adopted a resolute policy at home. His attitude towards the Great Powers with regard to the European Question was none the less independent and resolute.

The last
year of his
life.

CHAPTER XV

CASTLEREAGH'S FOREIGN POLICY AFTER 1815

The
reaction.

THE downfall of Napoleon after Waterloo was followed by the triumph of reactionary views in all the States of Europe. To many this result of a long period of revolutionary movements came as a bitter disappointment. Some enthusiasts had hoped that the liberation of Europe from the domination of France would be signalized by the abolition of armies and by the return to the Golden Age. Under these new conditions Europe would be governed by a Central Constitution, and would form a sort of Christian republic. To such theorists the actual results of the overthrow of Napoleon came as a cruel shock. The Allies were convinced that France must be prevented from ever endangering the peace of Europe by her own unaided efforts, and that in order to carry this intention into effect, Russia, Austria, Prussia and Great Britain should, as representing United Europe, form a close union.

The Tsar
Alexander
I.

The victory at Waterloo had removed all immediate danger from France, but the downfall of Napoleon gave an opportunity for Alexander of Russia to dominate the Councils of Europe. His influence was at once realized, when on September 26th, 1815, he announced his scheme of the Holy Alliance, which, according to its author, was designed "to give a lofty satisfaction to Divine Providence," but which according to Metternich, was a "loud sounding nothing." Alexander, who was at that time

influenced by the Evangelical revival, which had made some way on the Continent, honestly believed in his power of introducing Christian principles into the conduct of all public relations. To Castlereagh the manifesto of Alexander was merely "a piece of "sublime mysticism and nonsense," and he was saved from the necessity of giving it his signature by the action of the Prince Regent, who as a Sovereign Prince, but not as "the mouthpiece of "the responsible Government in power," wrote a letter expressing his individual agreement with the principles laid down in the manifesto.

To Castlereagh, and to all European statesmen, the two treaties signed at Paris on November 20th, 1815, had far greater political importance. Of these, one dealt with the situation in France. The reception given to Napoleon on his escape from Elba had naturally aroused a feeling of deep distrust of the French people in the minds of the Allied Powers, who decided by the first Treaty that a Committee of their ministers should be established in Paris, partly in order to watch events in France, partly to tender advice to the French Government. The second Treaty aimed at consolidating the alliance between the four Sovereigns, who should meet at fixed intervals to consider such measures as "at "each one of these epochs shall be judged most "salutary for the peace and prosperity of the nations "and for the prosperity of Europe."

Alexander of Russia undoubtedly desired that he and his allies should continue indefinitely to regulate and interfere in the internal affairs of France, of which country he entertained a deep distrust. To Castlereagh such a policy was most undesirable.

The
Treaties of
Paris.

Castle-
reagh's
views and
those of
Alexander.

Though fully aware of the immense value of the work already done by the Concert of the Powers, he was strongly averse to any unnecessary interference in the internal affairs of France. Like most English politicians, he steadily opposed the view held by Alexander that the Allied Powers should pose as "umpires in the constitutional struggles" which might arise in France. Should any action of the French people seem to endanger the peace of Europe, then, and not till then, should the Great Powers consider the question of interfering. Not that Castlereagh objected in 1815 to a system of European Congresses. The late events had, in his opinion, proved conclusively the value of the existence of close and friendly relations between the Great Powers. To preserve those friendly relations and to maintain peace in Europe, no better arrangement, in his opinion, could be devised than a system of meetings between the representatives of the Allied Sovereigns. Events in France justified Castlereagh's opposition to a strong and undisguised interference on the part of the Allied Sovereigns in the affairs of France, and to their posing as "umpires in the constitutional struggles" of that monarchy. In the autumn of 1816, the "*Chambre introuvable*" was dissolved, and in the ensuing elections the moderate royalists had an overwhelming majority. From that time France entered upon a period of prosperity, and the distrust of the French people which had hitherto been felt by the Allied Sovereigns, began steadily to disappear. Till 1820 the influence of the Constitutional Party, *i.e.*, of the upper middle class, was supreme in France, and a period of quiet re-organization was entered upon. On October 9th,

1818, the Allies, satisfied that France no longer constituted a danger to Europe, decided upon the evacuation of that country. At the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, which had met on October 1st, 1818, France was represented by the Duc de Richelieu, though on the question whether France should be formally admitted to the Grand Alliance, there was a marked difference of opinion. Castlereagh, though he naturally recognized that the formation of the Grand Alliance was due to a mistrust which he himself felt of the French people, was on the whole in favour of the admission of France on equal terms to the European Concert. But the other representatives of the Quadruple Alliance were opposed to the inclusion of France in that Alliance, and the Congress was destined to mark, "the highest point reached in the dictatorship of the Concert of the Powers." The Tsar, at the opening of the Congress, produced an idealistic scheme which was in some respects a return to the principles of the Holy Alliance. Alexander wished to combat not only revolutionary agitation, but also the action of those governments which "persevere in their old arbitrariness in internal administration, and partial alliances in external relations." He wished the Quadruple Alliance to be developed into "the alliance of all the States." This general alliance would guarantee legitimate sovereignty and the territorial *status quo*. By this means a permanent peace would be established, revolution would be checked, the stability of all European States would be secured, and the "liberties of the peoples wisely regulated" would gradually be developed. In spite of the Tsar's honest desire to unite "all nations in

"the tie of brotherhood," the scheme was regarded with distrust by Metternich and with undisguised opposition by the British Cabinet. Castlereagh only expressed the opinion of Canning and the rest of his colleagues when he declared his inability to support "an international organization established on a principle vague in itself, and capable of indefinite expansion."

Influence
of Great
Britain.

The instructions on which Castlereagh acted proved an absolute bar to an acceptance of Alexander's proposals, and though Castlereagh recognized the Tsar's sincerity and his anxiety to act according to "the purified morale of the Gospel," he found himself compelled to sweep aside the abstractions which filled Alexander's mind and to express the views of the British Cabinet in clear, if in somewhat ironical, language. "The benign principles of the Alliance of the 26th of September, 1815, may be considered," he wrote, "as constituting the European System in the matter of political conscience. It would, however, be derogating to this solemn act of the sovereigns to mix its discussions with the ordinary diplomatic obligations which bind State to State, and which are to be looked for alone in the treaties which have been concluded in the accustomed form."

The results of this declaration of the British Government were that (1) On November 15th, 1818, the Quadruple Alliance was secretly renewed; and (2) A Treaty, which was joined by France, was drawn up, declaring the intention of the Great Powers to preserve peace and to respect treaties.¹

Thus ended all hope of the Tsar's idealistic

¹ "Cambridge Modern History," vol. X, p. 17.

schemes being acted upon, and a decided check was given to the principle of intervention in the affairs of those States of Europe which might act in a way not agreeable to the views of the sovereigns of Russia, Prussia, and Austria. It was henceforward impossible "to provide the transparent soul of the "Holy Alliance with a body." The influence of Great Britain, aided by Spain, was also successful in defeating a project for enforcing the views of the autocratic sovereigns of Europe upon the Spanish Colonies in South America. But owing to the jealousy of the British sea power, no effort was made by the European States to suppress the slave trade, and at the same time, mainly owing to Great Britain's opposition to any plan involving the establishment of a Russian fleet in the Mediterranean, no steps were taken to suppress the Barbary pirates. The close of the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle marks an epoch in the history of Europe. From that time Alexander's plan of governing Europe by Congresses was gradually recognized to have failed. Its failure was due in great measure to the attitude of Great Britain and to the firmness of Castlereagh. Though Wellington and Canning accompanied Castlereagh to Aix-la-Chapelle, the policy of non-intervention originated with Castlereagh, though it took a bolder form later on under the influence of Canning. But Castlereagh, during the period from the Battle of Waterloo to his death, realized the necessity of preserving good relations with the Great Powers. Though he steadily refused to allow Great Britain to recognize the Holy Alliance or to adopt generally the views of Alexander, Metternich, and the King of Prussia, he kept on good terms with the sovereigns

and their ministers. After the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, we find Castlereagh writing to the Tsar (by the latter's wish), and telling him very plainly his views with regard to Russia's true policy towards Turkey. He was equally intimate with Metternich and Hardenberg, but his friendship with them was quite compatible with the expression of dissatisfaction at their attitude with regard to a system of intervention.

European
events
after the
Congress of
Aix-la-
Chapelle.

Castlereagh's views on foreign affairs, and his independence of character, are further illustrated by the events on the Continent between the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle and his death. For a time it seemed that there was some justification for Metternich's consistent opposition to liberal views and popular tendencies. England was the scene of reactionary measures necessitated by the discontent of the lower orders ; in France the progress of liberal agitation, and of the forces of liberalism compelled Louis XVIII to adopt a reactionary policy, and when the Duc de Berri was murdered on February 13th, 1820, to restrict the freedom of the Press, and by means of an electoral law to secure for the Government a majority in the Chamber. Richelieu, who had succeeded Decazes in 1820 as head of the Ministry, gave way in 1821 to the reactionary, Villèle, and at last France could take her place among the conservative Powers of Central Europe.

The
murder of
Kotzebue
and the
Carlsbad
decrees.

Meanwhile, the murder of Kotzebue, a poet, pamphleteer and sympathizer with the Tsar's monarchical views, on March 23rd, 1819, seemed to justify Metternich's desire for a repressive policy in Germany, and on September 20th, 1819, the issue of the famous reactionary Carlsbad Decrees marked

the triumph of the Austrian minister's policy. At Vienna, in 1820, these decrees "were established "as a permanent bulwark of sovereigns against their "people; and a perennial discontent was taken "for granted."¹ Though these Decrees may be said to mark the highest point reached by Austrian influence in Germany, they were not received with universal approval in all the States of Europe. Castlereagh at once protested. To him the Decrees represented an intention of interfering in most unjustifiable fashion with the internal affairs of independent states, while Alexander who was still an avowed supporter of liberty, refused to lend his support to the enforcement of the Decrees. But the murder of the Duke de Berri shook Alexander's determination, and from that time he agreed with Metternich's policy of repressing all popular movements. Ever since Kotzebue's murder, events had tended to reinforce the arguments in favour of the Austrian Chancellor's views. A military revolt at Cadiz, in July, 1819, had been followed by the outbreak of one revolution in Spain in January, 1820, and by that of another in Portugal in August, 1820, while in July of the same year the Neapolitans, fired by the example of Spain, rose and forced the King to accept a liberal constitution. These revolutions naturally had a very disquieting effect upon all supporters of the monarchical regime, and in some cases, notably in that of Spain, led to a long period of civil war.

These events made at once apparent the real lack of unanimity among the Great Powers. Upon Alexander the effect was stupendous, and from

Revolution
in Spain,
1820.

¹ "Cambridge Modern History," vol. X, p. 370.

that period his conversion to Metternich's views was complete. With his usual promptitude and with the eagerness of a convert he proposed that a Russian army should at once quell the Spanish insurrection, and that a Conference should be summoned. To these proposals Castlereagh and Metternich offered strenuous and successful opposition; that of the former on the ground that intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state was to be deprecated. Moreover, British trade interests were naturally opposed to any action on the part of the British Government which should have the effect of enabling Spain to strengthen herself in her contest with her South American Colonies. A strong Spanish government might mean the reconquest of those Colonies, followed by the erection of obstacles in the way of the lucrative trade which had grown up between them and Great Britain.

It is not surprising that these successive revolutions in Spain, Naples and Portugal should have alarmed the military empires of Europe. In the case of both Spain and Portugal, the Army had led the way in the demand for a liberal constitution; while in Naples the revolution had met with no resistance, and the kingdom had "crumbled before a handful of insurgents that half a battalion of good soldiers might have crushed in an instant." Before such a state of things the military monarchs considered themselves fully justified in adopting acts of precaution and repression. Anxious not to give Russia an opportunity of taking a leading part in carrying out a policy of repression, Metternich attempted to secure the assent of all the Great Powers in the suppression

of the revolution in Naples without using the machinery of a Congress.

But Castlereagh refused to give beforehand a general assent to Metternich's proposal, though he agreed with those who considered the revolution in Naples as "wanton and unprovoked." The Congress of Troppau met on October 20th, 1820, and England was represented by Lord Castlereagh's brother, Lord Stewart, the Ambassador at Vienna. Before the Congress actually met, Castlereagh had written a strongly-worded declaration of British policy with regard to revolutions, which was in direct opposition to the views of Metternich, who had urged that the Great Powers should never recognize revolutions which had proceeded from below. In it Castlereagh asserted most emphatically that if it should be desired "to extend the Alliance "so as to include all objects present and future, "foreseen and unforeseen, it would change its "character to such an extent and carry us so far, "that we should see in it an additional motive for "adhering to our course at the risk of seeing the "Alliance move away from us, without our having "quitted it."

Congress of
Troppau,
1820.

The Congress was a short one, and is chiefly noteworthy as marking the definite weakening of the Concert of Powers, and foreshadowing the later grouping of the European monarchs into two groups, one including Russia, Austria, and Prussia, and the other Great Britain and France. At Troppau, Metternich and Alexander forsook their suspicions of each other, and the latter finally decided to support the Austrian "Conservative system." Metternich had triumphed. The Carlsbad Decrees

had been established "as a permanent bulwark of "sovereigns against their people," and now he had the support of Russia in his repression of liberal ideas and movements in Italy. The Neapolitan revolt was put down by Austrian soldiers in March, 1821, and shortly afterwards Ferdinand was restored to his throne.

Congress is
moved to
Laibach.

Meanwhile, the Conference at Troppau had reopened its sittings at Laibach in January, 1821, and Castlereagh had notified the Powers that Great Britain would preserve an attitude of neutrality with respect to the revolution in Naples. This declaration roused the indignation of Metternich and Alexander, both of whom were determined that Great Britain should endorse the views laid down in the Troppau Protocol. Stewart, the British representative at Laibach, however, stood firm, and, in spite of the angry remonstrances of the three allied Sovereigns, declared that Great Britain held exactly opposite views to those expressed in the Protocol. A permanent split would have taken place in the alliance had not dramatic developments in the East of Europe created a new situation, which till 1830 temporarily but substantially altered the relations of the various States to each other, and postponed the division of the Great European Powers into two groups, one represented by Russia, Prussia, and Austria, the other by Great Britain and France.

Revolutions
in Naples
and North
Italy, 1821.

The events in Italy were certainly of a stirring character. A revolution had taken place in Naples, and in February, 1821, the Allied Powers assembled at Laibach declared that they would not recognize the revolutionary authorities. Moreover, Austrian

troops at once marched to the South of Italy, suppressed the revolution both in Naples and Sicily, and on May 12th the King was restored. In North Italy the Carbonari had organized an insurrection on March 13th, in the hopes of distracting the attention of the Austrians from their suppression of the Neapolitan rising. But this movement was easily suppressed by an Austrian force, and the authority of the King re-established on April 12th.

These events stirred the feelings of many of the Whigs in England, and on February 21st, Sir James Mackintosh, in Parliament, condemned the action of the Austrians, and enquired into the conduct of the British Government with reference to that action. In reply, Castlereagh made an admirable speech, which is of especial interest as being the last which he delivered upon foreign affairs.

He at once defended the general policy of supporting an alliance of continental sovereigns, an "alliance which I hope will long continue to cement the peace of Europe." With regard to the Neapolitan rising, he asserted that it was a matter with which Austria, and Austria alone, had to deal. "Great difficulty may arise hereafter as to how Naples, after its military occupation, is to be governed; and that being the case, nothing could be more impolitic in a British minister than to involve himself or his country in it. . . . I have always held out to the Allied Sovereigns that Great Britain was not at all interested in the transaction, and had so far separated herself from it, as to be no party to it whatever." He then pointed out the folly of, without accurate knowledge of the facts, taking it for granted that a constitution of the

Debate in
Parliament,
Feb., 1821.

Castlereagh's
last speech
on foreign
affairs.

British type was suited to the Italians. "I deprecate," he said, "the doctrine that the subjects of governments which do not enjoy a representative system are justified in throwing off their allegiance and resorting to arms in order to obtain one." Such a form of government had a few years previously been introduced into Sicily by Lord William Bentinck, and had proved an entire failure. Castlereagh then asserted that the tyranny of the late Government of Naples had been grossly misrepresented. It had done a great deal for the benefit of the nation; had rendered all the population equal before the law, had improved the system of justice, had abolished many abuses. The revolution had been due to a great extent to the Carbonari, and it was "the sect into whose hands the consolidation of Italy was to be entrusted." Castlereagh, therefore, felt justified in saying that he trusted that England would not be called upon to interfere. "The revolution against which Austria has now armed," he declared, "has been brought about by fraud and secrecy upon an organized plan between the military and the Carbonari, got up in the style of the worst period of the French Revolution. It was so artfully managed by these means that it succeeded, though it began only by the act of 150 dragoons, three lieutenants of police, and one priest." He then covered his opponents in Parliament with ridicule by informing them that the King of Naples, without being allowed a moment's deliberation, was advised by his ministers to offer the Spanish Constitution, *not one line of which had been read by any member of the Council.* "Surely," he said in conclusion, "the British Government

"were not much to blame if they hesitated to recognize an authority thus violently imposed upon a sovereign prince."

This debate, at the close of which the ministers had a majority of 69, made it manifest to the country that there was no truth in the ridiculous contention of the Whigs that Great Britain had joined in a "Crusade against the freedom of mankind." From that time the ministry became more popular, and men began to realize that their condemnation of Castlereagh as a reactionist was groundless. Its effects.

During these years Castlereagh had pursued a clear and straightforward line of action. From 1815 to 1820 it was absolutely necessary for all the Great Powers to remain united, and to adopt the same policy. No one could tell what new dangers Europe might be called upon to confront, no one could anticipate what political developments might mark the period immediately following upon the French revolutionary epoch and the long period of Napoleonic supremacy. At the time of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 it was becoming evident that the dangers anticipated in 1815 were not likely to occur, and that individual States might safely be left to work out their own salvation. Castlereagh was as fully alive as was Canning, who accompanied him to Aix-la-Chapelle, of the importance of the doctrine of non-intervention, and it was Castlereagh, and Castlereagh alone, who steadily from 1818 onwards "prevented the international acceptance of the "doctrine of interference," so dear to Alexander and Metternich. The character of Castlereagh's policy.

In protesting against the doctrines enunciated at Laibach, he laid down clearly the principles which

guided British foreign policy. "England," he wrote, "stands pledged to uphold the territorial arrangements established at the Congress of Vienna. The invasion of a weaker state by a stronger state for the purposes of conquest would demand our immediate interference. But with the internal affairs of each separate State we have nothing to do. We could neither share in nor approve, though we might feel called upon to resist the intervention of one ally to put down internal disturbances in the dominions of another. We have never committed ourselves to any such principle as that, and we must as a general rule protest against it."

Proposed
intervention
in
Spain by
France,
1822.

In 1822 the French minister, M. de Montmorency, who was a supporter of Metternich's "European System," was anxious that France should interfere in Spain just as Austria had interfered in Naples and Piedmont. The close connexion which existed between Great Britain and Spain, apart from other reasons, rendered Great Britain's opposition to this proposal a matter of certainty, and the mere suggestion of such action tended to make still wider the gulf which separated Great Britain from the Autocratic Powers. It was only through the personal intervention of the King, strengthened by the imminence of complications in the East that Castlereagh agreed to be present at the Congress of Verona.

The
Eastern
Question.

Further causes of the weakening of the Concert of Europe were to be found in the developments which were taking place in Eastern Europe. In 1821 the Eastern Question had raised new and important problems, and in October of that year Castlereagh had an interview with Metternich in

Hanover. The revolt of Greece had seemed to Alexander to offer a justification and a favourable opportunity for a Russian attack upon Turkey. Castlereagh agreed with Metternich in the undesirableness of encouraging the Russian anti-Turkish policy, which would lead to "destructive confusion" and disunion not only within Turkey but "in Europe." Alexander was pledged not to separate himself from the Alliance of all the Great Powers, and as a result of the diplomacy of Castlereagh and Metternich, he agreed to postpone his warlike, anti-Turkish projects, and to be present at the Congress of Verona, which after a preliminary conference at Vienna in September, was to meet in October, 1822. Castlereagh himself was preparing to set out for Vienna when on August 12th he put an end to his own life.

For some time past, Castlereagh had shown signs of suffering from the effects of overwork. That work had been enormous. "His official correspondence," writes Lady Londonderry, "alone fills" "seventy large volumes, and every draft, both at" "the War Office and Foreign Office, are in his own" "handwriting." One contemporary asserts, and probably with accuracy, that "his overwrought" "mind had evidently brooded on imaginary political" "reverses. He would cast despairing looks on the" "benches of the House of Commons behind him," "supposing that though really thronged they were" "deserted."¹ On August 9th, 1822, the King wrote him a kind letter, begging him to see his doctor before he returned to the country. A few days

Castlereagh's
death,
Aug. 12,
1822.

¹ The Marchioness of Londonderry: "Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh," pp. 62, 63.

later the King wrote a second letter. But before it arrived Castlereagh was dead.

The concert
of
Europe.

It is difficult to overestimate the value of Castlereagh's diplomatic labours between 1815 and 1822. He was mainly instrumental in bringing about and maintaining that close union of the Great Powers which in 1814 led to the first overthrow of Napoleon. It was he, too, who was mainly instrumental in preserving that union till all danger from Napoleon and from an agitated Europe had disappeared. As soon as the necessity for close watchfulness on the part of the Great Powers had passed away, Castlereagh steadily opposed the views of Russia, Prussia and Austria with regard to intervention in the affairs of independent States. He thus may be said to have definitely inaugurated that new foreign policy which Canning developed after his death. Castlereagh's instructions in July, 1822, to the Duke of Wellington, whom he proposed to send as Great Britain's representative to the Conferences of Vienna, where the affairs of Italy, Spain and Greece were to be discussed, leave no doubt that, though he will always be regarded as the advocate of the Concert of Europe during the critical years following the fall of Napoleon, he was clearly alive to the necessity of adopting new methods for the new problems which after 1818 were rapidly forcing themselves upon the attention of Europe.

Castle-
reagh's
attitude
after the
Congress
of Aix-la-
Chapelle.

At the time of his death, and indeed ever since the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, there was no longer any necessity for suppressing popular movements by means of the united action of the Great Powers. The temper of the French people in 1814 and 1815 was unmistakably dangerous to the Peace of Europe,

and Castlereagh had supported the action of united Europe with regard to France. But though the danger from France passed away, Metternich was ready and anxious to interfere in the affairs of Spain, Naples, and Piedmont. He even complained of the support which he asserted was given in England to revolutionary agitation, and was much irritated at the tone of the speeches made in Parliament. Metternich, however, was not the first European statesman who failed to understand the character of the British nation and its institutions. Canning's accession to office was signalized by no break in the policy pursued by Castlereagh. Events no doubt were leading to fresh developments, both with regard to the relations of Spain to her Colonies, and to the relations of Turkey with the Western Powers and with Russia, but Canning, with regard to Great Britain's relations to the European monarchies, simply acted upon principles laid down by Castlereagh. No doubt Castlereagh's death was a great blow to Metternich. The two men, with Alexander of Russia and the Prussian King, had acted together ever since 1813. They had brought to an end the Napoleonic rule in France, and they had freed Europe from all fear of a return to the Napoleonic supremacy. They had together passed through the crisis which closed at Waterloo; they had united in the work of the reconstruction of Europe, and till his death Castlereagh was perhaps naturally dazzled by the vision of the Confederation of Europe. During the years immediately following the Congress of Vienna, Castlereagh had acted loyally with the rest of the Allies, and though after the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle he and Metternich differed on certain

important points, the latter always believed that the British statesman and he agreed on the main lines of the policy to be pursued in Europe; and though Castlereagh had several times pointed out that the British Parliament controlled British foreign policy, Metternich and the rulers of Russia and Prussia had continued to think that the protests of Great Britain against the high-handed conduct of the Allies were "no more than sops thrown to "public opinion," and "mingled with the air."

Castle-
reagh's
death a
blow to the
Allies.

Consequently, the death of Castlereagh was, on personal as well as on general grounds, a severe blow to the Allies. Had Castlereagh lived longer, there is little doubt that the Allied Powers would have been compelled to realize the genuineness of his attitude with regard to Spain. In continuing and developing the policy of Castlereagh, Canning showed unexpected vigour and resource. His policy was an admirable complement of that of his predecessor, and he simply endorsed the views of Castlereagh when in 1825 he wrote to the Russian Ambassador that "the pervading principles" of the Alliance "are those established by the treaties of Vienna: "the preservation of the general peace, and the "maintenance against all ambition and encroachment of the existing territorial distribution of "Europe." Castlereagh had steadily protested, both in 1820 and later, against "the collective "interference of the Powers in the affairs of other "States." Europe owes more than is commonly recognized to Castlereagh's sound judgment and courage both before and after the fall of Napoleon. During the seven years that followed the battle of

Waterloo, British tendencies and those of Russia, Prussia and Austria tended to drift apart, and Castlereagh undoubtedly incurred, though he did not merit, unpopularity by his efforts to preserve the union between the great European Powers. The instructions which Castlereagh had drafted for his own use at the Congress of Vienna or Verona in 1822 were given to Wellington by Canning on Castlereagh's death. Beyond supplementing them with regard to the Eastern Question, which was rapidly approaching a serious stage, Canning made no further alteration, not even in the matter of Spain or of Spanish America.

It is often forgotten that Castlereagh had spent his life in fighting revolution. In that struggle he had learnt to appreciate the importance of united action on the part of the great Powers. He placed a very special value on the alliance of Austria, with which country Great Britain had acted during the critical period of the Congress of Vienna. Though after the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle British tendencies and those of Russia, Austria, and Prussia tended to drift apart, Castlereagh avoided all open rupture, though he vigorously protested against the collective interference of the Great Powers in the affairs of other States.

Shortly before his death the Eastern Question was attracting attention. Great Britain was interested in preventing a Russian invasion of Turkey, and one of Castlereagh's last acts was to induce the Tsar Alexander to postpone the declaration of war against Turkey. To Castlereagh, the preservation of the peace of Europe outweighed all other considerations. It was not till after Castlereagh's

Castle-
reagh's
recognition
of the
value of the
European
Concert.

death that the real import of the Greek insurrection was appreciated by European statesmen.

The
foreign
policy of
Canning a
develop-
ment of
that of
Castlereagh

There are two distinct views held with regard to the aims and character of Castlereagh's foreign policy after 1815. One set of historians maintain that Canning simply continued and developed Castlereagh's ideas, that the latter condemned the Continental System as represented by Metternich, and that the policy which he intended to pursue with regard to Spain was similar to that maintained by his successor. On the other hand, some writers maintain that Castlereagh was insincere, that he in reality approved of Metternich's Continental System, and that some of his letters were written in order "to throw dust in the eyes of the Parliament."

Castlereagh
■ great
statesman.

Castlereagh had many enemies, and even now his Irish and European policy is often misrepresented. But there are no real grounds for believing that he ever acted otherwise than honourably and straightforwardly. The more his whole political life is examined, the more will his statesmanlike qualities be appreciated. During the greatest and most prolonged crisis through which Europe has ever passed, he not only safeguarded the interests of Great Britain, but largely contributed to the re-establishment of order and peace in Europe.

He lies among other distinguished ministers in Westminster. Opinions may differ as to the wisdom of his policy at various epochs of his career, but no student of his life will deny him a place among England's greatest administrators.

EPILOGUE

CASTLEREAGH stands in the highest rank of British statesmen. Like the two Pitts, he helped to guide Great Britain through a crisis in which her very independence was threatened. Godolphin and Walpole were both eminent ministers, and Carteret had a profound knowledge of European politics. But none of these three men had to face a crisis of such magnitude as that with which Castlereagh had to deal. It may also be said that Europe has never passed through so momentous a period as was comprised within the years 1810-1815. And yet the man whose tact and determination alone kept the Coalition together in the years 1813 and 1814 is judged either from an inaccurate appreciation of the aims of his policy as Irish Secretary or from a misunderstanding of the political and economic situation in England after the fall of Napoleon.

Castlereagh's position among British statesmen.

Castlereagh's fame and reputation as a statesman must rest upon his conduct and policy during that Titanic struggle against Napoleon's despotism, which is often described as the rising of the nations.

Whig writers of the nineteenth century persisted in judging Castlereagh entirely from the internal policy pursued by the Government during the last few years of George III's reign. They have taken it for granted that that policy was worthy of condemnation, though at the time it had the support of the greater part of the Whigs, and with a curious partisan unreasonableness have not sought to discover

Whig and Irish historians.

the reasons which rendered that policy necessary. What would be thought of a writer of English History who judged Edward III by the events of the last five years of his reign, or Elizabeth by her policy to Mary Queen of Scots, or Cromwell by his conduct to Wexford, and in describing their lives omitted all the great transactions in which they took part ?

And yet this is what Whig writers and so-called Irish historians have to a great extent done, and with less excuse than the critics of Edward III, Elizabeth and Cromwell, seeing that the domestic policy of Castlereagh from 1815 to 1822, if unpopular, was absolutely necessary for the preservation of life and property. While the former have failed entirely to realize the immense debt which Europe owes to Castlereagh for his action during the greatest crisis through which Europe has ever passed, the latter have persistently ignored the fact that Castlereagh always held the view that *without Catholic emancipation* the Union of Ireland, though itself necessary, would bring in its train innumerable dangers and difficulties. They have also ignored the bitter hostility of France, which at the close of the eighteenth century had become doubly dangerous owing to disaffection in Ireland. The statement that that disaffection could have been removed by granting Catholic emancipation, while allowing the continuance of Ireland's legislative independence, exhibits an ignorance of the general condition of Ireland and a lack of appreciation of the state of public opinion in England and among the Irish Protestants, as well as of the danger from France, that can only be deplored.

Irish
Opinion
un-
historical.

Though on George IV's visit to Ireland, shortly

after his accession, the mob received Castlereagh in Dublin with enthusiasm, Irish opinion has declared against him. The grounds upon which that opinion has been formed are of the flimsiest character, the reasons assigned are worthless, the arguments used have no historical basis. Irish patriot leaders have never shown less historical accuracy than in their statements with regard to Castlereagh. Their dislike for an Irishman who rarely showed any traces of his Celtic blood is perhaps not surprising, but unfortunately for their reputation for accuracy, they have given reasons for that dislike which are absolutely misleading and unhistorical. He is accused by them of having instigated the Rebellion of 1798, of showing a small-minded jealousy of the patriot leaders, and of having trampled upon the religious liberties of Irishmen. The first charge is as absurd as it is untrue, and was itself confuted by Brougham, one of Castlereagh's chief opponents; the measures which Castlereagh took to shield Grattan disprove the second charge, while the history of Castlereagh's life shows that he was always a firm and consistent supporter of Catholic emancipation.

I cannot believe that the usual judgments passed upon Castlereagh's career based upon the views of that statesman's political opponents can be the result of a careful perusal of the Castlereagh Correspondence, or indeed can represent an intelligent study of the times in which he lived. Young essayists whose knowledge is limited, and older historians who have less excuse, seem to lose all sense of honesty, and indeed of truthfulness, when they write of Castlereagh. And the constant and worn-out comparison of Canning with Castlereagh,

Lasting
character
of Whig
influence.

much to the advantage of the former, shows such an ignorance of the real relation of the work of the latter to that of the former that one despairs of ever eliminating political prejudice from the minds of many writers of history. In great measure, no doubt, the travesty of Castlereagh's career which has been presented to the world by so-called historians, who ought to have confined themselves to the writing of fiction, is due in the first place to Whig influences, which on the whole dominated England from 1830 to 1874. And no better example of this influence can be found than in an article which appeared in the *Edinburgh Review* in the early sixties.¹ In that article the writer describes Castlereagh in terms which, happily, are rarely to be found in the annals of political partisanship. And yet the reviewer only summarized in a condensed form the views of a number of writers who, ignoring the immense services of Castlereagh during the struggle with Napoleon, judged him entirely from their biassed and inaccurate estimate of the domestic policy of Lord Liverpool's Cabinet during the anxious years immediately succeeding the final overthrow of Napoleon.

Defence of
Castlereagh.

Even, however, during the sixties, there were men like the late Marquess of Salisbury and Sir George Cornewall Lewis who recognized the immense debt which the Empire owed to the firmness and sagacity of Castlereagh's statesmanship. No one would admit that Mr. Gladstone's long tenure of office was not at times marred by mistakes. But no one on that account would deny him the title of statesman. And similarly, to take the most criticised period of

¹ *Edinburgh Review*, April, 1862, p. 186.

Castlereagh's life, viz., from 1815 to 1820, no impartial historian, remembering that Europe was slowly emerging from a long revolutionary period, would deny that there was some justification for the alarm felt at the discontent in parts of England and Scotland, the exact character and magnitude of which it was impossible to gauge. It has also been customary to criticise very severely the arrangements made at the Congress of Vienna, and to assert that they were the cause of the revolutions and disturbances which followed the Settlement of Europe in 1815. These critics cannot have understood the political condition of Europe at the time of the overthrow of Napoleon; they cannot have realized the necessity of a period of firm government in the case of almost every state in Europe. Firm and wise rulers were required, but it was not Castlereagh's fault that in many cases during the ensuing half-century the rulers of European States showed neither firmness nor wisdom. Until Europe had settled down, after a period of twenty-five years of almost constant war, it was impossible to grant those concessions which the ardent champions of reform demanded, often in a menacing fashion.

It was by no means certain that the militant energy of France had ceased, and it was naturally considered absolutely necessary to build dykes which should restrain all danger of a future French flood, and at the same time carry out the engagements which had been made during the struggle against Napoleon. As a statesman Castlereagh stands very high, and must be placed with men like Walpole, the two Pitts, Peel, Beaconsfield, and Salisbury. None of these men, however, had to

Castlereagh
and the
Congress of
Vienna.

control the fortunes of Great Britain in times as critical as those in which Castlereagh passed the chief years of his life. And in organizing and keeping together the Coalition against Napoleon, he was executing a more difficult task than that which was performed by the Elder Pitt during the Seven Years' War. It is seldom sufficiently realized that the uprising of the nations in 1813 might have ended in a terrible fiasco had it not been for the determination, sagacity, and diplomatic skill of Castlereagh. The successful march of the Allies to Paris in 1814, and the downfall of Napoleon was primarily due to him.

APPENDIX I

CASTLEREAGH'S PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCIES

HE was elected for Down county to the Irish Parliament at the general election of 1790 after a contest lasting 42 days. The numbers were :—

Lord Hillsborough	..	..	3,534
Hon. Robt. Stewart	..	..	3,114
Hon. Edwd. Ward	..	..	2,958
George Mathers		..	2,223

Stewart and Ward standing as colleagues against the Marquess of Downshire's eldest son and Mr. Mathers. When Hillsborough succeeded to the peerage in 1793 Mr. Francis Savage became Stewart's colleague, and both were re-elected in 1797 and held their seats till the Union, when they became members of the British Parliament.

Castlereagh's first seat in the English Parliament was for Tregony, which he represented from 1794 till the general election of 1796, his colleague being Matthew Montague, afterwards fourth Lord Rokeby. In 1796 he was returned for Orford, a pocket borough of the Hertfords in conjunction with Lord Robert Seymour, the patron's brother, but in July, 1797, he accepted the Chiltern Hundreds and was succeeded by the Earl of Yarmouth, the patron's eldest son,

afterwards so well known as Marquess of Hertford (the "Monmouth" of *Coningsby* and the "Steyne" of *Vanity Fair*). From 1797 to 1800 Castlereagh held no English seat, but on January 1st, 1801, he became, without further election, M.P. for Down county in the British Parliament, and was re-elected in 1802 without a contest. In August, 1805, on accepting office as Colonial Secretary, his re-election was successfully opposed by the Honble. John Meade, who received the support of the Downshire interest. Castlereagh headed the poll during the first eleven days of the polling, being twelve ahead at the close of the eleventh day, but on the following day the numbers stood : Meade, 1,523 ; Castlereagh, 1,481 ; and he then retired from the contest, and, no more votes being tendered on his behalf, Meade, who continued to poll his voters, was returned by a majority of 450. He was elected for Boroughbridge in the following January (1806), to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Eldon's eldest son, but at the general election of the same year he transferred his services to Plympton (a pocket borough of Lord Mount-Edgeworth, whose wife was half-sister to Lady Castlereagh), where he was re-elected on taking office in April, 1807, at the general election of that year, and also on resuming office in 1812. On the dissolution in the latter year he recovered his old seat for Down county and was again elected in 1818 and 1820, but in 1821 his accession to the Irish peerage made him ineligible for an Irish constituency, and he was once more elected for Orford, which seat he retained till his death. Below is a summary of his parliamentary services :—

IRELAND.

Down County, 1790-1800.

ENGLAND.

Tregony, 1794-96.

Orford, 1796-97.

GREAT BRITAIN.

Down County, 1801-1805.

Boroughbridge, Jan.-Oct., 1806.

Plympton, 1806-1812.

Down County, 1812-1821.

Orford, 1821-1822.

APPENDIX II

SUMMARY OF OFFICIAL SERVICES.

Keeper of Privy Seal in Ireland (under Pitt), 1797-1801 ;

Secretary for Ireland (under Pitt), 1797-1801 ;

President of the Board of Control (under Addington), 1802-1804 ;

Ditto (under Pitt), 1804-1806.

Secretary for War and Colonies (under Pitt), 1805-1806 ;

Ditto (under Portland), 1807-1809 ;

Foreign Secretary (under Liverpool), 1812-1822.

These two appendices have been drawn up by the Rev. A. H. Beaven, who has most kindly allowed me to use them.

A. H.

APPENDIX III

I

CHIEF DATES IN CASTLEREAGH'S POLITICAL CAREER

Born 1769.

At St. John's College, Cambridge, 1788.

M.P. for Down, 1790-1805.

Acting Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, 1797-1798.

Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, 1799-1801.

President of the Board of Control, 1802.

Secretary for War and Colonies, 1805-1806.

Secretary for War and Colonies, 1807-1809.

Out of Office, 1809-1812.

Foreign Secretary, 1812-1822.

Becomes Marquis of Londonderry, 1821.

His death, 1822.

II

CASTLEREAGH AND SIR JOHN MOORE, 1807

GENERAL Sir J. P. Maurice, in his edition of Sir John Moore's Diary (vol. II, pp. 288-9), points out that some of the most important data (viz. much of the correspondence between Castlereagh and Moore) "for judging of the circumstances of the campaign" have not yet been given to the world. It is to be hoped that this very important series of State Papers will become better known.

III

EXTRACT FROM *THE TIMES* OF 1808

Tuesday, June 28th.

"THE two foreigners, whose arrival we announced yesterday, are Spanish Noblemen, and have been brought hither in his

Majesty's Ship *Alcmene*, Capt. Tremlett, as Deputies from the province of Galicia. The Captain of the above mentioned vessel, having occasion to go into the port of Corunna under a flag of truce, was received by the inhabitants of that place with the most marked attention, and invited to be present in person at a meeting of the committee by which the affairs of the insurgents are at present managed. He was there informed of the determination of the province of Galicia to resist the French; and he coincided with the nobles assembled as to the propriety of opening a communication with Great Britain by means of deputies, himself engaging to convey two, that were thereupon nominated, to this country. These gentlemen state, in the strongest terms, the fierce hostility which rages in every Spanish bosom against their French oppressors, and they add that a general levy had taken place in the northern provinces of Spain, amounting to 300,000 men, whose first operation would be an attempt to rescue Madrid from the bloody tyranny of Murat."

IV

EXTRACT FROM *THE TIMES* OF JUNE 30th, 1808

"It is now three weeks since Viscount Materosa and Don Diego de la Vega arrived in London.—

"Their cause and forms conjoined, Preaching to stones, would make 'em capable.' And yet what has been done? All that we can speak of with certainty, exclusive of a few arms, which have been sent, is that exactly on this day fortnight Sir Arthur Wellesley left England to take command of an expedition, said to be bound for Gibraltar; and by letters from Ireland, we find that he had not quitted Dublin on Sunday last. We verily believe that Lord Chatham would ere now have had British troops upon the Spanish frontier."

V

THE DUEL BETWEEN CASTLEREAGH AND
CANNING. SEPTEMBER, 1809

ON this subject see the Diary of Sir John Moore, Vol. 11, p. 394, and The Life of Sir C. Napier, Vol. 1, p. 40. In a letter written by Castlereagh on September 22nd, 1809, the complaints of Canning are dealt with. Of these the second is that Moore was *not given up*.

VI

THE WALCHEREN EXPEDITION

ON February 2nd, 1810, the enquiry by the House of Commons into the Walcheren expedition began. By 178 to 171 Mr. Whitbread's motion for papers relating to the expedition was carried, the vote implying censure upon Lord Chatham and the vindication of Sir Richard Strachan. The latter, according to the testimony of a naval captain, though disapproving of Chatham's plan of operations, had worked with zeal and spirit throughout the operations on the Scheldt, and did all he could to bring them to a successful conclusion.

VII

A CHARACTERISTIC SCENE IN ENGLAND DURING
THE PENINSULAR WAR

THE painter, Haydon, relates that on August 16th, 1810, while he was at Bristol, the mail arrived dressed out with laurels, bringing the news that despatches had arrived from Wellington announcing a victory. Two eagles and flags were hanging out of the window. The people, he says, were all rejoicing, all in a bustle, longing for the *Gazette*, cursing the French, and praising Wellington. On the road the coachman pointed out to the passengers General Whitlocke, of Buenos Ayres fame, who lived near.

VIII

THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO

To commemorate the battle of Waterloo, £500,000 was voted for a monument in which painting, sculpture, and architecture were to have been united. The Academy, however, in order to avenge some previous affront which it thought it had received from the Government, refused to give any advice respecting the proposed monument. Castlereagh and the committee were so disgusted with this conduct of the Academicians that they dropped the whole matter.

IX

THE COERCIVE POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT,
1817-1822

MR. SPENCER WALPOLE, in his *History of England*, proves very conclusively that there was good ground for alarm in 1817 owing to the projects and actions of the "Radicals." He shows how widespread was the discontent, how deep the ramifications of secret societies, and states that "the general discontent had produced a series of lamentable outrages." He then blames severely the Government for taking precautionary measures, and declares that it ought to have had recourse to "mild remedies." He treats with contempt the reports of both Houses of Parliament which agreed in describing the situation in the country as necessitating strong measures for the defence of life and property, and questions their infallibility! It is allowable to ask how any ministry entrusted with the government of the country could have adopted any other course than the one decided upon? As Castlereagh said in 1817, "was Parliament to sit inert and inactive until the means of perpetrating them [crimes] had been brought to maturity?"

X

CASTLEREAGH AND THE RADICALS

IN Bamford's "Life of a Radical," I, p. 166, is an amusing account of "the surprise of the Radical leaders when they were apprehended and examined before the Privy Council and brought in presence of those whom they had been taught to regard as cruel bloodthirsty tyrants."—"Lord Castlereagh, the good-looking person in a plum-coloured coat, with a gold ring on the little finger of his left hand, on which he sometimes looked while addressing them; Lord Sidmouth, a tall, square, and bony figure, with thin and grey hairs, broad and prominent forehead, whose mild and intelligent eyes looked forth from their cavernous orbits; his manners affable, and much more encouraging to freedom of speech than was expected."

XI

THE DEATH OF CASTLEREAGH

Lord Liverpool to Mr. Peel.

"London, August 12th, 1822.

"I must beg of you to break the dreadful intelligence, of which this messenger is the bearer, to the King.

"Poor Londonderry [Castlereagh] is no more: he died by his own hand at nine o'clock this morning. There never was a clearer case of insanity. The King is in some degree prepared for the sad event; he knows what was the state of his mind when he saw him on Friday last. . . . what a sad catastrophe this is, private and public! What a conclusion to such a life! may God have mercy on his soul!" ("Sir Robert Peel," edited by C. S. Parker, p. 319.)

XII

"THE JOURNAL OF SIR WALTER SCOTT"

(Edinburgh; David Douglas, 1890, vol. I, p. 291.)

Sir Walter Scott visited Lord Granville in Paris in November, 1826, and found him occupying the same house as Castlereagh did in 1815.

"Here I saw much of poor Lord Castlereagh—a man of sense, presence of mind, courage and fortitude, which carried him through many an affair of critical moment when finer talents might have stuck in the mire. He had been, I think, indifferently educated, and his mode of speaking being far from logical or correct, he was sometimes in danger of becoming almost ridiculous, in spite of his lofty presence, which had all the grace of the Seymours, and his determined courage. But then he was always up to the occasion, and was an orator to convince, if not to delight his hearers. He is gone and my friend Stanhope also, whose kindness this town so strongly recalls. It is remarkable they were the only persons of sense and credibility who both attested supernatural appearances on their own evidence, and both died in the same melancholy manner."—(Extract from journal of Nov. 1st, 1826.)

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